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Summary
The main goal of this research is to improve the security of large-scale public IaaS
(Infrastructure-as-a-Service) cloud computing environments on the provider side.
We aim to help providers to be more aware of the cloud’s overall security and to
have a sense of control in areas where they actually have no control at all (i.e. the
activities inside the hosted Virtual Machines, or VMs).
In an IaaS model, computing infrastructure is delivered as a service. Consumers
can deploy and run their VMs in the cloud infrastructure that acts as a hosting
environment and offers virtual resources to VMs to consume. Each VM is under the
full control of its owner (the client) and contains operating systems, applications,
and services.
The hosted VMs are managed off-premises by the clients’ IT teams, which could
be security naive, have malicious intentions, or just carelessly ignore security poli-
cies and good practices. Insecure VMs hosted in the public cloud share the service
with other VMs that belong to different organisations which represent a major se-
curity threat.
Providers are trying to manage this threat through contracts and legal obliga-
tions. However, finding the source of the threat is a hard task if there are no security
monitoring tools. Even though providers have no control over what is happening
inside VMs, they are still responsible for protecting the hosted VMs, the infrastruc-
ture, keeping VMs from attacking each other, preventing attacks originating from
their network, and most importantly being able to find the source of the threat.
Therefore, detection systems are needed to monitor each of the hosted VMs with-
out invading their privacy and with the minimum performance overhead.
Providers have to monitor VMs and detect any abnormal activities without re-
quiring any instrumentation inside the VMs. Most of the cloud monitoring tools
available today are designed for performance monitoring, not security purposes.
For this research, we developed two detection systems that are able to monitor
VMs without any level of intrusiveness; we argue that this level of granularity is
sufficient for capturing a number of relevant attack classes. The developed systems
were able to detect abnormal activities within VMs and generate strong anomaly
signals. The first detection system is based on a very low-demanding statistical
method called bag of system calls (BoSC); the second system is based on a more
computationally expensive machine learning method called hidden Markov model
(HMM). The second system is designed specifically to monitor ephemeral VMs
(VMs with a short life) because it requires less training data and less time to be
ready.
In this research we also studied different cloud attacks and developed a cloud-
specific Denial of Service (DoS) class of attacks that work by misusing two of the
ii
main features of the cloud: over-commitment and migration. We call this newly de-
veloped class of attacks ”Cloud-Internal Denial of Service” attacks, or CIDoS. This
attack targets the architecture of the cloud, not the implementation, which makes it
harder to defeat. Then we suggested some detection and prevention mechanisms.
After that, we developed another attack that instrumented a CIDoS attack with re-
verse engineered migration algorithms in the cloud to extract parameters that help
improve the DoS attack and make it harder to detect and defeat.
iii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The main goal of this research is to improve the security of public IaaS
(Infrastructure-as-a-Service) large-scale cloud computing environments on the
provider side. We aim to increase providers’ awareness regarding the cloud’s over-
all security status and help providers have a sense of control in areas where they
have no control at all, such as the activities inside hosted virtual machines (VMs).
Cloud providers in an IaaS model are responsible for protecting both the infras-
tructure and the hosted VMs in addition to preventing VMs from attacking each
other. They are also responsible for preventing any attack originating from their
network from affecting the outside world.
Large-scale public cloud environments are open in nature, which gives attack-
ers easy access to the cloud network as consumers. They can easily access the
provider network sharing the same physical hosts with other bystander consumers.
Malicious consumers might use their VMs and try to extract sensitive data from
other co-resident VMs, prevent them from using the service, starve them, steal the
service from them, use the service at their expense, attack the infrastructure, satu-
rate the cloud network, or disrupt the service, all of which might affect the reliabil-
ity of the service, in addition to affecting provider’s reputation and might lead to a
Service Level Agreement breach.
The cloud would be more secure if providers could successfully prevent attack-
ers from being consumers in the first place; however, this is very challenging in
large-scale public cloud environments where there are hundreds of thousands of
VMs, some are permanent and others are temporary, and automated provisioning
is one of the essential characteristics of the cloud. According to the NIST defini-
tion of cloud computing, ”a consumer can unilaterally provision computing capa-
bilities, such as server time and network storage, as needed automatically without
requiring human interaction with each service provider” [122].
There are plenty of research today focused on authentication in the cloud and
checking the true identity of potential requesters of the service; however, this is a
very complicated task and there will always be vulnerabilities; the attacker may
frequently succeed in having a foot inside the cloud either by being a consumer, hi-
jacking VMs, stealing legitimate consumers’ credentials, attacking vulnerable ser-
vices or unpatched VMs, or any other means.
Maintaining the security of the large-scale cloud is more challenging because
VMs are 100% under the control of the cloud’s clients.
Since:
1. providers have no control inside VMs and they are 100% under the control of
the client (VM owner, also called the client or consumer),
1
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2. monitoring VMs is essential to maintain the security of the cloud and protect
other co-resident VMs,
3. hosted VMs are potential threats because the cloud is an open environment1
and clients are free to choose what to install in their VMs (operating systems,
applications, security tools, and possibility highly vulnerable applications)
which means, the cloud environment should be considered hostile,
4. providers are responsible for maintaining the security of the cloud and pre-
venting VMs from attacking each other, the infrastructure, or the outside
world. They are responsible for monitoring and detecting attacks on their
network and within hosts.
There is a need for tools that allow providers to monitor hosted VMs and detect
any potential threat. Having no control inside VMs makes the provider’s responsi-
bility of maintaining security a hard goal to achieve. The straightforward solution
for this problem is to allow providers to have control within VMs by installing
agents or monitoring applications inside each of them. This solution is applicable
in limited private IaaS clouds but not in large-scale public clouds. This is true for
many reasons:
• Accessing each of the possibly millions of hosted VMs in a large-scale public
cloud (which is the environment we target in this research) and collecting de-
tailed data about all of their activities, analysing these data, extracting mean-
ingful security information, and making decisions based on that information
will definitely impose a great performance overhead, which will increase the
cost and carbon footprint of the service.
• The cost model in the cloud is pay for what you use. Therefore, any activities
inside VMs consume resources, and clients are billed for these. If security
monitoring tools are deployed inside VMs, who will be charged for the re-
sources consumed by the monitoring tools? If the clients are charged for the
monitoring activities, this means they will pay for resources they have not
used, which is against the cloud cost model.
• Allowing providers to access hosted VMs will heavily affect clients’ privacy;
monitoring applications that are managed by the provider will allow access
to clients’ private data.
• There is already a lack of trust between providers and clients; allowing
providers to access VMs will amplify this problem. Clients are not sure
if providers are maintaining the security of the cloud properly, following
the best security practices, and protecting their data. On the other hand,
providers cannot be sure of whether a client is innocent or a hacker and using
the service properly or for malicious purposes. Providers also cannot be sure
if clients are following the best security practices by using safe applications
and operating systems, applying security patches, and maintaining their cre-
dentials properly. Allowing providers to access clients’ VMs will amplify the
trust problem.
1A public cloud offers services (automated provisioning) to almost anyone that can pay the cost,
i.e. businesses, governments, individuals, and possible attackers [181]. This is discussed further in
the state of the art chapter, chapter 3.
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• The ability to monitor VMs from the inside might increase the provider lia-
bility for VMs’ illegal activities.
Therefore, for security (trust and privacy), legal, and performance reasons, lim-
iting the depth of intrusiveness benefits providers and should be one of their main
targets. We aim to improve the security of large-scale public IaaS by developing
tools that allow providers to monitor VMs and detect any anomalous behaviour
inside VMs without accessing them. The idea is to build an identity or a character
for each VM and detect any change in behaviour and consider it as anomaly. This
idea will also allow a provider to assess the security condition of clients, and thus
the cloud’s overall security status. It will also help providers have a sense of control
in areas where they have no control at all, such as the activities inside hosted VMs.
In this research, we proposed a method to monitor system calls at the VM host
level without requiring any instrumentation within VMs.2 We argue that this level
of granularity is sufficient to capture numerous relevant attack classes. This, to-
gether with the efficiency of the approach, is shown through experiments and sta-
tistical analysis in a Linux KVM-based reference scenario.
We monitored system calls because they reflect every activity occurring inside
the monitored VMs. The only way of communication between a VM and its host is
through system calls. We dealt with the VM as a black box and found two streams
of data coming out of it that might give indications about normal and abnormal
activities occurring inside. The first source of data is the system calls, and the sec-
ond is network traffic (packets). The monitoring of inbound and outbound net-
work traffic is generally performed using network-based intrusion detection sys-
tems (NIDSs) and firewalls, which are outside of the scope of this research. We
focus on monitoring VMs using hypervisor host-based intrusion detection systems
(HIDS). The proposed systems are not an alternative to NIDS, but rather are com-
plementary.
Furthermore, system call-based HIDS has been proven, in the literature, to be
very efficient at creating representative normal behaviour profiles for hosts, in ad-
dition to providing a high detection rate, low false positive rate, reasonable over-
head, and successful generation of strong anomaly signals in case of attacks [63],
[93], and [128]. There are many methods to process system calls; our first detection
system is based on a very low-demand statistical method called the bag of system
calls (BoSC), which is used to monitor all of the system calls invoked by VMs.
The hypothesis behind this first detection system (BoSC) is that a normal be-
haviour profile can be built for VMs hosted in large-scale public IaaS environments
using sequences of system calls only. A strong enough anomaly signal is generated
when comparing abnormal sequences of system calls with the normal behaviour
profiles that are built using a bag of system calls representation method that ig-
nores the order of system calls and relies only on frequencies.
Collecting system calls does not require accessing VMs or installing any script
on them (knowing that no instrumentation within VMs is a main requirement).
System calls might also reflect the security status of the VM and useful security
2System calls are the interface between processes and the operating system. In cloud environ-
ments, VMs communicate with the host kernel and send requests for resources through system calls.
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information can be extracted from them. Furthermore, monitoring the system calls
invoked by a VM has a very limited effect on a VM’s privacy.
BoSC was derived from bags of words modelling, which is a popular representa-
tion method in speech recognition. In BoSC, the order of the system calls is ignored,
and only their frequencies are considered. Researchers in [93] have proven that the
frequencies of system calls are enough to build a normal behaviour profile for pro-
cesses and detect anomalies reliably.
We built a cloud network in the laboratory, collected streams of system calls
from VMs (normal and malicious), and then built a BoSC classifier that we trained
using normal data and tested using both normal and malicious data. We monitored
the entire VM (with its operating system, applications, and services) as a single
process. The system we developed works specifically for cloud environments, and
we found by experiment and through hypothesis testing that it generated a strong
enough anomaly signal and could detect anomalies reliably with a 100% detection
rate and no false positives.
The other system we developed was based on the more computationally ex-
pensive machine learning method: the hidden Markov model (HMM). This system
was designed to work in cloud environments to monitor ephemeral VMs because
of its ability to work on the fly; it requires less training data and less time to be
ready and start detecting anomalies.
The hypothesis behind the second detection system is that a normal behaviour
profile can be built for ephemeral VMs hosted in IaaS environments using a limited
number of system call sequences. A strong enough anomaly signal is generated
when comparing abnormal sequences of system calls with the normal behaviour
profiles that are built using an HMM representation method.
Ephemeral VMs are VMs that live for a short period of time (i.e. an hour or
two) and perform specific tasks, after which they terminate. Ephemeral VMs and
the model behind them are very popular in the cloud; they suit the cloud’s nature.
For instance, when an organisation needs to analyse terabytes of data, hundreds of
VMs can be initiated in the cloud for an hour or two to perform the analysis. They
will then terminate, which saves time and also ensures that consumers will still pay
the same amount of money as they would be charged if only one VM was installed
and worked for a long period of time.3
The intrusion detection system (IDS) used to monitor ephemeral VMs has to
be able to finish training and create the normal behaviour profile using a small
amount of data in a short period of time. HMM-based detection systems might
require more computational power than BoSC systems, but computational power
is not a scarce resource in the cloud.
The hypervisor HMM-based IDS we developed works specifically for cloud en-
vironments. We found by experiment that it consumed a small amount of data for
training (about 780,000 system calls to train the classifier, which is about 19 MB)
and provided a 97% accuracy, 100% detection rate, and 5.66% false positive rate 4.
Hypothesis testing was used to verify that the anomaly signal was strong enough.
3This is particularly true if there is enough data parallelism [11].
4The accuracy is the proportion of data correctly classified (true positives and true negatives).
The detection rate is the proportion of malicious data correctly classified (true positives only). The
false positive rate is the proportion of data that is falsely classified as malicious (false positives only).
4
1. INTRODUCTION
We also used numerous ideas and tricks to reduce the size of the normal be-
haviour profiles and the time and computational power needed to build the clas-
sifiers and detect anomalies. The details of these ideas and tricks are discussed in
detail in chapter 4.
For this research, we also studied different cloud attacks and developed a cloud-
specific denial of service (DoS) class of attacks that works by misusing two of the
main features of the cloud: ’over-commitment’ and ’migration’.
Migration is the process of moving a running (or offline) VM from one host to
another for load balancing and/or energy saving. For example, a VM might be
migrated to save energy by evacuating and then turning off a low-utilised host or
to create more room in an over-utilised host. The process of moving a VM from
one host to another is very expensive because it consumes bandwidth and com-
putational power, and affects the security by increasing the attack surface. Dur-
ing the migration, the entire VM is transmitted through the network, which gives
the attacker the chance to attack the VM passively by eavesdropping for sensitive
data or information. If the attacker succeeds in taking a snapshot of the VM in
the transmission channel, this will give him or her the chance to attack the VM of-
fline without raising suspicion or leaving any trace. All parts of the VM have to
be migrated, including the running memory, which increases the danger of data
loss and requires tools to maintain the integrity and confidentiality of the transmit-
ted data. Furthermore, authentication and authorisation mechanisms should be in
place, and the security of the source and destination servers should be considered.
Finally, there should also be monitoring and alerting mechanisms for VMs during
migration to detect any stealing, tampering, or dropping of the data. Migration de-
cision mechanisms might also be a target for attackers, initiating migration orders
for false reasons or cancelling a valid order.
If it is a live migration, the VM (including the running memory) has to be moved
while running. Turning off the VM to migrate it would cause a disruption of the ser-
vice. Ideally, migration should be done without the consumers’ awareness, without
the need for them to adapt or track the change in location [15]. Migration and over-
commitment are essential to efficiently manage the cloud’s resources.
Over-commitment occurs when cloud servers are allowed to host more VMs
than they can afford, relying on the expectation that not all of the VMs will be
used to the maximum at the same time [182]; an idea similar to over-booking in the
airline industry5. A high over-commitment ratio increases the utilisation of cloud
servers. However, it might cause a service level agreement violation if the provider
fails to provide what it promises [182]. As we will discuss in detail later, over-
commitment is a key factor for allowing elasticity and reducing cost by sharing
resources.
We developed a cloud denial of service attack that targets these two features.
We call this newly developed class of attacks a ”Cloud-Internal Denial of Service at-
tack”, or CIDoS. This kind of attack targets the architecture of the cloud rather than
its implementation, which makes it harder to defeat. The main idea is to trigger
the very expensive migration process for fake reasons. Depending on the success
5In the airline industry, airline companies usually offer a greater number of tickets than the seats
available on the flight, relying on expectations that a percentage of passengers will miss the flight
[182].
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and extensiveness of this attack, it could cause a complete paralysis of the cloud. If
VMs enter a continuous migration state, the entire cloud will have difficulty func-
tioning and the availability will be heavily affected which might lead to a breach of
the service level agreement (SLA) and loss of reputation and potential customers.
The attackers in a CIDoS attack are a group of co-resident VMs that communi-
cate through covert channels. They coordinate their resource consumption rates by
building on each other in a technique similar to jamming signals to break thresh-
olds that trigger migration. The attack is actualised by a novel protocol based on
a group key agreement (JKT protocol [86]) to establish a session key, packet delay
variation (to synchronise the time), pulse-code modulation (to digitise the work-
load patterns), and leader election protocol (to choose a leader for the attack). The
attack pattern is calculated and distributed using spread spectrum techniques. The
attack, like with many cloud attacks, requires co-residency, a co-residency check,
and covert channels for communication. The protocol has a very low complexity
O(n + T ) for the key agreement protocol and requires the sending of a very small
stream of data (less than 100 bits in the example we studied).
We then suggested some detection and prevention mechanisms for the CIDoS
class of attacks that are based on calculating the workload correlation of VMs over
time, which are actualised using a novel protocol. We also suggested methods of
prevention and responses to the attack.
After that, we developed another attack that employs a CIDoS attack in addi-
tion to reverse engineered migration algorithms in the cloud to extract parameters
that help to improve DoS attacks and make them harder to detect and defeat. We
designed a stealthy and randomised probing strategy to learn the parameters and
thresholds used in the process of making migration decisions in the cloud. In a
CIDoS attack (without the improvement), it is assumed that the workload thresh-
olds that need to be broken to trigger the migration are known to the attackers. In
reality these thresholds are hidden, and it was necessary to design a new attack to
discover them, which was the improvement of the CIDoS attack.
In the improvement, we perform sequential runs of the attack to extract and re-
veal these parameters and thresholds. The attack is based on CIDoS, together with
statistical analysis. We will call the sequential runs of the attack tests because the
attacker here is testing the cloud management algorithms to collect measurements.
We also designed a formal model for the migration decision process, and then cre-
ated a dynamic algorithm to extract the required hidden parameters. The mecha-
nisms to extract these thresholds adapt to dynamic changes in cloud management
algorithms. Revealing the parameters is a security breach in itself; furthermore, the
revealed parameters can be used in a CIDoS attack to allow the malicious VMs to
accurately generate the needed workload to cause the required effect (trigger migra-
tion). It is vital that the generated workload be no more than what is required to
reduce the possibility of detection and make the attack live longer; attackers will
try to keep the host on edge. Attackers can also use their understanding of the ap-
plied migration policies and algorithms to avoid being migrated, as we will see in
chapter 5.
To outline the main goals, this research was guided by two main questions.
The first research question was by monitoring only the system calls invoked by a VM
and without prior knowledge or any instrumentation within the VM, are we able to create
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a character of the VM representing its normal behaviour and is this level of granularity
sufficient to capture a number of relevant attack classes?
The hypothesis under this part is that a normal behaviour profile can be built
for IaaS-hosted VMs by monitoring the sequences of system calls invoked by them.
We assumed that VMs generate sufficient data for training, VMs are not initially
malicious, and they are limited in the number of used services and applications
(their behaviours are relatively consistent).
In this part, we proposed two systems. The hypothesis for the first system is
that a normal behaviour profile can be built for VMs hosted in an IaaS environment
using sequences of system calls, and a strong enough anomaly signal is generated
when comparing abnormal sequences of system calls with the normal behaviour
profiles. The normal behaviour profiles are built using a bag of system calls rep-
resentation method, which ignores the order of system calls and only relies on fre-
quencies.
The hypothesis for the second system is that a normal behaviour profile can
be built for ephemeral VMs hosted in IaaS environments using limited number
of system calls sequences. A strong enough anomaly signal is generated when
comparing abnormal sequences of system calls with the normal behaviour profiles
that are built using an HMM representation method.
The second research question is by coordinating the resource consumption of a group
of co-resident malicious VMs, can we force the cloud orchestration service to trigger a
migration order? Under this part, we hypothesise that in a large-scale public IaaS
cloud, if m malicious co-resident VMs coordinate their workload consumption to
break the cloud migration algorithms thresholds, the migration order will be trig-
gered for false reasons.
1.1 Short Background
One of the best definitions of cloud computing is NIST SP 800-145 [122]; it is the de
facto standard for defining cloud computing, describing its essential characteristic,
service, and deployment models.
The NIST defines cloud computing as ”a model for enabling ubiquitous, con-
venient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing
resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can
be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service
provider interaction. This cloud model is composed of five essential characteris-
tics, three service models, and four deployment models” [122].
Cloud computing provides the best solution for data analysis, distributed stor-
age, and high-performance computing [15]. It also helps distributed government
services, agencies, and organisations reduce their spending on IT and increase their
efficiency. In February 2011, the U.S. government issued the Federal Cloud Com-
puting Strategy that describes cloud computing as a ”profound economic and tech-
nical shift (with) great potential to reduce the cost of Federal Information Technol-
ogy (IT) systems while improving IT capabilities and stimulating innovation in IT
solutions” [90].
IaaS is one of the cloud service models and NIST defined it as ”the capabil-
ity provided to the consumer is to provision processing, storage, networks, and
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other fundamental computing resources where the consumer is able to deploy and
run arbitrary software, which can include operating systems and applications. The
consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure but has
control over operating systems, storage, and deployed applications; and possibly
limited control of select networking components (e.g., host firewalls)” [122].
Public service providing is one of the deployment models, the other being pri-
vate, community, and hybrid.6 The NIST defined a public service model as ”the
cloud infrastructure is provisioned for open use by the general public. It may be
owned, managed, and operated by a business, academic, or government organiza-
tion, or some combination of them. It exists on the premises of the cloud provider”
[122].
The service in a private cloud is provided for a single organization and could
even be deployed on-premises, which makes the cloud security close to that of the
traditional IT security architecture. A public cloud has a different architecture that
requires rethinking security and developing new solutions [102].
A public large-scale cloud introduces new threats and vulnerabilities. One of
its main characteristics is that it’s accessed through the public Internet. Therefore,
consumers need a working, secure, and reliable Internet connection to enjoy the ser-
vice. If the there is a problem in the Internet infrastructure reliability (i.e. failure,
network congestion, or attack), the cloud service will not be reliable either, from the
consumer perspective [15]. Another characteristic is that cloud environments have
a heavy workload that has to be processed and monitored, which requires special
security tools that can tolerate a heavy workload without falling over. Furthermore,
there is the problem of adapting to new service paradigms from a security perspec-
tive [148]. There are also the threats introduced by multi-tenancy (sharing the same
physical host and address space); access policies and hypervisors are the only sep-
aration between co-resident VMs belonging to different organisations. Any flow
in the implementation or access policies management could affect all aspects of
consumers’ security [15].
Large-scale cloud providers are usually a homogeneous environment; they use
the same systems, configurations, and protocols. Therefore, any discovered vulner-
ability might cause severe damage and propagate very quickly. This homogeneity
usually attracts hackers because it is worth the effort; one discovered vulnerability
can be applied in many places [138].
1.2 Published Papers
As an outcome of the research findings, five research papers were published with
the following titles:
1. ”Detecting Anomalies in IaaS Environments Through Virtual Machine Host
System Call Analysis” [3]. This paper was published in 2012 in IEEE and
it discussed the first detection system (BoSC) to monitor regular cloud VMs
from outside.
6The definition of private, community, and hybrid deployment models can be found in NIST SP
800-145 [122], we only focus on the public model.
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2. ”Anomaly Detection for Ephemeral Cloud IaaS Virtual Machines” [4]. This
paper was published in 2012 in the Springer and it covered the detection sys-
tem for ephemeral VMs.
Chapter 4 covers the details of the previous two papers.
3. ”Robust Coordination of Cloud-Internal Denial of Service Attacks” [5]. This
paper was published in 2013 in IEEE. The paper discussed the details of the
CIDoS attack and the algorithm we developed to coordinate the attack.
4. ”Mitigation of Cloud-Internal Denial of Service Attacks” [6]. This paper was
published in 2014 in IEEE and discussed mitigation strategies for CIDoS at-
tacks.
5. ”Dynamic Parameter Reconnaissance for Stealthy DoS Attack within Cloud
Systems” [7]. This paper has been accepted and will be published soon in the
Springer. It discusses the improvement of the CIDoS attack and methods and
algorithms to extract hidden cloud parameters.
Chapter 5 covers the details of the last three papers.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The next chapter, chapter 2, contains definitions and background information; we
discuss the definition of cloud computing, the main cloud models and character-
istics, and their architectures. We also discuss security standards, concerns, and
monitoring in the cloud.
The state-of-the-art in chapter 3 covers the literature on IaaS cloud security in
general, hypervisor-based IDSs, cloud-specific IDSs, and a survey of different at-
tacks against the IaaS cloud, with a discussion on the mechanisms used. The pro-
posed detection systems with the details of the experiments carried out and the
evaluation of the systems are discussed in chapter 4. We also evaluate other similar
systems and discuss attacks against a system call-based IDS.
In chapter 5, we discuss the CIDoS class of attacks, related literature, the threat
model, possible mitigation strategies, and the extension of the attack by discovering
hidden cloud parameters and using them to strengthen the CIDoS attack.
In the concluding chapter, chapter 6, we summarise the problems we discov-
ered and the proposed solutions. We also summarise the CIDoS class of attacks
and its improvement and discuss future work.
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Background
”As of now, computer networks
are still in their infancy, but as
they grow up and become
sophisticated, we will probably
see the spread of ’computer
utilities’ which, like present
electric and telephone utilities,
will service individual homes
and offices across the country”
[10].
LEONARD KLEINROCK CHIEF
SCIENTISTS OF ARPANET IN
1969.
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the context of this study. The purpose
of this chapter is to help the reader understand what cloud computing is (especially
public IaaS, which is the subject of the study), by discussing the idea of cloud com-
puting, its architecture, usage pattern, the user’s and provider’s roles, and cloud
security concerns, monitoring, and best practices. Furthermore, providers’ security
responsibilities and area of control are discussed in detail to make the reader aware
of the providers’ limitations and help them understand the context of the solutions
proposed in this research. The basics of virtualisation security are also covered
here, in addition to background information about intrusion detection systems in
general.
2.1 Cloud Computing Idea and History
In datacentres, large amounts of money are wasted on electricity, maintenance,
hardware, space, and operating expenses for very low-utilised servers. The esti-
mation of server utilisation in datacentres ranges from 5% to 20% [11]. Consolidat-
ing servers by installing more services on them is not always a suitable solution,
especially if the service has a high variant workload. Usually, many services have
a peak workload that ”exceeds the average by factors of 2 to 10” [11]. Servers in
datacentres must be able to provide the service at the peak time, which might make
them almost idle during off-peak times which waste energy and money.
Servers should also be ready to provide the service during predicted times of
increases in consumption, in addition to coping with unexpected jumps in con-
sumption due to good reasons (i.e. more consumers) or bad reasons (i.e. a denial of
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service attack). For instance, if a high-profile user on Twitter broadcasts a message
about a service, an unexpected jump in consumption might occur, which might
stress the aforementioned service hosting resources. The service should be able to
cope with the situation and not falls over due to the sudden increase in consump-
tion.
Deploying servers that are able to provision the service for peak times and both
predicted and unexpected increases in workload causes a huge waste of money
and an increase in carbon emissions. The more pronounced the variation between
these three factors and the average utilisation, the more unnecessary the expenses
and pollution.
What is more, new businesses (and new developers) usually have problems
predicting the expected workload of a newly provided application or service. They
might over-provision (thus wasting money, which is a sensitive issue for new busi-
nesses) or under-provision (thus losing potential customers, revenue, and reputa-
tion). Workload prediction is a very challenging but essential task; new services
and applications have to be equipped with enough computation power, band-
width, and IT staff.
The computing industry has evolved by offering very flexible computing power
as a service that:
• reduces the criticality of workload prediction,
• reduces the waste of resources due to low-utilised servers, thus reducing car-
bon emissions,
• shifts capital expenses to operational expenses, which helps new businesses
start with lower capitals,
• allows easy and fast release of machines when the job is done,
• allows easy and fast deploy of new machines when needed,
• provides backup machines as part of a disaster recovery plan,
• scales up and down based on the workloads,
• limits the loss of money if the new business has fail,
• requires less IT personnel,
• allow fast deployment of new services (because there is no need to buy and
install physical servers), and
• reduces maintenance effort.
Furthermore, as stated in [11], ”companies with large batch-oriented tasks can
get results as quickly as their programs can scale, since using 1000 servers for one
hour costs no more than using one server for 1000 hours. This elasticity of re-
sources, without paying a premium for large scale, is unprecedented in the history
of IT.”
The saving will also become more feasible in extremely large-scale cloud
providers due to deploying datacentres at low-cost locations and decreasing the
cost of electricity, network bandwidth, operations, and hardware [11].
Microsoft Hotmail, introduced in 1996, can be considered the first software-as-
a-service (SaaS) cloud computing service.1 One of the most popular platform-as-a-
service (PaaS) providers is salesforce.com, which was established in 1999 to deliver
1Microsoft Hotmail is an email service provided online, replacing client-server architecture mode.
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enterprise applications via a simple website [143]. Amazon (started in 2006) is one
of the first infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) providers in the market; it is currently
the most popular one. Before the emergence of cloud computing, Amazon already
had the required infrastructure to make a large-scale public cloud provider. Then
Microsoft, Google, VMware, and other blue-chip companies followed Amazon and
started providing public cloud services.
The national institute of standards and technology (NIST) defined cloud com-
puting in Special Publication 800-145 [122]. Their definition has become the de facto
definition of cloud computing. The first draft of the definition was submitted to
the international committee for information technology standards (INCITS) as the
U.S. contribution [58]. It took the NIST more than two years and over 15 revisions
of the definition to reach the final version.
2.2 Cloud Computing Definition
The NIST defined cloud computing as ”a model for enabling ubiquitous, con-
venient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing
resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can
be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service
provider interaction. This cloud model is composed of five essential characteris-
tics, three service models, and four deployment models” [122].
2.2.1 Cloud Characteristics
Cloud computing, according to the NIST, has five main characteristics. First, con-
sumers should be able to increase the used resources based on their demand auto-
matically with almost no human intervention from the provider side - ’on-demand
self-service’. Second, the service should be able to accessed through the network
using any type of device, such as tablets, laptops, and computers - ’broad network
access’. Third, cloud resources are pooled and used by different users concurrently
(multi-tenancy); the user might choose the location or region for its machines but
without being aware of the exact location - ’resource pooling’.
The fourth characteristic is ’rapid elasticity’: consumers can increase and de-
crease the used resources on demand and sometimes automatically. Resources
should be available to consumers at any time and in any quantity; they should ap-
pear unlimited to consumers. The last characteristic is ’measured service’: consumers
pay only for what they use - pay-per-use model [122].
Some of these characteristics have long been part of the computing industry
(such as on-demand self-service and broad network access) and so the security risk they
pose is well known. Other characteristics, especially when combined with other
cloud features and characteristics, are posing rather new security challenges. One
such characteristic is resource pooling in a public IaaS, which introduces a wide range
of threats caused by multi-tenancy. In particular, if the service is shared among
consumers from different organisations, some of them might be malicious users
or even competitors. If there is isolation insufficiency between co-resident users,
malicious ones might attack their co-residents. For example, they can steal their
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confidential data, analyse their behaviour, monitor their transactions, and interrupt
their service by conducting a denial of service attack.
The other characteristic that poses a security challenge is rapid elasticity when
combined with self-service and automation. There is a threat of attackers increasing
the bills of other consumers by forcing them to request more resources (expand) for
false reasons, fake requests, or incomplete requests of the service.
Roman et al. in [74] defined elasticity as ”the degree to which a system is able
to adapt to workload changes by provisioning and deprovisioning resources in an
autonomic manner, such that at each point in time the available resources match the
current demand as closely as possible.” There are a number of published research
papers discussing the automation of elasticity in the cloud, which is when the cloud
expands automatically without any human intervention from either sides (cloud’s
clients and cloud administrators). Today, the automatic elasticity feature is not
activated in many cloud providers. However, we believe that it is essential and has
to be activated with the development of the cloud when it becomes more mature;
solutions should be developed to deal with the risks posed.
Cloud computing, according to the NIST, has three service models: software-as-
a-service (SaaS), platform-as-a-service (PaaS), and infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS).
In the SaaS model, cloud providers offer their application to users through the net-
work. Users can access the application using thin clients and browsers or program
interfaces designed to communicate with the other applications hosted in the cloud.
PaaS model are offered for applications developers as a development environ-
ment in which to host and support developers with libraries, services, supported
tools, networks, and storage. In IaaS, providers offer the needed infrastructure and
resources to host consumers’ machines (virtual machines). IaaS providers offer
computing power, storage, networks, and any other supporting resources to host
VMs. Each host in the cloud IaaS model is occupied by a number of VMs sharing
the resources; the VMs are isolated from each other by the virtualisation layer. If
the hosting service is offered to only one organisation exclusively, the deployment
model in this scenario is a private cloud. The infrastructure in the private model
could be either on-premises of the organisation or off-premises. The public deploy-
ment model is when the cloud service, infrastructure, and resources are offered to
different organisations and individuals to share [122].
There is also a third deployment model: the community cloud deployment model.
In this model, the service is offered to a specific community, like health care, where
organisations belong to this community share the same cloud and the same con-
cerns, policies, regulations, etc. [122]. The last deployment model is the hybrid,
where more than one deployment model is used. The deployment models are
bound to each other using technologies that enable data exchange and application
portability [122].
Sometimes cloud providers offer mixed service deployment models to support
each other, such as Microsoft Azure, which offers mainly PaaS models and supports
it with an IaaS in a way similar to value chains, in which organisations deploy a
series of activities to add more values to the offered service [123] and [142].
IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS all represent an abstract level, with IaaS being the lowest
abstraction level. IaaS can provide a service to PaaS and SaaS; PaaS can provide a
service to SaaS but not to IaaS; and SaaS cannot provide a service to PaaS or IaaS
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[123].
2.3 Cloud Usage Patterns
There are three common scenarios for using cloud service. First, there is the simple
scenario, in which a provider provides the service directly to end users. Second, the
hybrid service is when the end user consumes different cloud services from differ-
ent providers, concurrently. Third, the value chains are when different providers
collaborate to add values to a service or when one provider deploys more than one
cloud service model to add values to its end users’ service [123].
2.3.1 Stakeholders
Stakeholders are the players in cloud usage scenarios. The first player is the cloud
service provider, which could be either a native provider or a non-native one. A na-
tive provider is one that owns the cloud infrastructure, while a non-native provider
rents the infrastructure from another cloud service provider. Non-native providers
are also called intermediary providers because they consume cloud services and
provide cloud services to end users. End users are also stakeholders and can be
individuals, applications, enterprises, or governmental institutions [123]. There are
also cloud partners, third parties, and service brokers.
In the public cloud, there is a problem of trust between different players. Con-
sumers are not sure if providers will maintain the security of the cloud properly,
have a disaster recovery plan, and protect consumers’ data and VMs. Consumers
cannot even be sure if providers are accessing their data or not. On the other hand,
providers cannot be sure whether a consumer is innocent or a hacker, and whether
they are using the the service properly or for malicious purposes.
Since there is a problem of trust between consumers and providers, regulatory
compliance and service level agreements (SLAs) are needed.
2.3.2 Regulatory Compliance
Regulatory compliance is needed to ensure that providers are following the best
security practices and deploying the needed security controls and processes to pro-
tect the infrastructure and consumers’ data. Furthermore, regulatory compliance is
essential to reducing the risk inherent in relying on cloud services.
2.3.3 Service Level Agreements (SLAs)
A service level agreement is the key accountability agreement between a cloud con-
sumer and its provider to gain assurance of risk mitigation. It has to specify the
minimum level of quality of services (QoS), such as level of availability, response
time, and error-rate. For instance, response time is critical in some businesses (i.e.
voice processing). Such businesses have to guarantee the minimum response time
before moving the service to the cloud, which is specified in the SLA. There are
two types of SLAs, internal and external. Internal SLAs specify the acceptable QoS
between a consumer and a provider belonging to the same cloud, while external
SLAs are between two different organisations.
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Due to the flexibility of the cloud, there might be a future need for dynamic
SLAs. Dynamic SLAs can change automatically with consumers’ needs and re-
quirements, unlike general SLAs that describe entire classes of services [35].
Still there is a problem of SLA compliance, assurance, and violation reporting.
The performance and compliance (i.e. the response time or error rate) should be
checked continuously to guarantee that the QoS level is maintained. Furthermore,
there is a need for regulatory compliance evaluation, which is usually performed
by a trusted third party. There is also a need for a continuous risk assessment to en-
sure continued acceptable performance in the face of new security threats. Security
monitoring is a main part of the risk assessment and management process. Con-
tinuous monitoring is essential to detecting violations and to predicting violations
before they occur. These tasks should be performed automatically without human
intervention to suit the cloud model.
For availability, providers usually determine the minimum level of availability
they guarantee in the SLA (i.e. Amazon guarantees 99.95% availability in a year).
Downtime due to scheduled maintenance is not considered in the calculation of the
overall downtime for the SLA.
2.4 Who Uses the Cloud
The best candidates to move to the cloud are businesses with an unsteady workload
and varied demands on the IT services. For example, if a large amount of comput-
ing power is needed only once a week or just during Christmas time, then moving
the service to the cloud might save money and effort, and require smaller IT teams.
Businesses with unknown in-advance demand are also good candidates for the
cloud [11]. New small-to-medium organisations can launch their services faster in
the cloud with less initial capital expenses. The reduction of capital expenses due to
the use of cloud computing might cause an increase in the operational costs. How-
ever, it could also cause the opposite (a reduction in the operational costs) if the
business nature is suitable for cloud computing (i.e. has a highly varied workload
or unknown in-advance demand). Businesses with limited technical resources (i.e.
IT experts personnel) are also good candidates for cloud computing.
In contrast, large and old organisations with legacy infrastructure might find
it hard to migrate to the cloud due to lack of interoperability. Furthermore, the
cost of migration might be very high to some businesses (i.e. companies handling
critically sensitive data) to the extent that cloud computing is not a choice. Regula-
tory compliance restrictions sometimes prevent some organisations from benefiting
from the cloud. For example, U.S.-based cloud hosting usually has a problem with
European and Canadian companies due to the Patriot Act, which gives the U.S.
government the right to access hosted data; this leads to a potential privacy breach
[18].
2.5 Cloud Providers
Providers for the public cloud should be ready with a massive infrastructure and
massive pool of computing resources (networks, storage, servers, and services).
They also have to be ready with the experience, tools, and IT personnel to manage
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the resources. Experience in maintaining security and deploying security control
are essential to protecting the cloud and its consumers. Providers are responsible
for providing a secure multi-tenant environment. Access policies, data protection,
authentication, identity management, access control, accountability, forensics sup-
port, policy integration, and privacy control all are essential to providing a trust-
worthy cloud service; providers have to be able to provide these security mecha-
nisms. Large responsibilities and high demand of experiences allow only blue-chip
companies, such as the very popular online retailer Amazon.com, to offer large-
scale public IaaS cloud service.
2.6 Cloud Security Standards, Best Practices, and
Guidelines
There are three major issues slowing businesses’ adoption of cloud services: trust,
interoperability, and the cost of migration.
To deal with the trust problem, some form of evaluation is needed to help con-
sumers decide if they can trust the provider and help them calculate the risk in-
troduced by moving to the cloud. Security standards are essential to provide this
evaluation, which helps providers prove that they have sufficient security controls.
Furthermore, government agencies require cloud services that can ensure security
and compliance.
Standardising cloud environments is also essential to ensuring interoperability
and ease of integration. There are many general IT security standards; however,
cloud security standards are often missed. If the cloud is going to be thought of as a
utility, an industry-wide cloud security standard has to be developed.
2.6.1 Cloud Security Alliance (CSA)
When the cloud was first introduced, non-profit organisation, Cloud Security Al-
liance (CSA) developed a cloud security best practices. Almost all major cloud
providers (such as Amazon, Oracle, RedHat, and Salesforce) are members of the
CSA.
The CSA published a report of nine top threats to cloud computing with rec-
ommendations and guidelines [9]. They also developed a compliance standard
called cloud control matrix (CCM), which provides standard security controls that
can guide providers and help consumers in the assessment of the risks associated
with a provider [42]. It also provides a detailed framework for cloud information
security and covers the area of operational risk management, cloud threats and vul-
nerabilities, security control requirements, normalisation of security expectations,
cloud taxonomy and terminology, and security measures.
2.6.2 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
The NIST’s Special Publication 800-95 Guide to Secure Web Services is for web ser-
vices in general, but is also useful for cloud computing [102]. They also have
more recent publications designed specifically for cloud security. In addition to the
NIST definition of cloud computing [122], the NIST published Special Publication
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800-144 Guidelines on Security and Privacy in Public Cloud Computing, which covers
public cloud security and privacy challenges, outsourcing recommendations, cloud
threats, and technology risks and safeguards. The guidelines are designed for con-
sumers to help them evaluate the security of providers [85].
2.6.3 ISO 27017 and ISO 27018
The ISO is publishing two cloud security standards in 2015: ISO 27017 and ISO
27018. The new standards are to apply 27001 and 27002 to cloud computing. They
will also provide guidance to ensure that providers offer suitable security control
and maintain the privacy of their customers. The standards also consider other ISO
standards such as ISO/IEC 27031 on business continuity and ISO/IEC 27036-4 on
relationship management [84] and [1].
2.6.4 IEEE P2301
IEEE project P2301 guide for cloud portability and interoperability profiles (CPIP) is
a guide aiming to help cloud providers and consumers ”in developing, building,
and using standards-based cloud computing products and services” [83]. CPIP
offers recommendations to providers and consumers in choosing standards-based
applications, interfaces, file formats, operation conventions and other areas [83].
2.6.5 ENISA
In 2012 ENISA published a practical guide called ’Procure Secure: A Guide to Mon-
itoring of security service levels in cloud contracts’ designed for the procurement and
governance of cloud services. It provides advice regarding security monitoring in
the cloud and potential indicators for transparency during service delivery [57].
2.7 Virtualisation
Virtualisation is the key enabling technology for multi-tenancy that plays a sig-
nificant role in cloud computing. In virtual environments, there are three main
components: hypervisors or virtual machine managers (VMMs), virtual memory
managers, and virtual machines (VMs) [102].
The hypervisor is the software responsible for creating and managing VMs.
Each VM might have a different operating system and, in a public cloud com-
puting scenario, each of them might belong to a different organisation. Providing
resources to each VM and maintaining the isolation between them are the hypervi-
sor’s main tasks. Some hypervisors interact directly with the hardware, this type of
hypervisor is called type 1 or native hypervisor. Other hypervisors work within the
host operating system; such hypervisor is called type 2 or hosted hypervisor [102].
Most of the recent hypervisors require CPU with virtualisation extensions (Intel VT
or AMD-V) to perform well.
Virtual memory managers are responsible for managing memory requests made
by the host operating system and VMs. Allocating pages, page tables, and page di-
rectory tables are some of the virtual memory manager’s responsibilities.
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A virtual machine (VM) is a piece of software that acts like a physical computer
by running operating systems (guest OSs) and applications on them. VMs’ oper-
ating systems and applications run on virtual devices that mimic actual physical
devices. In virtualised environments, more than one VM can run simultaneously
in the same physical host (multi-tenancy). They are constantly created, migrated,
and terminated.
Providers can offer:
• computation resources such as CPU cores and speed, memory, and network
rate,
• storage resources in different size and types,
• system services such as virtual router, DHCP, and DNS, and
• network service.
2.7.1 VM Lifecycle
To create a VM, the consumer has to select or upload an image (ISO file) and specify
the CPU speed, number of cores, amount of memory, and disk space. The consumer
also has to choose the zone (location) of its new VM, after which the host will create
and run the new VM. Then, the client can run, stop, reboot, and terminate its VM.
VMs can also be migrated from host to host depending on the cloud migration
policy; however, clients should not be aware of this migration.
To move from a VM state to another, the cloud has to perform a number of op-
erations and tests. For instance, to terminate a VM, the cloud has to track all con-
tainers in memory, interactions between VMs, and dependencies with other VMs
in the cloud [102]. Consequently, each VM operation has a varying cost depend on
the complexity and imposed risk of the operation.
VM migration is one of the most costly VM operations in the cloud. It is a very
complicated task because VMs have to be migrated without interrupting the ser-
vice or creating a noticeable latency; even the running memory has to be migrated
while running. Migration operation also consumes a large amount of resources and
increases the attack surface and security risk. VMs have to be protected while mi-
grating in an environment that can be considered hostile. Because understanding
migration operations are essential for this research, they are discussed in detail in
chapter 5.
For security purposes, clients who own VMs hosted in the cloud are advised
not to mix services in one VM. As stated by Krutz et al. in their book [102], ”while
contemporary servers and virtual machines are adept at multi-tasking many func-
tions, it’s a lot easier to maintain secure control if the virtual machine is configured
with process separation. It greatly complicates the hacker’s ability to compromise
multiple components if the VM is implemented with one primary function per vir-
tual server or device.” The cost model in the cloud, usage-based pricing, supports
this idea. Instead of creating one large VM with many functions, the client can cre-
ate a number of small VMs, each with one primary function and still pay the same
cost.
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2.7.2 Virtualisation Security
Complexity and security are inversely proportional; more complexity means less
security. Transferring real environments to virtual ones adds layers of complexity
to systems. Therefore, virtualisation usually has a negative effect on security. The
hypervisor code is usually small in order to limit the newly introduced attack sur-
face; however, the threat and vulnerabilities still exist. Examples of attacks against
hypervisors are Blue Pill (Xen attack), Cloudburst (exploit that allows VMware
guest to escape to the host), SubVirt, and DKSM [138] and [117].
There are number of security concerns associated with virtualisation:
• virtualisation hides some of the network activities (traffic between co-resident
VMs) from the network-based intrusion detection systems,
• the use of vulnerable images to create new VMs,
• the use of default VM images without changing the default passwords and
configurations,
• security patch management (i.e. sleep VMs that require security patches),
• resource sharing among VMs (CPU, clock, memory, network, and hard disk)
introduces the possibility of a number of attacks such as VM-to-VM attack,
starvation attacks, and covert channel attacks,
• VM escape attacks (when a malicious VM escapes from the isolation and con-
trols the host), and
• kernel rootkits in virtual environments, which are hard to detect with regular
IDS because of the difficulty of extracting meaningful information from the
available low-level data that are collected from virtual resources [91].
2.8 Cloud Architecture
The large-scale public IaaS cloud system can be divided into front-end and back-
end. The front-end is the interface for consumers. Consumers can use different
types of devices and thin devices to access the cloud. They can access the service
through the Internet from anywhere in the world. To use the service, consumers
might need special applications in addition to authentication credentials, such as
passwords and encryption keys. If cloud consumers (clients who own VMs hosted
in the cloud) are themselves service providers, there will be another layer - the
consumers of cloud consumers’ services.
Back-end is the cloud system that involves networks, physical servers, storage
systems, and management machines. The cloud consists of a collection of regions.
Under each region there is a collection of locations, and each location has a number
of hosts. Consumers’ VMs live in hosts and each VM has at least one operating
system and a collection of applications and services. Third parties usually exist to
provide services such as auditing, forensic analysis, and integrity checks.
2.9 Security Concerns
There is a lack of security monitoring tools in the cloud. Cloud providers usually
deploy performance monitoring tools to provide administrators with the ability to
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monitor the performance of servers and VMs to identify the areas of poor expe-
rience and improve them. These tools also help to ensure availability in addition
to providing the means to charge consumers based on the resources consumed.
However, performance monitoring tools cannot fulfil the requirements of security
monitoring due to a lack of security monitoring and reporting built-in functions;
additionally, they cannot inspect VMs’ internal states [190].
The ability to detect and report malicious activities inside VMs is critical for
securing the cloud by providing measurements and continuous risk assessments.
The regular security goals of confidentiality, integrity, and availability must be
met in the cloud as in any other computing environment. Old threats exist in the
cloud too, such as illegitimate modifications of data, eavesdropping, and searching
and indexing on encrypted data that might reveal sensitive information to cloud
administrators. Therefore, regular security defences have to be deployed and man-
aged in the cloud. examples of such defences include firewalls, intrusion detection
systems, data encryption, and authentication and authorisation mechanisms.
New threats are induced by the use of virtualisation and sharing physical re-
sources among public cloud service consumers, such as VM-to-VM attacks and
covert channel attacks [28] and [181]. Other threats induced by some of the cloud’s
main characteristics include massive scalability and maintaining the security of
VMs during migration [167] and [180]. There are some threats that come from the
nature of VMs, such as handling the security of offline VMs, VM snapshots, and
VM rollback to a compromised state or affecting the freshness of cryptographic
keys [28].
Data in the cloud travels long distances through the Internet, which increases
the threat of data loss, eavesdropping, and unauthorised modification of data. Fur-
thermore, there is the threat of different types of DoS attacks. Recently, new DoS
attacks have been developed specifically to work on the cloud by misusing cloud
features and characteristics [167], [164], [5], and [180]. Lastly, one of the main chal-
lenges facing cloud computing is coping with new service paradigms [148].
2.9.1 Security Monitoring
Proving the security state of the whole cloud and each of its components is a tough
problem facing providers [35]. Monitoring is essential to meeting many security
requirements and providing service assurance. By security monitoring, providers
can collect information that helps them reflect the security status of cloud systems,
discover vulnerabilities, know which security controls are weak or missed, and
then react accordingly.
Main cloud components (i.e. network traffic, host systems, virtual machines,
applications, and processes) have to be monitored. The data collected from mon-
itoring these components are usually raw and low-level. Due to a mixing of ser-
vices, a mixing of clients, and high data volumes in the public cloud, making sense
of and extracting useful security information from these low-level data is a hard
task. First, collecting and analysing data then extracting information and report-
ing (when needed) have to be automatic and without human intervention because
manual interaction with data in such a tense mixed environment as the large-scale
public cloud is not feasible. Second, the monitoring tools have to cope with high
volumes of data without falling over. Third, monitoring tools have to work on the
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fly, providing instant monitoring, detecting, and reporting. When designing cloud
monitoring tools, providers should:
• assume that the public cloud environment is hostile [138],
• design monitoring tools that are tamper-resistant,
• consider not posing overhead,
• design tools with enough generality to monitor different VMs [191],
• consider coping with cloud special features (i.e. VM migration), and
• consider sharing information with consumers or third parties when needed
[70].
To extract information from collected data, events from different monitoring
tools must be correlated. However, maintaining central events analyser or co-
relater in large-scale distributed flexible environments would not be efficient for
many reasons: data volume will be excessively large; a signal point of failure will
be created; a bottleneck will be created; sending data through the network to the
central analyser might consume the bandwidth; and distances and large volumes
might delay the process of analysing and responding. All these special require-
ments are imposed on new monitoring tools that are designed especially to work
on cloud environments.
Although monitoring tools collect large amounts of raw data, there are still dark
yet critical inaccessible areas which is the area inside VMs. Therefore, developing
efficient VM monitoring tools can improve the security of cloud computing and
reduce risk exposure. There is a gap in VMs monitoring area as shown in the state
of art chapter, chapter 3, where we conducted a survey of available VM monitoring
tools in literature.
2.9.2 Security Responsibilities
Security responsibilities differ according to the used service model. In SaaS, con-
sumers are only application users. They are allowed (in some cases) to change cer-
tain configuration parameters of the used application. Consumers are responsible
for securing and protecting their passwords, encryption keys, and any authentica-
tion credentials used for the SaaS service. Applications, operating systems, hosts,
networks, and the underlying infrastructure are under the full control of providers
[118] and [24].
In PaaS models, providers have control over operating systems, hosts, net-
works, and the underlying infrastructure, while consumers have full control over
the application, including its code and the security [118] and [24].
In IaaS, providers have control over the virtualisation layer, network, and the
underlying infrastructure while consumers have full control over their VMs (the
used operating system, applications, services, and security controls). Providers
have no control in the area inside VMs. Having limited control does not imply
less responsibility. For instance, in IaaS, while providers have almost no control
about what is inside VMs, they are still responsible if one of these VMs is compro-
mised and starts attacking other co-resident VMs, the infrastructure, or the outside
world. Having no control, makes security design and achieving security goals and
assurance harder tasks for providers [118] and [24].
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The mix between control and responsibilities in the IaaS model has created an
unclear vision for third parties who are responsible for security monitoring and in-
cident reporting [70]. For instance, the third party who is responsible of security
monitoring has to decide to whom the incident should be reported; if a malicious
traffic has been detected, should the third party inform the provider or the con-
sumer? [70]. If traffic with signs of anomalies has been detected in the large-scale
IaaS cloud network, it is hard to identify the true source of the malicious traffic
because of resource pooling, the large number of VMs, and large volumes of data.
In some service models, and especially in IaaS, providers might need to enable
their consumers to access data sources relevant to some incidents to help them diag-
nose security vulnerabilities, thus improving the security of their virtual machines
[70]. This emphasises the problem of trust. Do providers meet their obligations on
reporting security incidents that have an impact on consumers’ virtual machines?
A number of solutions can be used to deal with this problem. First, security
reporting and the access possibilities for data sources can be included in the SLA
[70]. Second, a security system with an interface for incidents and events data ex-
change can be designed to automate the process of event monitoring and reporting,
a system that considers consumers’ rights to access some of the relevant data in a
timely manner [70].
Furthermore, a trusted third party for security monitoring and reporting is usu-
ally suggested as a solution for trust problems. The last solution to be mentioned
here is offering security as a service to consumers, which might imply allowing
providers’ security systems to have a better vision for what is inside VMs. This
would provide better security by enhancing the ability to extract meaningful secu-
rity information from low-level data, or bridge the semantic gap. However, provid-
ing better vision for providers might increase their legal responsibilities in addition
to slowing the monitoring process, especially in large-scale clouds where there are
hundreds of thousands or even millions of virtual machines.
2.10 Security Monitoring
Monitoring the cloud’s overall security status, in addition to monitoring VMs’ be-
haviour, is essential for providers to fulfil their security responsibilities (which in-
clude protecting the infrastructure, preventing VM-to-VM attacks, and preventing
attacks on the outside world using the cloud network). Intrusion detection systems
are the most widely used tools for security monitoring; they are discussed in this
section.
2.10.1 Intrusions
An intrusion is any unauthorised activity on the network, data, or computer sys-
tems, i.e. unauthorised access, data theft, and denial of service attacks. Intrusions
might lead to security incidents. A computer security incident, according to NIST
SP 800-61 [146], is any ”violation of computer security policies, acceptable use poli-
cies, or standard security practices,” such as leaking sensitive data through a file-
sharing service.
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The NIST categorised incidents into five categories: denial of service attacks,
malicious code (i.e. viruses), unauthorised access, inappropriate usage, and multi-
ple components (incidents that contain two or more incidents) [146].
Incident handling:
One of the primary domains in the information security management process is
incident handling. It is one of the main domains in ISO 27001 in addition to security
policy, human resources security, and business continuity management [61]. Inci-
dent handling usually has the following steps: detection of possible incidents, anal-
ysis, containment, recovery from the incident, and continuous improvement [70].
Intrusion detection and prevention systems are useful for detection, analysis, and
sometimes containment of incidents. There are different types of IDSs: host-based
and network-based (or HIDS and NIDS), anomaly-based and signature-based.
Host-based IDSs are for monitoring computer systems; network-based IDSs are
for monitoring network traffic. The anomaly-based detection method works by
building a normal behaviour profile for the monitored host and then measuring any
deviations from normality. If it exceeds a certain threshold, an alarm for intrusion
will be raised [92]. In the signature-based detection method, intrusions are detected
by comparing events with known signatures of intrusions [92].
Signature-based IDSs usually have low false alarms rate for known attacks, but
they require accurate defined rules. The main disadvantages of signature-based
IDSs are that they cannot detect unknown attacks and the difficulty of updating
and adding new rules for detecting new attacks. Anomaly-based IDSs can detect
novel attacks if they change the behaviour of the host. However, it usually suffers
from high false alarms rate [92].
In this research we focus on monitoring VMs using HIDS based on anomaly
detection methods. We concentrate on anomaly-based HIDS because it can de-
tect novel attacks and does not require accurately defined rules, which are hard to
create, hard to update, and require a deep understanding of the attack’s technical
details. Furthermore, as explained, anomaly-based HIDS has the ability to create
a normal behaviour profile that represents the VM if it has a relatively consistent
behaviour, as we will discuss in detail in chapter 3 and 4.
2.10.2 Anomaly Detection
To identify intrusions in hosts, an intrusion detection system is used to inspect the
host’s activities and detect ones that do not conform to the expected behaviour. The
detection system has to be trained to be familiar with the host’s normal behaviour
(and sometimes abnormal behaviour) so it can recognise any deviation. Data col-
lected from the host are normally used to train the detection system. The choice
of training method is heavily affected by the available data for training and for
detection.
The detection system has to go through several phases:
1. Collect data for training: collect live data, data generated by experiments, real
systems, or import already collected data from other research. The accuracy
and detection rates rely heavily on the accuracy of the collected data. Gener-
ating quality data for training is critical and experience in computer systems
is needed to be able to build the system with the right configuration [128].
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2. Train the classifier: the training could be supervised, semi-supervised, or un-
supervised. In supervised anomaly detection, only labelled data are used for
training (normal or abnormal); in semi-supervised, only normal data are la-
belled, while in unsupervised there are no labels based on the assumption
that most of the data are normal and anomalies are rare [25].
3. Features and patterns extraction: in this phase, the collected data has to be
processed to extract features of them that represent the data and to be used
later for detection. The extracted features are then used to train the classifier.
Many methods are available to choose and extract features. Some of them
are based on statistical analysis and others on machine learning techniques
or data mining approaches. The choice of method depends on the available
data for training, system requirements, and the available resources.
In statistical approaches, the classifier generates a normal behaviour profile
representing the data statistically, and then the variances of the monitored
new data from the normal profile are constantly generated. For detection, the
system compares current usage to the saved profile and reports any statis-
tically significant deviation (which might be a potential attack) as abnormal
[134]. Examples of statistical approaches are given by Jyothsna et al. in [92].
They include the following: threshold metric (simply counting the number of
events occurring in a specific period of time and raising an alarm if they are
less or more than a specific threshold); Markov process (examining the state of
the system at fixed intervals and calculating states probabilities); mean and
standard deviation; multivariate model; and time series (time and value of
observations are stored, then when a new observation arrives, the probabil-
ity of its occurrence is calculated and an alarm of abnormality is raised if the
probability is low).
Machine learning techniques are based on intelligent algorithms that are used
to learn and recognise complex patterns in data then make decisions. Ma-
chine learning algorithms normally focus on finding and extracting relation-
ships from data [92].
There are many mature machine learning algorithms, such as neural net-
works and the naive Bayesian classifier.
In neural networks, there are a number of nodes that produce non-linear func-
tions. The input of each node is either from the source or from another node.
The general function is modelled by the network, which consists of a set of
very complex inter-dependencies and the characteristics of nonlinear systems
with feedback [92].
In naive Bayesian, one scan of data is required to train the classifier. The
classifier applies Bayes’ theorem with the strong assumption that attributes
are conditionally independent. Each attribute consists of a number of values
and the classifier estimates the class-conditional probability of each value. For
classification, the classifier computes the posterior probability for each class
[60].
The output of the classification function is either label or score. In label, each
monitored activity is given a label of being normal or anomaly. In score out-
put, each monitored activity is given an anomaly score. More details are in
chapter 3.
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In the next chapter (the state of art), we discuss from literature IaaS cloud com-
puting security in general, hypervisor-based IDSs that are used to monitor VMs,
and intrusion detection systems that are designed specifically to work in the cloud.
We also survey cloud attacks (especially DoS attacks), the techniques they rely on,
and the exposed vulnerabilities.
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Chapter 3
State of the Art
”It is a security nightmare and it
can’t be handled in traditional
ways” [120] in the description of
cloud computing.
J. CHAMBERS, CISCO SYSTEMS’
CHAIRMAN AND CEO,
This chapter will explore the literature that is relevant to cloud intrusion detec-
tion systems, host-based cloud intrusion detection systems, hypervisor-based in-
trusion detection systems, and detection systems in the cloud. We will also discuss
the importance of intrusion detection systems in a large-scale public IaaS cloud.
Furthermore, we will discuss in detail the special requirements for cloud monitor-
ing systems that have to be met to work efficiently in our environment and will
show how previous research failed to satisfy these requirements, which created
a need to develop new detection systems that satisfy them. We believe we have
accomplished this in the proposed systems. We developed two hypervisor-based
detection systems to work in a large-scale public IaaS cloud. These new detection
systems significantly close the gap in the literature that we discovered, as revealed
in this chapter. We will also explore DoS attacks that are designed specifically to
work in the cloud and introduce our novel architecture-based cloud DoS class of
attacks.
Section 3.1 will discuss the security challenges faced by a large-scale IaaS cloud.
Discussing these challenges is essential to our research because it leads to an under-
standing of the need for monitoring and determining the threats and requirements.
In this section, we also explore the challenges of security control in the cloud, VM
monitoring, denial of service threats, IDS taxonomy, IDS in the cloud, HIDS in the
cloud, and HIDS considerations to suit cloud environments.
The literature on hypervisor-based IDS in general is discussed in section 3.2.
Cloud intrusion detection systems are discussed in section 3.3. The last section,
section 3.4, covers the literature on cloud attacks, which are specifically designed
to work in cloud environments.
3.1 Cloud Computing Security
As stated by Yanpei et al. in [40], ”security has emerged as arguably the most signif-
icant barrier to faster and more widespread adoption of cloud computing.” Since
2009, many research papers and reports in academia, government organisations,
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and industry have emphasised this fact such as in [11], [121], [165], [102], [40], and
[163]. As a result, the security of cloud computing has become a main topic in most
security conferences. A study in 2012 showed that about 35% of research about
cloud computing from 2007 to 2012 involved the security and privacy of the cloud
[68], see figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: About 35% of research in cloud computing from 2007 to 2012 was about
security [68].
Most of the papers from 2007 up until now are about the security risks of using
cloud computing, security challenges, and countermeasures.
Researchers have also presented numerous security benefits that can be deliv-
ered by using cloud computing, as Garrison stated in his book [67], by ”removing
local databases from unmanaged computers and from laptops that can be lost or
stolen” and by taking ”security out of the hands of what could be under-skilled
IT workers in some instances.” These benefits are mostly for small business, as
stated by Krutz et al. in their book Cloud Security: A Comprehensive Guide to Secure
Cloud Computing, [102], ”Smaller companies with minimal IT departments often
see a bigger security return by using cloud infrastructure offered by a public cloud
service provider than large, better funded organizations with complex infrastruc-
ture. Large established companies have a bigger investment in traditional IT and its
accompanying security architecture, whereas a newer company can more readily
employ the security features offered by a CSP.”
Availability is a main concern in cloud computing; providers periodically pub-
lish reports revealing service outage such as in [159]. Any service disruption event
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can cause significant damage to the provider’s brand reputation, affect consumers’
productivity, and potentially cause the loss of existing customers. Moreover, the
news of the event will spread quickly via IT news websites, magazines and blogs.
Availability is one of the main factors defined by a service level agreement (SLA),
in addition to the response time and error-rate [35]. Any service outage incident
problem might cause an SLA violation. SLA violations directly affect the revenue
of the cloud service provider (CSP) because of the penalty scheme for violations
and indirectly by affecting the provider’s reputation, as shown by the two famous
Amazon S3 and EC2 incidents that affected availability in 2008 and 2011, see [161]
and [160].
3.1.1 Security Control in the Cloud
Cloud security responsibilities are shared between providers and consumers;1 se-
curity responsibilities are distributed differently in each cloud model [156]. In SaaS,
the cloud is almost under the full control of CSP, which bears most of the security
responsibilities; consumers are only application users and they are responsible for
managing their authentication credentials properly and using safe application con-
figurations and modes of operations [70] and [156]. In PaaS, applications are under
the control of the consumers, and application security is one of their responsibil-
ities. Providers are responsible for maintaining the isolation between consumers’
applications and controlling the runtime environment and infrastructure [70] and
[156].
In IaaS, consumers have full control over their virtual machines (VMs). They
can freely choose the operating system and applications used; they also might
choose a highly vulnerable application and never apply security patches. Providers
have almost no control at all in this area, but they are still responsible for network
security, protecting the infrastructure, and protecting VMs from each other [70]
and [156]. A highly vulnerable VM in the IaaS cloud could affect the whole cloud;
once this VM is breached, the attacker could use it to attack other collocated VMs,
which may belong to other consumers from different organisations. The attacker
may also attack the cloud infrastructure or perform a denial of service attack (DoS),
which might cause a service outage and SLA violation. Providers have no control
over the hosted VMs, but they are still responsible, which makes security harder
to achieve and more complex, as stated in [181] ”it is more error-prone for normal
users to manage a whole virtual machine (IaaS) than just a single piece of soft-
ware (SaaS). Therefore, security threats under IaaS model deserve more attention.”
Moreover, in the IaaS model, server administration commands (even critical ones)
come through the network (possibly the Internet), which increases the security bur-
den on providers [178].
Other security issues should also be considered in the IaaS model, as stated in
[181], such as ”multi-jurisdictional issue, redundancy checking, privacy-preserving
calculations, and hardening virtualisation environment” [181].
In [163], researchers conducted a deep analysis of cloud security challenges;
they based their research on the threats introduced by cloud security alliance (CSA)
1Cloud consumers are usually service providers themselves and they share their part of the se-
curity responsibilities with their consumers or users (the consumers of cloud consumers services)
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[9]. The technologies used in the cloud are not unique. Therefore, it faces security
threats that are similar to those of other computing environments. However, the
collection of technologies and concepts has also created new threats and vulnera-
bilities [163]. The security concerns discussed in [163] are that cloud environments
have heavy workloads that have to be processed and monitored. They are also
multi-tenant environments, and providers have to protect tenants from each other,
in addition to protecting the cloud infrastructure from malicious tenants [163]. Re-
searchers have also suggested countermeasures to improve the security of the VMs
and network in the cloud such as establishing ”zones of trust in the cloud, the
virtual machines must be self-defending, effectively moving the perimeter to the
virtual machine itself” [163].
In [126], Molnar et al. divided the threats into two categories: threats created be-
cause of moving from owning to leasing and threats that exist because of resource
sharing. They investigated a large number of threats and suggested countermea-
sures for each of them. For instance, under those resulting from leasing, there is
a contractual threat, with cost-overrun attacks under this threat, where the victim
consumers pay the cost of answering attackers’ malicious (and fake) requests. This
type of attack is discussed in more detail later, in section 3.4. As a countermeasure
to cost-overrun attacks, Molnar et al. suggested allowing consumers to set bound-
aries for the VM expansion to control the cost (limit their elasticity)[126].
3.1.2 Security Challenges in the Cloud
The special combination of technologies and features in the cloud also introduces
new security risks, leading to new security requirements. There is a need for new
or improved security mechanisms in addition to regular security defences such
as intrusion detection and prevention systems, encryption, firewalls, and access
control policies and mechanisms [102] and [163].
In the cloud market today, providers offer many monitoring tools such as Ama-
zon CloudWatch [172]2 and LogicMonitor [113]3. Most of the tools offered provide
the service of performance and resource consumption monitoring for VMs and can-
not be used for security monitoring. As Zou et al. states, ”performance monitoring
typically provides means to charge cloud users based on the resources consumed
by their VM instances”, and they take ”the whole VM as the monitoring target and
does not consider the internal state of the VM, therefore applying existing perfor-
mance oriented monitoring solutions is not enough for the requirements of security
monitoring” [190]. Providers offer these tools to help consumers control the cost.
3.1.3 Special IaaS Cloud Characteristics, Requirements, and Threats
The most obvious cloud characteristic is the high volume of data; it is one of the
main characteristics of the cloud that has a direct effect on the choice and design of
security measurements and tools [163]. The reasons for having higher than usual
amounts of data in cloud environments are as follows:
2Amazon CloudWatch is a tool that allows consumers to monitor their usage of cloud resources
and offers load balancing [191].
3LogicMonitor is a tool to discover newly added or deleted VMs and monitors them [191].
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• First, the utilisation of servers is increased to save power, which reduce the
cost and the carbon footprint. Reducing cost by consolidating servers means
more activities. Thus, more traffic is generated.
• Second, the cloud infrastructure and the hosted VMs are accessed by many
parties concurrently, including providers (cloud administrators and systems),
consumers, users of consumers’ services, third parties and possible malicious
parties (i.e. attackers, worms, and/or viruses). Having many parities access-
ing the service concurrently increases the amount of data flow to, from, and
within the cloud network.
• Third, the migration feature of the cloud requires the transfer of large amounts
of data; for example, in live migration, the VM has to be transferred to another
host while running (without interrupting the service). Even the memory has
to be transferred while running bit by bit along with network connectivity,
which generates more traffic [16].4
• Fourth, the continuous and automated creation of snapshots and backups
of VMs, which are usually stored in different geographical areas, as part of
business continuity management, generates large volumes of data.
• Fifth, data and commands to and from VMs travel long distances through
the network and most probably the Internet in the case of a public cloud;
graphical outputs, mouse clicks, and even keyboard keystrokes come from
long distances, which generate a greater data flow.
• Sixth, in the model of ephemeral VMs, the process of initiating these intense
short-lived VMs, their tense workloads, and terminating them after a short
period of time contributes to the expansion of the data volume in the cloud.
Having high volumes of data, especially if combined with the requirement of
working on the fly, demand special security solutions, i.e. distributed security sys-
tems to be able to monitor and control the high volume of traffic. Fast automated
monitoring and acting on the fly are essential to suit the dynamicity of cloud en-
vironments; for instance, a consumer can initiate a large number of VMs (i.e. hun-
dreds), use them for an hour or two to accomplish a specific task (i.e. analyse data
or generate reports), and then terminate them. Ephemeral VMs are popular in the
cloud, and they require security systems that can be built and work on the fly.
Another cloud characteristic is the openness of the environment; a public cloud
offers the service (automated provisioning) to almost anyone that can pay the cost,
i.e. businesses, governments, individuals, and possible attackers [181]. Different
clients initiate VMs with different operating systems and applications require flex-
ible security systems with adequate generality to be able to work effectively in the
diverse cloud environment [191]. Furthermore, the environment should be dealt
with as hostile, as stated by Rhoton in [138] ”applications must therefore be much
more secure in a potentially hostile environment than they would need to be on a
private network.”
In addition, since all commands and data (even highly critical and sensitive
ones) are coming through the Internet (in the case of a public cloud), strong confi-
4There are many approaches to performing live migration such as pre-copy migration, where mem-
ory pages are copied from the source to the destination without interrupting the work of the VM, and
then transferring dirty pages. At some point the VM should be stopped for an ideally unnoticeable
short period of time and transferred to the destination [26].
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dentiality mechanisms are required. Encryption can protect data during transfor-
mation from being read by other users or attackers, but there is no guarantee that
data are not being accessed by cloud administrators, especially since the data have
to be decrypted at some point in the cloud to be useful [102] and [148].
Multi-tenancy is a defining attribute of the cloud to increase server utilisation;
a number of VMs share the same physical host (co-resident), and each of them
might belong to a different client. The cloud provider (in all of the cloud models) is
responsible for maintaining the isolation between co-resident VMs [163]. Virtual-
isation is the technology that allows multi-tenancy. Although, popular virtualisa-
tion applications (hypervisors) on the market today, like Xen, VMware, and KVM,
are continuously improving the isolation mechanisms between VMs, there are still
leaks, as we will see later, in section 3.4. Multi-tenancy with different clients in-
troduces new threats and vulnerabilities [28]; VM co-residency, as Vaquero et al.
said ”increases the attack surface and risk of VM to VM compromise” [163]. VM to
VM compromise is also called inter-VM attack, and it usually happens through the
shared resources, i.e. by using side channels [28] and [181].
Malicious VMs might attack other benign VMs, and they also might attack the
cloud infrastructure. Some virtualisation features, such as rollback, can be abused
and threaten VMs, and thus the cloud. For instance, a VM can be rolled back to
a compromised or unpatched state [28]. Moreover, a rollback and snapshot might
affect the freshness required in cryptographic protocols [28]. Another threat was
suggested by Zhang in [181]. He called it a ”Threat to Dormant”; he said that even
if VMs are turned off, they are still available because they are saved in the cloud
system, which is online most of the time. He stated that an ”offline VM is not
equivalent to an off powered computer at home” [181]. Thus, offline VMs can be
attacked. In addition, attackers might copy them or even snapshot them and attack
the copy offline to extract some data or information from them [28].
Another threat to the cloud is VM escape, where a malicious VM successfully
controls the host or part of the host, if the VM can bypass the hypervisor and inter-
act with the host directly. As Reuben said in [137], this might result in a complete
”breakdown in the security framework of the environment.” Elhage, in [53], pub-
lished an example of a VM escape attack in a KVM hypervisor. They exploited a
bug in KVM (CVE-2011-1751) [44]; KVM receives unplug requests from guest hard-
ware and executes them before checking whether they support being unplugged or
not. These unplugged devices might leave behind corrupt states or dangling point-
ers that allow attackers to execute malicious code, as presented in [53].
Although virtualisation has negative effects on security, some researchers have
suggested using virtualisation to address security problems [132] and [66]. Many
research papers and books have been published in this area [79], [132], and [66].
The properties of virtualisation that make it attractive for security are its isola-
tion and flexibility. By using virtualisation, you can easily isolate infected virtual
servers so they do not affect other virtual servers or the host, as Hoopes said in his
book, Virtualization for Security, ”isolate compromised portions and OS instances by
denying them the very resources they rely on to exist. CPU cycles can be reduces,
network and disk I/O access severed, or the system halted altogether. Such tasks
would be difficult, if not impossible, to perform if the compromised instance was
running directly on a physical host” [79]. Therefore, virtualisation increases the de-
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fence system’s ability to respond. Isolation has also been used by many researchers
in building attack-resistant host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDSs). The
most popular one is virtual machine introspection (VMI) [66], which we will dis-
cuss in detail in section 3.2.
The flexibility of managing and maintaining VMs is another appealing feature
of virtualisation that can be used in providing security. Organisations can use vir-
tualisation in disaster recovery by creating backup virtual servers instead of spend-
ing large amounts of money on physical backup servers that are idle most of the
time. These backups are activated in the case of failover, which saves money, man-
agement effort, physical space, and power [79]. Virtualisation can also be used in
sandboxing, honeypotting, and helping in forensic analysis.
3.1.4 Patch Management in the Cloud
Providers in that IaaS model have no control inside VMs, which makes patch man-
agement a great problem in the IaaS cloud. To maintain security, applications
should be kept in updated states with the most recent patches. However, there
is no guarantee that consumers are following through and updating [124]. The re-
searchers in [124] suggested virtual patching as a solution to this problem. Virtual
patching is a layer over the application to prevent the exploiting of known vulner-
abilities [17]. It is like an application firewall that filter the application’s ins and
outs that are related to a known vulnerability until the patch is available and tested.
It is only effective for known vulnerabilities that do not yet have patches or have
untested patches. In contrast, we are here discussing users who fail to follow best
practice security policies by ignoring the need to update their applications and op-
erating systems with available patches. Patch management in the cloud is also a
problem under different circumstances:
• if a VM is offline for a long period of time and is thus outdated,
• if a VM is rolled back to a state before patching,
• if an unpatched VM is cloned to create an image that is used in future to create
other VMs, and
• if an image (i.e. in a public repository) is in an unpatched state.
Kang and his colleagues in [59] investigated the problem of patching in the
cloud and designed a system called offline patching scheme (OPS) for patching.
OPS searches for out-of-date images and patches them (even the offline ones).
However, it targets images rather than VMs. Users with unpatched VMs are not dis-
covered by this system. Regarding offline images, they patch them in three ways:
mounting the image and then patching it; inserting the updating script into the im-
age to be run when the image is booted next time; or by using the Script Rewrite
Method, which is a method to analyse the patches and apply only the essential part,
see [59] for the details. As stated, this might solve part of the problem: the problem
with unpatched images, but not unpatched VMs.
3.1.5 VMs Monitoring
To deal with malicious or unpatched VMs, there is a requirement for monitoring
VMs from inside. If these out-of-date VMs are breached, attackers might attack
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other VMs (inter-VM attacks), attack the hypervisor (VM escape attacks), attack the
infrastructure, and/or attack other parties outside the cloud, which might cause le-
gal liability for the provider. As stated in [191], ”to accurately observe, distinguish
and report the malicious and benign behaviours inside VMs is a critical stage for
providing measurements to secure the clouds.” Some researchers have suggested
installing agents inside VMs for monitoring, such as in [13]. This leads us to ques-
tion the acceptable level of instrumentation in VMs.
Installing an agent or a piece of code inside VMs can lead to a number of neg-
ative effects. First, collecting and analysing detailed data from inside all the VMs
might affect the efficiency of the used security systems; large amounts of data will
be collected, which will increase the power and time needed to analyse them. This
might prevent the security system from working on the fly and live detection which
are essential in the cloud. Second, legal and contractual restrictions might limit the
permitted level of intrusiveness. A high level of intrusiveness might also cause
an increase in the providers’ accountability. Moreover, an SLA sometimes requires
the absolute minimum amount of surveillance from providers. Allowing providers
to install code in consumers’ VMs presents another problem involving trust in the
cloud.
Should consumers trust providers? Are there any guarantees about the security
of the service? Do provides comply with security standards? In reality, consumers
distrust cloud providers because there are currently no trust-supporting mecha-
nisms in the cloud, as stated in [191].5 To deal with the trust problem, third party
auditing might be required. However, as stated in [148], the ”privacy of data from
a third party auditor is another concern of cloud security.” Allowing providers or
third parties to enter VMs will emphasise the trust problem and increase the threat.
Therefore, providers should reduce the level of instrumentation within VMs to the
minimum possible. There is a need to reduce the instrumentation while simulta-
neously verifying the security status of the cloud, which are necessities for both
providers and consumers.
3.1.6 The Problem of Infected Images
Images are used to create new VMs. These images are usually stored in public
repositories or the Cloud App Store.6 A public repository allows users to share and
exchange images; any user can upload an image (publisher) and other users might
use it to create their own VMs (consumer).
Sharing images imposes security threats to the cloud, see figure 3.2 (this figure
is from [28]). First, a publisher might upload an infected image with malware or
a Trojan horse. Usually, providers scan the repository for viruses and rootkits to
reduce the threat. However, this does not eliminate it completely [28]. Second,
the publisher might (by mistake) upload an image that contains sensitive informa-
tion, i.e. cryptographic keys or passwords [28]. Bugiel et al. in [28] showed that
the threats introduced by publicly shared images are still serious and no longer
theoretical.
5In Zou et al.’s paper, [191], they discussed the problem of trust regarding the provided quality of
service (QoS). However, if there is a problem related to trust, it might affect the security, in addition
to performance monitoring.
6Cloud App Store is the name of Amazon’s public repository
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Figure 3.2: Uploading infected images in shared repositories [28].
3.1.7 Vendor Lock-In
Another security concern is locked in to a provider. For example in the case
of provider bankruptcy, if there are no data interoperability standards among
providers, consumers will be in a data lock-in state [148]. Garrison, in his book
[67], suggested managing this problem contractually, in addition to choosing a
well-known provider. He also warned that providers might increase the cost if
they have a lock on the consumer business.
3.1.8 The Threat of Denial of Service
Three main features of a public IaaS cloud make it more vulnerable to DoS attacks
and distributed DoS attacks (DDoS) than a private IaaS cloud or regular on-premise
IT environments. The first is the openness of the public IaaS cloud architecture; the
service is offered to everyone through the Internet. Because of this openness, ma-
licious consumers can easily gain access to the cloud to perform DoS attacks. Fur-
thermore, a DoS attack can be performed on the consumers’ side or the providers’
side; an example of a consumer side DoS attack is blocking the consumers’ access to
the cloud service or blocking their users’ access to a cloud-based consumer service.
An example of a provider side attack is disturbing the cloud service or affecting the
fairness when distributing resources.
The second feature that makes the public IaaS cloud more vulnerable to DoS
attacks than private cloud is the multi-tenancy of the VMs belonging to different
clients sharing resources. Attackers can easily become neighbours and share re-
sources with benign consumers. They might then penetrate them and steal their
data or resources. Isolation between VMs is provided by the hypervisor; despite the
effort to improve this isolation, many attacks in the literature succeeded in discov-
ering and exploiting vulnerabilities in the isolation layer in different hypervisors
(see section 3.4).
The third feature that emphasises the risk of DoS attacks in a public IaaS envi-
ronment is the on-demand elasticity. We found from the literature that the misuse
of this feature occurs by performing economic-loss attacks, where innocent con-
sumers are forced to pay more for fake reasons, i.e. the economic denial of sustain-
ability attack (EDoS) which is discussed in [77], [152], and [167]. Another example
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of an economic-loss attack is when attackers’ VMs gain more resources by stealing
them from their innocent neighbours (co-resident VMs), i.e. a resource freeing at-
tack (RFA), which is discussed in [164]. The details of these attacks are in section
3.4.
These attacks affect the availability of the service, although their goal is financial
gain rather than disturbing the service. For instance, if the targeted consumer has
inactivated the automatic elasticity (to fix the cost) it will turn into a regular DoS
attack, as discussed in [180]. These attacks can also be categorised as starvation
attacks, which are DoS attacks. Regular DoS attacks, i.e. Smurf attack and SYN
flood attacks, are also threats in the cloud.
To be able to detect DoS attacks and monitor the behaviours of consumers’ VMs
to detect and prevent any penetration of cloud defences by malicious consumers,
malicious cloud administrators, and/or malicious outsiders, intrusion detection
systems (IDSs) are required. An IDS is responsible for monitoring, inspecting, and
generating early warnings of any suspicious activities. Nowadays, an IDS is con-
sidered a main security tool in network and computer systems. It is an integral part
of an incident response policy and is widely used to detect DoS and DDoS attacks.
3.1.9 IDS Taxonomy
An intrusion detection system (IDS) and intrusion prevention system (IPS) are two
different security tools that are closely related to each other. An IPS is sometimes
called an active IDS, whereas the regular IDS is a passive IDS. An IDS reacts to in-
trusions by raising alarms, while an IPS reacts more actively, i.e. disconnecting
suspicious connections. An IPS is an IDS with an extension, which is the active
reaction [188]. Here, intrusions could be unauthorised access, malware, data theft,
and/or DoS attacks.
An IDS is used to detect intrusion attempts, whether they succeed or not, before,
while, or after the attempt [80]. After detection, the IDS should generate an alarm,
which is supposed to lead to an investigation, followed by a decision to dismiss
or react to it. The investigation, decision making, and response processes could be
manual or automated [80]. Furthermore, some IDSs can be used to collect forensic
evidence [87]. The data collected by an IDS can be sent for analysis in a central IDS
(centralised IDS) or can be analysed at the same place as the collection (distributed
IDS) [188].
IDSs can be categorised in several ways. Mian, in [188], drew a tree to show
different IDS categories, see figure 3.3.
IDSs can also be classified based on the methods used for detection: signature-
based and anomaly-based. In a signature-based IDS, the system scans traffic or
data for known attack patterns. In an anomaly-based system, the system creates a
normal behaviour profile for the traffic or data and detects any deviation from it.
The nature of an anomaly-based IDS makes it more suitable to detect new intru-
sions and attacks such as zero day attacks [188].7 For anomaly-based IDSs, many
approaches are used to create normal behaviour profiles, including data mining ap-
7Zero day attacks are attacks against unknown vulnerabilities (not known to the public but found
by attackers). Defending against this type of attack is hard because the vulnerability is not known.
Thus, it cannot be detected by antivirus applications and cannot be patched [22].
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Figure 3.3: IDS Taxonomy [188].
proaches and statistical approaches. More information about anomaly-based IDS
approaches is given in chapter 4.
The most popular IDS types are host-based IDS (HIDSs) and network-based
IDSs (NIDSs). An HIDS provides protection inside a server by monitoring its ac-
tivities, i.e. log files, system calls, and/or critical files [188]. A NIDS protects the
network by monitoring the traffic [188].
The literature reports less popular types of IDSs such as mobile agent-based
IDS.8 The idea of a mobile agent IDS involves dispatching an agent to hosts to
examine the data instead of collecting them using a central IDS. These data might
have large volumes, which consume high bandwidth if the data are being sent
through the network to the central IDS [145]. There are many other ideas for Mobile
Agent IDSs. However, it is not a good candidate to perform security monitoring in
the cloud due to problems with reliability, scalability (it cannot deal with a large
amount of data and a large number of VMs), and lack of attack-resistance [95].
3.1.10 IDS in the Cloud
Kholidy et al., in [95], said that a ”traditional NIDS and HIDS cannot identify sus-
picious activities in a cloud environment.” A NIDS faces numerous challenges in
the cloud. The first is the problem of monitoring and analysing encrypted traf-
fic, knowing that all the traffic between consumers and their VMs and between
nodes in cloud environments are encrypted [80] and [95]. Second, co-resident VMs
might communicate within the host, and a regular NIDS will not be able to monitor
in-host communications [73].9 There is also a common NIDS problem when imple-
mented in switched environments [102]. Switched environments will not allow
NIDS sensors to inspect all the traffic because switches work based on connections,
and the sensor will only receive packets addressed to it (unlike a hub that echoes
8Mobile agents are small, autonomous, and intelligent pieces of code (programs) that have the
ability to travel, learn, communicate within the network or between hosts to perform specific tasks
set by the agent developer [65].
9This is especially true in a case where co-residency is a feature offered by providers to help
consumers that have time critical businesses, i.e. financial business. These consumers can request
to host their VMs at the same physical host to reduce communication time, and they pay more for
this service. Furthermore, virtualisation sometimes allows communication between co-resident VMs
through sharing the clipboard and memory, if needed to increase efficiency [91].
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every packet). In his book [102], Krutz discussed a number of solutions to deal with
the problem of cloud NIDSs in switched environments. The first solution is config-
uring the switch to span the data from a specific port to the IDS port. However, he
said, ”unfortunately, some switches cannot be guaranteed to pass all the traffic to
the spanned port, and most switches allow only one port to be spanned at a time”
[102]. The second solution is deploying hubs between switches, between routers
and switches, and between servers and switches. This solution will guarantee that
data will reach IDS sensors for inspection. However, as Krutz argued, this solu-
tion ”spells the beginning of the end for the switched network, and removes the
benefits of a switched solution” [102]. Furthermore, as Jie et al. concluded in [73],
”the communication port of the switch may be changed when virtual machines are
migrated to a different physical server. Therefore, traditional NIDSs are no longer
applicable in intrusion detection on the IaaS data centers” [73].
A NIDS suffers from more problems, including the problem of attacking the
NIDS sensor itself and the problem of coping with large volumes of data in the
cloud. With an increase in the data volume, the NIDS might be saturated, which
usually heavily affects the IDS performance. It will require more time to store and
analyse data, and some packets might be discarded, which will generate high error
rates [102]. Moreover, in a recent analysis of the current cloud computing secu-
rity measurements in [49], researchers said that the regular network defences in the
cloud will not be able to detect intrusions, but an indication of their existence will
be derived from anomaly detection systems or other intelligence sources. These
are the challenges facing a NIDS in monitoring the cloud network. However, intru-
sions inside hosts are outside the NIDS scope. Thus, inter-VM attacks and VM to
infrastructure attacks cannot be detected by a NIDS [80] and [102]. An HIDS is re-
quired to cover this area. An HIDS and NIDS are complementary systems. Cloud
NIDS restrictions and challenges emphasise the importance of using an HIDS in
the cloud.
3.1.11 HIDS in the Cloud
An HIDS can be anomaly or signature-based. A signature-based HIDS is effective
for known attacks that have known signatures. Many antivirus applications can be
considered to be signature-based HIDSs [80]. An anomaly-based HIDS is used to
detect deviations from the normal host behaviour, and it is effective for unknown
attacks or attacks that have unknown behaviours.
We found that there are three different models of HIDSs available that can be
deployed in the cloud:
• Model 1: an HIDS that is implemented in the cloud host to monitor its activ-
ities (critical file changes, critical system calls, log files, application activities,
and system integrity); this is a regular HIDS.
• Model 2: an HIDS that is implemented in the hosted virtual machine. It col-
lects data from virtual resources but deals with them as real resources; VMs
users (clients) see it as a regular HIDS.
• Model 3: a hypervisor-based IDS that is implemented in the cloud host to
monitor its tenants (VMs). This IDS is isolated from the monitored VM, which
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make it more attack-resistance and gives it relatively good visibility. The IDS
sensor in this type of HIDS can be deployed directly on the host system itself
(in the virtualisation layer) or in a dedicated VM. More about this type of
HIDS is in section 3.2.
3.1.12 HIDS Considerations to Suit Cloud Environments
For an HIDS to work in the cloud, we conclude that it should consider the follow-
ing:
• cope with high volumes of data in the cloud,
• work on the fly,
• avoid a ”single point of failure” [95],
• ”detect intrusion initiated from within a VLAN” [91],
• protect the IDS sensor itself from tampering or being disabled in the case of
compromised hosts or compromised VMs [95] and [91],
• monitor all the VMs and their hosts in the cloud,
• minimise the level of intrusiveness without requiring installations or modifi-
cations inside VMs (for legal and efficiency reasons as stated in section 3.1.5),
• ”have a flexible architecture to be applied to several cloud architectures” [95],
• ”consider different service models and user requirements” [95],
• adapt to the scalable and distributed nature of the cloud, i.e. VM migration
[95],
• does not require any prior knowledge from inside VMs,
• flexible and not centralised,
• does not require any interference to be able to work effectively (automated),
and
• detect unknown novel attacks.
The dilemma in cloud security monitoring is that IaaS providers should deploy
detection systems that are able to perform efficiently with little or no knowledge
about what is inside customers’ VMs. Providers should not require any knowledge
about a VM’s structure, memory content, OS, and applications [70].
To cope with the scalable and distributed nature of the cloud, researchers sug-
gest using distributed IDSs (DIDSs) such as in [166], [71], and [95]. Kholidy et al.
stated in [95] that ”only a distributed strategy may be appropriate.”
In literature, we found that regular HIDSs are faced with three main challenges:
• First, the monitoring tools suffer from low attack-resistance due to the fact that
they are installed in the host being monitored; once the host is compromised,
the attacker can simply disable the monitoring tools [104], [115], and [148].
Virtualisation is often used to solve the problem of low attack-resistant by
isolating the HIDS from the monitored host, moving the monitored host to a
VM and installing the HIDS in the host, such as in [66].
• Second, the monitoring tools might start dropping data when overloaded. This
problem is emphasised in an environment with a high data volume such as
a cloud. To cope with high volumes of data, a distributed IDS is often used
[166].
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• Third is the challenge of bridging the semantic gap between the collected data
and the effect that this data has, or will have, on the monitored system (ex-
tracting useful information from the data) [110]. HIDS usually suffers from
the semantic gap problem; however, the problem becomes more severe in a
hypervisor-based IDS. The semantic gap in this type of HIDS is between the
hypervisor and guest VMs [111]. Many approaches are used to deal with this
semantic gap, such as Trap and Inspect and Checkpoint and Roll Back [66], [12],
and [110]. In both approaches, the IDS sensor is located in the host or in an-
other dedicated VM, and to provide the needed information, it injects a piece
of code in the monitored VMs (owned by consumers) [12], [110] and [66]. This
solution might be acceptable in a private cloud, or in a trusted virtualised en-
vironment, but not in a public cloud where the environment should be dealt
with as hostile, and a lack of trust exists among parties. Further informa-
tion about the approaches and solutions to the semantic gap is discussed in
chapter 4.
As stated in section 3.1.11, there are three types of HIDSs: a regular HIDS in the
host to monitor the host, regular HIDS in consumers’ VM to monitor the VM, and
hypervisor-based IDS in the host or a dedicated VM to monitor the consumers’
VMs. The first and second types of HIDSs are regular ones and do not meet the
requirements for an HIDS in the cloud. A hypervisor-based IDS has good poten-
tiality for meeting the requirements and tackles the dilemma of efficiently moni-
toring consumers’ VMs with little or no knowledge about what is inside them. A
hypervisor-based IDS has high attack-resistance due to the full isolation from the
monitored VM. It also has the required power to control VMs because the host
runs with the highest operating system privileges (Ring 0) which allows it to clone,
suspend, and restrict VMs [110]. Working with a high privilege mode gives the
hypervisor-based IDS the capability of prevention in addition to detection. Fur-
thermore, a hypervisor-based IDS clearly has better visibility than a NIDS [110],
because it can at least inspect all the ins and outs of every hosted VM. For these rea-
sons, more research has recently been done on hypervisor-based IDSs. However, it
still has to deal with the semantic gap problem. We think that a hypervisor-based
IDS might also help providers gain a better sense of the overall security picture of
the cloud. It might also help them to detect any malicious VM before it starts at-
tacking the infrastructure, other VMs, and/or other parties outside the cloud. By
monitoring VMs, the provider will be able to evaluate the security situation of each
VM, which will help in forming feature decisions regarding renewing or modify-
ing contracts with some consumers, and/or notifying them to improve the security
condition of their VMs.
3.2 Hypervisor-based IDS
A glimpse of the use of virtualisation in security was provided by Goldberg in 1974
[69]. He started his paper by saying:
”Virtual machines have finally arrived. Dismissed for a number of years as merely
academic curiosities, they are now seen as cost-effective techniques for organizing computer
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systems resources to provide extraordinary system flexibility and support for certain unique
applications.”
He suggested using VMs to improve software reliability; in that relatively in-
nocent old digital world, by software reliability, he meant not allowing errors in
multiprogramming applications and operating systems to affect other operating
systems and applications. The virtualisation feature used here to provide security
was isolation.
After that, most of the research on virtualisation was about using it in server
consolidation, testing applications, fault tolerance, and the use of legacy applica-
tions [27] and [29]. In 2001, a hypervisor-based IDS was suggested by Chen and
Noble in their paper ”When virtual is better than real” [39]. They suggested mov-
ing the IDS from a real machine to a virtual one as a solution to the low attack-
resistant problem. They also suggested an IPS called clone-based intrusion preven-
tion, which works by cloning the monitored VM and then testing the detected sus-
picious events on the copy rather than the original to decide whether to allow these
events to reach the original VM or not. The virtualisation features they used were
isolation, portability, and easy control (clone, encrypt, and migration).
The challenges discussed in [39] were the performance overhead and seman-
tic gap. Chen et al., in [39], said that to fully bridge the gap, ”one must re-create
this information in some form.” In the proposed model, VMs can be accessed by
the monitoring tool to collect data that are not acceptable in a cloud model. Chen
and Noble said that three services will take advantage of moving to virtualisation:
”secure logging, intrusion prevention and detection, and environment migration”
[39]. They argued that trusting the hypervisor is similar to trusting a real processor
because hypervisors are small and provide few and simple services. They con-
cluded by remarking that VMs ”offer the potential for improving both intrusion
prevention and intrusion detection” [39], which proved to be true in the following
research.
A year after this, another paper was published [52] with an application called
ReVirt. This applied the same idea of moving to a VM to isolate the monitoring
tools from the monitored host, which makes them more tamper resistant. How-
ever, the security tool here was not an IDS but a system logger. They targeted two
main problems in regular system loggers: the low attack-resistance in the case of a
compromised system and the lack of completeness to fully understand the occur-
ring incidents. ReVirt’s main job is to monitor and log all events in the VM. Thus, to
overcome the lack of attack-resistance problem, ReVirt converted the host to a VM;
and to overcome the lack of completeness problem, it used techniques from the
backup and recovery field, i.e. ”checkpointing, logging, and roll-forward recov-
ery” [52]. By using these techniques, ReVirt can replay the whole VM execution bit
by bit. However, this has a high cost on the overall performance. In ReVirt model,
VMs are accessed by the monitoring tools in the host which is an unacceptable level
of intrusiveness for cloud environments.
One of the most popular hypervisor-based IDSs is virtual machine introspec-
tion (VMI); in [66], Garfinkel and Rosenblum designed VMI to monitor and detect
anomalies. The system was designed to improve regular HIDSs by making them
achieve better attack-resistance. They converted a real server into a VM and mon-
itored this VM. The IDS was also isolated from the hypervisor and deployed in a
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separate VM dedicated to monitoring. VMI monitors hardware state such as mem-
ory pages, register contents, and I/O device flags. It requires prior knowledge and
data from within the VM, i.e. the operating system structure and implementation,
to deal with the semantic gap. Therefore, different operating systems require dif-
ferent policies and use different libraries. Researchers also added some response
abilities to the IDS (intrusion prevention abilities), which allow it to suspend, re-
sume, reboot, and checkpoint the monitored VM. The paper described in detail the
relationship between the hypervisor and the monitoring VM. The proposed system
also required modification to the used hypervisor (VMWare) to be able to collect
data from VMs and communicate with the IDS. The VMWare was modified and
tested. However, the researchers claimed that the same modification could be ap-
plied to most of the available hypervisors. After modifications, the IDS can access
the internal states of the VM and examine them. For instance the IDS can perform
queries such as, ”give me a list of all the processes currently running on the sys-
tem, or tell me all the processes which are currently holding raw sockets” [66], and
”show me the contents of virtual memory from x to y in the context of the login
process, or display the contents of task structure for the process with PID 231” [66].
Bryan, in [132], criticised VMI because it provided a very low-level memory
view, which caused difficultly in extracting any meaningful information from the
collected data. Furthermore, we think that the level of intrusiveness of VMI is un-
acceptable in public cloud environments for efficiency and legal reasons, as we ex-
plained in section 3.1.5. Most of the hypervisor-based IDSs that came after Garfinkel
et al.’s were based on VMI, such as the hypervisor-based IDS proposed in [88].
The systems we developed and tested in this research were hypervisor-based
IDSs that monitor VMs from outside and isolate the IDS from the monitored VMs
to make it as tamper resistant as VMI. VMI converts a real machine to a virtual
machine for monitoring purposes, while in the cloud, using virtualisation to allow
multi-tenancy is essential and not a choice.
The main difference between our systems and VMI is that we comply with the
security monitoring requirements of a large-scale public cloud. Our systems con-
sider detection in real-time, building small profiles to reduce the performance over-
head and reduce the building and detection time. Small profiles are also essential
because, in the case of VM migration, the profile also has to be migrated with the
corresponding VM. Furthermore, we require no prior knowledge, require no in-
strumentation within VMs, and monitor system calls only; in contrast, of VMI op-
erates by observing hardware states such as physical memory pages and registers
based on a prior knowledge of the VM structure. VMI also uses a modified version
of VMware, whereas we utilised plain KVM.
Payne et al., in [131], designed another hypervisor-based IDS that provides ac-
tive monitoring, while VMI provides passive monitoring. In passive monitoring,
the monitoring mechanism is not able to stop the attack before it happens, it only
scan what is already happening. In active monitoring, the execution of the moni-
tored system will be interrupted if a certain condition occurs, and the control will
be passed to the security tool [131]. A hook was placed inside the VM. If the exe-
cution reached the hook, it would be interrupted, and the control would be passed
to the security system. The execution inside the monitored VM would be trapped
and transferred to the IDS VM for analysis. For that reason, their system is an IDS
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and IPS.
Laureano et al., in [104], implemented an idea similar to VMI. The HIDS was
separated from the monitored host to protect it from tampering. They modified the
hypervisor User-Mode Linux (UML) to be able to extract data (i.e. system calls)
from inside the monitored VMs. In general UML is not a competitive hypervisor in
the market however they used it for testing the suggested architecture, and because
it is open source, it can be modified. The communication between the hypervisor
and monitored VM internal processes was through named pipes. To register sys-
tem calls, sliding window from [63] was used. In the learning phase, all the pro-
cesses with correspondent users were recorded to generate an access-control list
(ACL). In the detection, the sequences of system calls were checked, in addition
to the processes and users in the ACL. An idea similar to VMI was applied with
the improvement of adding an ACL and more concentration on response mecha-
nisms. We think that, in Laureano et al., there was a lack of technical details and
descriptions of the methods used.
Another hypervisor-based system is HyperSpector from [101]. HyperSpector de-
tection system, that is a HIDS and a NIDS, is deployed in a VM dedicated to mon-
itoring. It monitors network traffic to and from the monitored VM, the integrity of
the file system, and the behaviours of processes in the monitored VM. To be able
to collect these data from inside, the VM maps the monitored VM file system and
processes to the IDS VM. Therefore, the hypervisor can access VMs and is aware
of their interior. They also assumed the ability to work as part of a distributed IDS
architecture [101]. If HyperSpector was used in the cloud, it would threaten the
privacy of consumers and would require a high level of intrusiveness.
Jin et al., in [89], developed VMFence which is a distributed intrusion preven-
tion system for distributed virtual environments and prevention implies detection.
The system was not dedicated to cloud environments. However, we are convinced
that it has great potential to work efficiently in the cloud because it was designed
for distributed and highly flexible virtual environments with the consideration of
multiple hosts and multi-core CPUs. VMFence provided network monitoring ser-
vices only (NIDS). It captured all network traffic to and from each VM by monitor-
ing the virtual bridge in the host and without installing any code inside the mon-
itored VMs or requiring any prior knowledge. In this system, there is a dedicated
monitoring VM that runs numerous detection processes, each of which is respon-
sible for monitoring only one VM. With the arrival of any VM (new or migrated),
a new process is launched. There is also a main process that analyses traffic and
distributes it among its children (detection processes) based on the MAC address.
Each detection process has detection rules that are continuously updated to suit
the corresponding VM. These rules (configuration file) are migrated with the VM
in the case of migration. The prevention involves updating firewall policies in the
monitored VM and/or notifying the administrator to suspend or terminate the VM
under attack. The system was implemented and tested on Xen and was shown to
provide a low drop rate, high performance, and the ability to respond in real-time.
The system was designed to work in highly flexible environments: environments
that support migration. Furthermore, it can cope with high data volume. However,
the researchers did not discuss one of the most important challenges facing a NIDS
in such environments: dealing with encrypted traffic. In addition, the detection
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rate was not covered in the research.
3.3 Cloud Intrusion Detection Systems
Since 2009, in academia, many security systems have been designed to work specif-
ically in cloud computing environments. Dastjerdi et al., in [45], proposed a mobile
agent-based IDS architecture for cloud environments. The system has four compo-
nents:
1. An IDS control centre (IDSCC) which manages and controls all the mobile
agents in each subnet of VMs.
2. Investigative mobile agents (IMA), which are responsible for collecting evi-
dence from within VMs in the case of incidents for further analysis and au-
diting. They also perform the task of correlating data to detect distributed
attacks.
3. A mobile agents agency, which is a piece of code installed in each VM that is
responsible for hosting and executing mobile agents and protecting the un-
derlying VM.
4. Static agent detectors (SAD), which are installed inside VMs and are respon-
sible for monitoring the VMs, collecting data, i.e. log files, in addition to other
tasks. In SAD, different types of IDSs can be used, i.e. any NIDS or any HIDS.
Furthermore, the SAD can be designed to be application specific to reduce the
CPU load and the amount of data collected.
As we can see, the previous architecture requires the installation of code inside
consumers’ VMs, and mobile agents have to enter the VMs. For these reasons, we
believe that this architecture might suit private clouds but is much too intrusive-
ness for public cloud environments. We also doubt the efficiency of using a mobile
agent-based IDS in extremely tense environments such as a public cloud (they are
tense in terms of the workload and high flexibility). Jin et al., in [89], also criticised
the use of a mobile agent-based IDS in virtualised environments by stating that
”the configuration and management of mobile agent platforms on numerous hosts
in a large-scale distributed system is extremely hard and it is difficult to assure cor-
rectness” [89]. The public cloud is not just a large-scale distributed system but is also
an open environment, with automated provisioning for almost everyone and dif-
ferent clients with different operating systems and applications in an environment
that should be dealt with as hostile, as we discussed in section 3.1.3.
In [140], a distributed network and host-based IDS architecture were developed
to work in cloud environments. There are three components in the system. The first
component is a central management unit to manage and control all the IDS sen-
sors and perform correlations between alerts. The second component consists of
IDS sensors attached to consumers’ VMs to access, collect, and analyse data from
within these VMs. These sensors can be any type of IDS sensor (HIDS and/or
NIDS). Consumers are allowed to configure their IDS sensors, explore detected at-
tacks, and choose the countermeasure. The sensors are connected to the central
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management unit. The last component consists of IDS sensors to monitor cloud
hosts and cloud infrastructure. They are also connected to the same central man-
agement unit. The alerts are designed using the intrusion detection message ex-
change format (IDMEF).10 Providers can check alerts in the central management
units which make the detection of large-scale attack relatively easy because of the
correlation between the alerts raised from different sensors. Providers can also au-
tomate countermeasures, i.e. shutdown hosts in case of attack, which converts it
to an active detection system (prevention system). The management units are al-
lowed to read and modify the configuration of all the sensors under their control
(VMs sensors and hosts sensors). Because the sensors can access and collect data
from within the VMs, again this system might suit the private cloud but not the
public. It also has a single point of failure, which is the central management unit.
Furthermore, having a central management unit makes it unsuitable for tense en-
vironments such as the cloud.
Mazzariello et al., in [119], designed and tested two different scenarios for a
cloud-specific NIDS. The first NIDS was deployed close to the cluster controller (a
server that manages a collection of node controllers, each of which controls a col-
lection of hosts).11 Researchers in this paper tested the proposed architecture using
Eucalyptus (cloud management software), snort (a signature-based NIDS), and ses-
sion initiation protocol (SIP) against flooding attacks targeting hosts.12 The second
scenario involved deploying a NIDS for each physical server. The attacks were
successfully detected in both scenarios. However, the IDS in the first scenario was
heavily overloaded, which might give attackers the chance to deliberately overload
and thus disrupt the detection before starting the real attack. In Mazzariello et al.,
the researchers only tested the detection of a DoS attack, but did not mention how
to deal with encrypted traffic, which is the main problem facing the use of a NIDS
in the cloud, in addition to dealing with large volumes of data without affecting
the efficiency.
An IDS log cloud analysis system (ICAS) is a system developed in [178] to col-
lect all the IDS log files and analyse them to provide user-friendly and useful attack
reports for administrators to read and react accordingly. The main problem that this
system solves is dealing with extremely large IDS logs, which are rapidly increasing
in cloud environments. The Hadoop MapReduce algorithm was used to analyse
IDS logs and generate reports.13 The inputs of ICAS are IDS log files collected from
10The purpose of IDMEF ”is to define data formats and exchange procedures for sharing informa-
tion of interest to intrusion detection and response systems and to the management systems that may
need to interact with them” [47].
11A cluster controller is a dedicated machine that controls a location (or an availability zone in
Amazon terms); this location is a collection of node controllers, where each node controller manages
a number of physical servers and each physical server hosts a number of VMs. The terms cluster
controller and node controller are used by Eucalyptus, which is an open source private cloud software
for building cloud services.
12”Session initiation protocol (SIP) is an application-layer control (signalling) protocol for creating,
modifying, and terminating sessions with one or more participants. These sessions include Internet
telephone calls, multimedia distribution, and multimedia conferences” [141].
13”Hadoop MapReduce is a software framework for easily writing applications that process vast
amounts of data (multi-terabyte data-sets) in-parallel on large clusters (thousands of nodes) of com-
modity hardware in a reliable, fault-tolerant manner. A MapReduce job usually splits the input data-
set into independent chunks, which are processed by the map tasks in a completely parallel manner.
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different IDS sensors. These logs are then analysed using the MapReduce algorithm
and the outputs are reports containing attacks graphs. The proposed system was
tested using different NIDS sensors, including Snort, IDP8200, and NK7Admin, to
collect logs.
In [14], researchers proposed a hypervisor-based IDS that was not designed
for cloud computing. However, we believe that it has good potential to work in
the cloud because it requires neither prior knowledge from inside VMs nor the
installation of any code inside them, which satisfy the most challenging cloud IDS
requirements. The detection system was deployed in the host virtualisation layer.
Only information available to the hypervisor was collected and used for detection.
However, modifications to the hypervisor were required to be able to extract the
required data during runtime. To implement a prototype of the suggested IDS
they used a VirtualBox hypervisor, which is open source so can be modified. The
extracted data included the I/O accesses, page faults, translation look-aside buffer
(TLB) flushes, and control register updates. The semantic gap was bridged using
data mining algorithms; they tested two methods: the distance-based K-Nearest
Neighbour and the density-based Local Outlier Factor algorithms. The collected
data were transformed into features using statistical techniques. Then, the features
were used by the data mining algorithms to build a normal behaviour profile for
the monitored VM, which could be used later for detection purposes (by measuring
the deviation from normal). Only normal data were used to train the classifier.
The proposed IDS was tested using 300 different malwares, and it provided a 93%
detection rate and 3% false alarm rate. Two approaches were used to categorise the
features: storing sum of events and the relationship between pairs of events. They
reduced the feature space by using feature subset selection. We believe that this
hypervisor-based IDS is a very strong IDS candidate that has the potential to work
efficiently in the cloud. This IDS is further discussed later in the chapter 4.
In [148], a multithreaded cloud-specific NIDS architecture was designed to deal
with various challenges. The first involved the problem of trust in the cloud when
a consumer VM is breached or has a data loss incident, and the provider is aware
of the incident but chooses to keep the consumer unaware of the incident for dif-
ferent reasons. The second is the problem of the high volume of data in the cloud.
The third is the problem of the low attack-resistance of HDSs. They suggested a
distributed multi-threaded cloud IDS that is monitored by a third party. When the
IDS detects an intrusion, it raises an alarm to the third party, which in turn anal-
yses the alert, generates a report, notifies both the provider and consumer, and
sends them recommendations to deal with the detected intrusion. The researchers
in [148] stated that a NIDS is more suitable for deployment in the cloud than an
HIDS because an HIDS suffers from low attack-resistance and cannot deal with a
high volume of data. They deployed the NIDSs outside hosts, i.e. close to switches
or routers, where the suggested NIDS was signature-based. They also assumed
that the third party was able to analyse NIDS alerts and generate useful security
information and recommendations from them. We believe that using a third party
to deal with the trust problem in the cloud might be a good solution. However, a
The framework sorts the outputs of the maps, which are then input to the reduced tasks. Typically
both the input and output of the job are stored in a file system. The framework takes care of schedul-
ing tasks, monitoring them, and re-executes the failed tasks”[64].
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centralised IDS service might not be able to cope with the scalability and flexibil-
ity of the cloud. It represents a single point of failure. Furthermore, we question
how realistic it is to assume that the third party is able to generate efficient security
information and recommendations just by analysing the NIDS alerts. The research
also did not mention how to deal with encrypted network traffic. Lastly, we do not
think that a NIDS is an alternative to an HIDS, but is complimentary, and both of
needed in cloud environments.
Another solution was proposed by Jie et al., in [73], to solve the problem of
trust in the cloud between consumers and providers. The researchers tried to help
consumers to be aware of the security status of their VMs. The solution they sug-
gested is a user-oriented distributed HIDS and NIDS. The system consists of two
components; the first one is a management server, called a 3D-IDS server, which
is deployed in the user’s machine outside the cloud (off-premises server). This
server is responsible for receiving alerts from different IDS sensors and analysing
them to generate security status reports. The second component consists of sensors
that are installed by the consumer in each VM under its ownership. These sensors
are HIDSs, NIDSs, and system logs.14 In our opinion, these sensors have a thor-
ough view of all the activities and traffic inside VMs. However, they suffer from
a low attack-resistance; they can be neutralised by attackers if the VM is compro-
mised. Furthermore, sending system logs and sensor alerts though the network
(which is the Internet in the case of a public cloud) will have a negative effect on the
cloud’s overall performance by increasing the bandwidth consumption because of
the probable large volume of data. Moreover, if the analysis of the collected data is
conducted in the VM sensors themselves (which was suggested by the researchers),
they will require more computation power, which will increase the cost because the
cloud cost model is pay for what you used. Lastly, we believe that, from the user’s
point of view, this IDS architecture is a regular distributed HIDS, which is an old
problem, not the new security challenge introduced by cloud computing.
Alharkan et al., in [8], also suggested a user-oriented distributed IDS like in
the previous research. The suggested IDS is an on demand service provided to
consumers. It is an IDS-as-a-service (IDSaaS), with the pay-for-use cost model. It is
a NIDS because it monitors the traffic between VMs. It has three components; the
first is the IDSaaS manager, which performs all supervision tasks and manages all
of the sensors. The second is the IDS core (sensors), which monitors the traffic in the
private subnet. Many identical copies could be made from the sensor to cope with
the high volume of data and avoid a single point of failure. The third component is
the LoadBalancer, which is responsible for distributing traffic among the sensors.
This paper was just a simple proposal for an IDSaaS. It is not clear how consumers
will use the system and many details are missed.
Kholidy and Baiardi, in [95], developed a cloud intrusion detection system ar-
chitecture called CIDS, which stands for cloud-based IDS. CIDS is both an HIDS
and NIDS using signature and anomaly-based detection methods. It is a distributed
detection system with no central coordinator to suit the scalability of the cloud and
to be able to cope with large data volume. Each host should have two databases,
an audit system, and an alert system. The databases are used by the CIDS, one
14They considered three different types of sensors, which is the reason for calling it three-
dimensional IDS. However, we consider the collection of system logs to be part of an HIDS.
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by the signature-based IDS and the other by anomaly-based IDS. The audit system
monitors message exchanges between hosts, log system events, and collect data
coming from within VMs. The alert system is used to communicate alerts to other
hosts in the cloud in the case of incidents, either directly or through the node con-
troller. It also provides an application called the report producer with the required
data to generate a readable report for cloud administrators. The report producer
is located in a dedicated machine called the scheduler machine, which is accessed
by cloud administrators to read incidents reports. The scheduler machine collects
alerts from VMs and NIDSs, which are deployed in physical or virtual switches
inside the cloud virtual network. Each VM should have a sensor that is responsible
for collecting logs from inside the VM, audit data, user actions, and commands,
and acts as an HIDS. CIDS runs using different detection models. The first is when
hosts have to exchange consumer audit data to obtain complete audit data for the
current consumers in each of them.15 Another detection model is when hosts ex-
change consumers’ audit data with the use of a neural network method. The last
model is when every host works independently and there is no need to exchange
audit data. The proposed system is scalable and flexible with no single point of
failure. Even the scheduler machine is not a single point of failure because as they
said, ”a cloud runs several copies of the scheduler node with a fault tolerance tech-
nique provided by the middleware to backup the processing data” [95]. It is not
clear how the NIDS will deal with the problem of detection in encrypted traffic.
Lastly, the level of intrusiveness is high because they install a piece of code inside
each VM, which exports too much sensitive data that could lead to trust problems,
legal problems, and performance problems.
Zou et al., in [191], designed a cloud monitoring framework and implemented
it on Xen and Openebula.16 The framework is used to monitor different VMs with
different operating systems, with almost no intrusiveness (no need to install any
code inside VMs), but they require prior knowledge about the monitored VM’s
operating system version. It also deals with the trust problem between providers
and consumers: first, by separating the monitoring functionality from the VMM
by deploying them in a specific VM (monitoring VM) to reduce the services pro-
vided by the VMM and thus reducing the attack surface. Second, the integrity of
the monitoring VM is maintained by utilising the trusted computing technology.
Furthermore, an independent trusted computing base (TCB) was established for
each monitored VM. Lastly, the researchers suggested putting the monitoring VM
under the control of a trusted third party.
The suggested framework has three main components. The first component is
the management VM (MVM), which is used by cloud administrators to control and
manage other VMs. The second component is the monitoring VM, which has a
piece of code called the monitoring driver. The monitoring VM might have sev-
eral monitoring drivers corresponding to different types of operating systems in
the monitored VMs. With the arrival of a new VM, a correspondent monitoring
driver will be loaded. The monitoring driver is used to process the low-level data
15It is not clear to me why they want to maintain all of the audit data for each consumer in each
host. However, I think the reason is to allow the data to be used in the case of migration or in a case
where one consumer has more than one VM; although they did not mention migration in the paper.
16OpenNebula is an open source cloud computing management system that is used to manage
VMs in distributed environments[133].
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collected from the corresponding monitored VM. It has the needed information to
understand the low-level data and bridge the semantic gap (more about this part
of Zou et al.’s research is discussed later in the chapter 4, section 4.4). The third
component is an event sensor that is deployed in the VMM and is responsible for
collecting low-level data coming from the monitored VMs. It collects data about
VMs from registers and transfers the data to the correspondent monitoring driver.
The collected data are only system calls coming from VMs. The event sensor also
monitors privilege VMs (not just consumers VMs). To be able to monitor privilege
VMs and intercept events, a modification of the VMM code was required.
One of the main goals of cloud services is reducing the need for human inter-
vention to the minimum possible. Some research papers have relied heavily on
users to supply some data for the IDS, such as in [130]. Onoue et al. proposed a
system to monitor VMs from outside. Another VM dedicated for monitoring was
used to monitor VMs. They also used a modified version of the hypervisor (Xen)
in the host machine. The system installed in the monitoring VM intercepts system
calls from certain processes that are specified by the VM user ahead of time. In
the monitoring VM, there should be a security policy that specifies what is allowed
for certain processes and what is not, and how to react if a violation occurs. This
policy also should be provided ahead of time by the user. The user is also required
to provide knowledge about the structure of its operating system kernel, such as
the addresses of several routines in the kernel space corresponding to the system
call entry and exit. This knowledge is generated automatically for the supported
operating system (Linux only) using a tool during the process of installing the op-
erating system. All the required information depends on the version of the used
kernel. Most of the tests in this paper involved the performance. We are not sure
how the system performs from the security side. We think that the main obstacles
here are the requirements from the user. Deciding what processes need to be mon-
itored and a security policy for each process are very complicated tasks. However,
some of the techniques used here are useful for converting a research laboratory
HIDS into a real-world system.
In [36], researchers developed a system called SYRINGE for monitoring virtual
machines. The main goal is protecting the detection system from being neutralised
or tampered with in the case of a compromised host by separating the detection sys-
tem from the monitored host. The monitoring application in SYRINGE was placed
in a separate VM called a security VM (SVM). SYRINGE is allowed to invoke func-
tions from inside the monitored VMs (VMs’ operating systems) using a technique
called function-call injection, which allows the SVM to invoke functions in the mon-
itored VMs by interrupting their execution and manipulating the contents of their
CPU and memory. We consider the system’s ability to invoke functions from inside
the monitored VMs to be a high level of intrusiveness that is not acceptable in a
cloud environment.
3.4 Cloud Attacks
Many cloud-specific attacks developed in academia have been published recently,
such as in [167], [139], [53], [187], [19], [164], [183], [184], and [180]. As explained
in section 3.1.8, public cloud computing is vulnerable to DoS attacks due to its
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openness and shared resources. It is vulnerable to different types of DoS and DDoS
attacks. Some of the published cloud attacks were implementation-based, whereas,
others were architecture-based. Examples of implementation-based cloud attacks
are the attacks introduced in [187] and [53]. In [187], researchers discovered a vul-
nerability in the Amazon EC2 version of the Xen hypervisor that can be exploited
by malicious co-resident VMs, which allow them to monopolise about 98% of the
CPU time and affect the performance of other consumers, thus violating the SLA.17
This type of attack is called a Theft-of-Service attack. They tested and proved the se-
vere damage from this attack, notified Amazon about the vulnerability, and Ama-
zon patched it.
The other implementation-based attack is VM escape, reported in [53], which
we discussed in section 3.1.3. Architecture-based DoS attacks (compared to
implementation-based) represent a more significant threat to the development of
the cloud. Therefore, they have more weight in our research.
As we discussed in section 3.1.8, any economic-loss attack can be considered
to be a DoS attack. The first architecture-based DoS attack is the economic denial of
sustainability attack (EDoS). The idea for this attack was first suggested by Hoff in
his blog in 2008 [77]. The attack targets the cost model in the cloud(pay-for-use)
and the on-demand elasticity feature. Attackers enlarge the bill of the targeted cloud
consumer by requesting the provided service using fake or incomplete requests.
Due to these fake requests, the victim will consume more resources and might also
respond to the increased demand by expanding, and thus paying more money to
the provider. This attack and its mitigation were discussed in [152], [167], and [177];
however, we believe that there has still been no deep analysis of the EDoS class of
attacks in the literature.
The second cloud attack is the cross-VM attack discussed in [139]. This attack
aims to extract sensitive information from the targeted innocent VM, such as cryp-
tographic keys. It requires the attacker VM and targeted benign VM to live in the
same cloud host (co-residency). Then, it uses a side channel to extract the required
sensitive data or information.18 To increase the possibility of co-residency, they
suggested using techniques such as finding and analysing the cloud placement al-
gorithms (the algorithm used by cloud management machines to distribute VMs
among hosts, more about this in chapter 5, section 5.1.1). They also suggested col-
lecting network features such as the structure of IP addresses to be able to map the
infrastructure and help achieve co-residency. Furthermore, a brute force strategy
can be used for co-residency. In a brute force attack, the attacker initiates a large
number of VMs and terminates the non-co-resident ones. Many techniques can be
used to check the success of co-residency. Some of these techniques are network-
based such as network probing, time-to-lives (TTLs), small packet round-trip times,
and numerically close internal IP addresses. Other techniques are based on using a
covert channel to perform co-residency checks. They also proved that a malicious
VM can monitor the workload of a co-resident VM through time-shared caches.
The attack was tested in the lab and also in Amazon EC2.
Many defence strategies were suggested in the same paper to defend against
17Amazon uses a modified version of Xen that is concealed.
18In a side channel, an attacker obtains secret information by monitoring the activities and hard-
ware status of the targeted system [189].
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the cross-VM attack, such as keeping the internal structure of the cloud and the
placement policy confidential. They also suggested blocking all possible side chan-
nels. Furthermore, they said that ”the best solution is simply to expose the risk
and placement decisions directly to users” [139]. We found that the first solution
(keeping the placement policy confidential) is security through obscurity, which is
a risky proposition. The second solution (block side channels) is almost impos-
sible because it is hard to prove that all side channels are blocked; there are no
guarantees. The third solution (expose the risk to users) is only transferring the
problem. The more acceptable solutions from the security prospective are, for ex-
ample, improving the detection mechanisms to cover this attack and strengthening
the hypervisors’ isolation techniques.
Bates et al., in [19], developed a traffic analysis attack that works in cloud en-
vironments, in addition to any other virtualised environment. In this attack, the
attacker successfully measures the workload and extracts more accurate traffic in-
formation about the victim VM using a malicious co-resident VM, without relying
on side channels, as in the previous attack. The malicious co-resident VM injects
a watermark signature into the network traffic of the victim co-resident VM. First,
the malicious VM (which is a regular web server) uses co-resident watermarking
to confirm co-residency. Then, the attacker from outside the cloud initiates a sin-
gle TCP session with both the malicious and victim VMs. After that, the attacker
measures the workload of the victim by observing the ratio between the through-
put of the two TCP flows. Since the two VMs live in the same server and the two
flows usually use the same network path, they are affected by the same conditions,
i.e. network congestion. Therefore, the effect of these conditions can be ignored
because it does not change the ratio. The inserted watermark can threaten the
resource isolation between VMs. This attack technique was evaluated in the lab
and in a production environment. A relatively wide covert channel (4 bits per sec-
ond) was successfully established and also tested as a prove of co-residency using
network-based techniques. They used a Kolmogorov-Smirnov distribution test to
examine the inter-packet delays between VMs. In the experiment, they proved co-
residency in less than 10 s and injected the watermark successfully within 2.5 s.
Resource freeing attacks (RFAs), were introduced in [164] by Varadarajan et al..
They tested different techniques to improve the performance of the malicious VM
by forcing other innocent co-resident VMs to release resources which make them
available to attackers to use (steal the service). For instance, attackers analyse the
targeted VM to find a performance bottleneck application or service on it. They
then saturate the bottleneck so the victim is forced to suspend other used resources,
which makes them available to the malicious VM to use. They implemented the at-
tack in the lab and in Amazon EC2. In the lab, they successfully increased the
malicious VM performance by about 60%, and in Amazon EC2 it was increased by
about 13%. The performance of the targeted VM was also heavily affected with a
degradation in performance of about 80%. This attack also, as in previous attacks,
required co-residency and a co-residency check. They used a brute force technique
to attain co-residency. For the co-residency check, they used a network-based tech-
nique involving the packet round-trip times of network probes and a cache-based
covert channel technique. The main contribution of the paper was finding free-up
resource strategies. The researchers also suggested some mitigation strategies such
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as using dedicated servers to prevent co-residency, in addition to recommendations
to strengthen the isolation between VMs and improve the scheduling mechanism.
As can be seen, many cloud-specific attacks are based on exploiting vulnerabil-
ities in the resource isolation between VMs. The isolation and resource distribution
are the main job of the hypervisor. However, research has proven that the isolation
and resource distribution in virtualised environments need to be improved [164].
Covert channels are widely used in cloud attacks (due to the multi-tenancy fea-
ture and isolation insufficiency). Some research papers such as [173], [112] and
[176] have attempted to create a covert channel in virtualised environments. Wu
et al., in [173], designed a covert channel dedicated to cloud computing environ-
ments. It is based on a memory bus not on shared caches as most of other covert
channels. The researchers argued that cache-based covert channels are not efficient
in cloud environments for many reasons. The first reason is CPU cores do not share
any caches. The second reason is the hypervisor completely flushes the L1 cache
at context switches (when the resource user has changed). The third reason is the
VMs use virtual processors, which are frequently migrated from a physical proces-
sor core to another by the hypervisor. The covert channel designed by Wu et al.
was implemented and tested in the lab and in Amazon EC2. In the lab, it success-
fully transferred about 700 bps with an error rate of 0.09%, while in Amazon EC2, it
transferred about 100 bps with an error rate of 0.75%. They also designed a proto-
col to use the suggested covert channel, and it was used in their experiments. More
information about covert channels is provided in chapter 5.
For security assurance, some cloud providers offer a dedicated hosting service
to their consumers for extra money, which eliminates the threat of inter-VM at-
tacks and any covert channel leakage. Zhang et al., in [183], proposed a system that
verifies the exclusivity of using the host resources for consumers who request ded-
icated servers. It is necessary to verifying the exclusivity because, as discussed in
section 3.1.5, there is a trust problem between providers and consumers. The sys-
tem is called HomeAlone, and it uses an L2 memory cache-based side channel to
check the exclusivity. The same suggested side channel was also used in [184] for
attacking innocent co-resident VMs and extracting cryptographic keys from them.
3.5 Conclusion
As we can see from the literature, there is a need for an efficient cloud HIDS that
is able to monitor VMs without requiring any prior knowledge from inside them
or installing any code in them. This HIDS should also be able to cope with large
volumes of data, should be flexible enough to suit VM migration, and have no
single point of failure. It also has to have adequate generality to be able to deal with
different types of VMs and should also be able to perform on the fly and without
disrupting the service or causing an SLA violation. We also found that hypervisor-
based IDS has great potential to work efficiently in the cloud. In the next chapter,
we propose two new hypervisor-based monitoring and detection solutions that are
designed to work in large-scale public IaaS cloud environments and satisfy their
requirements.
From the literature on cloud attacks, we found that there is usually a generic
theme in most of the available architecture-based DoS cloud attacks. They require
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co-residency, co-residency checks, and the use of covert channels for communica-
tion or stealing data or resources. We used the same theme to develop our new
cloud DoS attack, as discussed in chapter 5.
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Chapter 4
Host-Based Virtual Machine
Monitoring
The providers of public IaaS cloud services are required to protect their infrastruc-
ture, prevent VMs from attacking each other, and prevent malicious users from
attacking the outside world using the cloud. Furthermore, providers need infor-
mation about the security status of each consumer to maintain the security of the
whole cloud and deal with the security ignorance of consumers by notifying them,
isolating them, charging them extra money, or even terminating their contract if the
situation requires it after checking the legal status (i.e. if a breach of contract has
been detected).
To fulfil these security requirements, there is a need to monitor all of the hosted
VMs to detect any malicious attempts and be aware of the security status of each
consumer and the whole cloud. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are usually used
to continuously monitor and detect any suspicious traffic or events.
As discussed in section 3.1.10, a network-based IDS in the cloud suffers from
numerous issues. First, it cannot monitor encrypted traffic, and almost all the traffic
in the cloud is encrypted. Second, it cannot detect attacks between co-resident
VMs (inter-VM attacks). Third, it also cannot inspect all the traffic in switched
environments, and cannot cope with a high data volume, which is one of the main
characteristics of the cloud.
Regular HIDS in the cloud also has the problem of coping with a high data vol-
ume, in addition to suffering from low attack-resistance (when the attacker success-
fully compromises the machine, he or she can disable the monitoring application).
Furthermore, the main problem facing regular HIDS in the cloud is that to monitor
VMs efficiently, the detection system needs to access them and collect data from
within; these data are used to bridge the semantic gap and generate useful infor-
mation about the security status of VMs. Signs of intrusion are extracted from the
data collected from inside VMs.
From chapter 3, we understand that there are numerous special requirements
for cloud detection systems. These can be summarised in seven points:
1. dealing with large volumes of data;
2. monitoring VMs without accessing them or installing code in them, with the
minimum level of intrusiveness;
3. requiring no prior knowledge about VMs;
4. high attack-resistance so consumers or attackers cannot disable the monitor-
ing system;
5. being able to work on the fly (fast training, monitoring, and detection);
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6. being able to migrate with the corresponding VM in the case of migration,
which means the IDS has to be small, autonomous, and mobile; and
7. being completely automated and not requiring any human intervention to
suit large-scale public IaaS cloud environments, which are automated, flexi-
ble, and tense.
These requirements must be considered in a new cloud-specific intrusion detec-
tion system, in addition to the regular host-based intrusion system (HIDS) require-
ments, which are an acceptable overhead, a minimum false positive rate, and an
acceptable detection rate. Furthermore, maintaining a balance between false posi-
tives and false negatives is essential.1 In addition, there is the requirement of being
able to detect novel attacks, especially in open environments such as the cloud.
In this chapter, we propose two new intrusion detection systems that satisfy
these requirements to a high degree. The new detection systems were designed
and tested in the lab. They are a type of hypervisor-based intrusion detection sys-
tem. As proven in the literature and discussed in chapter 3, the best HIDS candidate
to work in the cloud and monitor VMs is the hypervisor-based IDS. There are two
types of hypervisor-based IDSs: anomaly-based IDS and signature-based IDS. A
signature-based IDS detects malicious events by comparing them to known and
pre-determined attack patterns. It requires prior knowledge and human interven-
tion, and cannot detect novel attacks. Therefore, it is less appropriate for a cloud
environment in comparison with an anomaly-based IDS.
In a hypervisor anomaly-based IDS, the monitoring system is used to build a
character or a normal behaviour profile for each of the hosted VMs and detect any
deviation from normal as an anomaly. To build the profile and detect anomalies,
the IDS should go through several stages:
1. selection of learning methods and features to build the classifier,
2. collection of data to be used for training and testing,
3. training of the classifier using the collected data to create the normal be-
haviour profile, and
4. testing of the classifier to measure efficiency and effectiveness.
To select the learning method, we need to first decide the source of the data to
be used to build the behaviour profile of the monitored VM. We chose to monitor
all system calls invoked by the VM and used them to build the normal behaviour
profile that represents the VM; the reasons for using the the system calls as the main
source of data and the literature on their use in an HIDS are discussed in section
4.1.
After selecting the source of data (system calls), we then built a small cloud
environment with the minimum acceptable setup for production environments, as
suggested by the Eucalyptus system administrators guide [56]. The details of the
setup and experimental tools and how we generate normal and abnormal traffic, in
addition to the methods we used to analyse the system calls to get useful security
information and bridge the semantic gap, are discussed in section 4.2.
1False positives occur when normal events are falsely classified as anomalous; false negatives
occur when malicious events are falsely classified as normal. The balance between false positives
and false negatives is the same as the balance between under-generalisation and over-generalisation.
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We collected data (normal and abnormal) that we used to build the two new
hypervisor-based IDSs that we proposed. The first one was built using the BoSC,
which was first suggested in [93]. The first reason for choosing BoSC is its simplicity
(it is almost the simplest method we found in the literature). Because this study is
one of the first in this area, it is more reasonable to start with a simple method and
improve or change the method when needed. The second reason for choosing BoSC
is that it ignores the order of the system calls and only consider their frequencies;
maintaining the order of events in a virtualised environment is a hard task, and an
IaaS cloud is a virtualised environment.
The second system is built using the hidden Markov model (HMM) represen-
tation method. This detection system was designed to monitor ephemeral VMs:
VMs that run for a short period of time to accomplish a specific task and then ter-
minate (which is a popular usage model in the IaaS cloud). Collecting data from
ephemeral VMs, using the data to build representative normal behaviour profiles,
and then using these profiles to detect any change in behaviour are challenging
tasks given that the VM will only be on for a short period of time. Time is critical in
the process of training the IDS to monitor these VMs and detect any anomaly. We
decided to use a representation method that provides a high detection rate with the
minimum time even if it consumes more resources, if not time. We found from the
literature that HMM satisfies our need [170] and [128]. HMM is known to provide
a very powerful model to capture the structure of sequential data. Therefore, we
used it to build the second detection system.
The new detection systems could not be tested in a real productive environment
(for legal and security reasons); they had to be tested either in a virtualised envi-
ronment or in a real environment in the lab. We decided to test the systems in the
best available choice, which was a real environment in the lab. We built an IaaS
cloud in the lab with the minimum acceptable setup suitable for productive envi-
ronments, as suggested by the Eucalyptus system administrators guide [56]. We
host a number of VMs in our cloud with activities on them; the hosted VMs ran an
ERP (enterprise resource planning) application and performed regular ERP tasks.
After that, data were collected (normal non-malicious data) from each of the VMs
and used to build the normal behaviour that represented each of the VMs (training
the classifiers).
To generate abnormal data, we ran abnormal activities in the VMs; abnormal
data were then used for testing the detection systems. The idea was to change the
VMs’ behaviours and test whether the change in behaviour could be detected by
the classifiers. Any change in behaviour should have been considered to be a sign
of abnormality in VMs because we assumed that the VMs had consistent behaviour.
To generate abnormal data we designed an attack scenario based on stressing the
CPU to trigger a migration order for false reasons to misuse the migration and over-
commitment features of the IaaS cloud. That was the initial test of the attack that
was later further developed and demonstrated in chapter 5.
We tested the new detection systems using normal and abnormal data. The de-
tection rate, accuracy rate, and false positive rate were used to measure the efficacy
of the proposed systems, which are widely accepted criteria for measuring the ef-
ficiency of HIDSs [93]. We also calculated the required time, storage, and size of
the representative normal behaviour profile. To determine whether the anomaly
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signals were strong enough, we used hypothesis testing.
The details of the new monitoring systems and their performances in the lab are
discussed in section 4.3.
Section 4.4 is dedicated to discussing other monitoring systems that are very
close to the proposed systems. There are three very strong candidates: VMM-IDS
by Azmandian et al. in [14] and two systems proposed by Zou et al. in [174] and
[191]. In this section, we discuss the details of these systems, evaluate them, and
demonstrate the difference between them and our systems.
The last section before the conclusion is section 4.5, which covers possible at-
tacks against the proposed systems; then the conclusion and future work are dis-
cussed in section 4.6.
The initiation of the idea:
Forrest and her team [63] developed an anomaly-based intrusion detection sys-
tem that relies on monitoring the system calls invoked by root processes based on
the assumption that root processes have consistent behaviour and any change in
behaviour might be an indication of an abnormality. We noticed the similarity be-
tween root processes and the VMs hosted in the IaaS cloud: both are expected to
have consistent behaviour and any change in behaviour could be an indication of
an abnormality.
Why are the VMs hosted in a cloud expected to have consistent behaviour?
First, the VMs hosted in an IaaS cloud are limited in the services and appli-
cations used. This assumption is relative to regular servers that may aggregate
multiple services on a single instance. Regular best practices for IaaS cloud ser-
vices would argue against such mixed workloads being deployed in a single VM
for security and performance reasons.
• For security reasons, clients who own VMs hosted in the cloud are advised
not to mix services in one VM. As stated by Krutz et al. [102], ”while contem-
porary servers and virtual machines are adept at multi-tasking many func-
tions, it’s a lot easier to maintain secure control if the virtual machine is con-
figured with process separation. It greatly complicates the hacker’s ability
to compromise multiple components if the VM is implemented with one pri-
mary function per virtual server or device.”
• For performance reasons, as stated in [11], ”companies with large batch-
oriented tasks can get results as quickly as their programs can scale, since
using 1000 servers for one hour costs no more than using one server for 1000
hours. This elasticity of resources, without paying a premium for large scale,
is unprecedented in the history of IT.” The cost model in the cloud, usage-
based pricing, supports this idea. Instead of creating one large VM with many
functions, the client can create a number of small VMs, each with one primary
function, and still pay the same amount of money.
Second, in general, servers usually tend to perform the same series of tasks
repeatedly, which provides a sound data set for training.
If VMs have consistent behaviour, an anomaly-based HIDS is a good candidate
to build a normal behaviour profile that represents each VM in the cloud and de-
tects any change in behaviour as a sign of abnormality.
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4.1 Learning Methods and Features Selection - System Call
HIDS
Different methods can be used to design the anomaly-based IDS (to build the clas-
sifier and detect anomalies). The choice of method depends on the environment
requirements and the available data for building the normal behaviour profile and
indicating attacks. For instance, slow methods cannot be used in environments that
require detection on the fly (fast training and fast detection).
4.1.1 Available Data for Training
Each VM hosted in an IaaS cloud has two communication channels. The first one
is between the VM and the host, which is occupied with system calls and signals.
The second channel is between the VM and the outside world through the network
using packets (see figure 4.1).
Figure 4.1: VMs communicate with host using system calls and signals and with
outside world using network packets.
Network packets in the first channel can be monitored using a network-based
intrusion detection system (NIDS) (which is not covered in this research). The sec-
ond channel between VMs and the host, which is occupied with system calls and
signals, can be monitored using a system call-based HIDS. System call-based HIDSs
are reported in the literature to be effective, and they are discussed next.
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4.1.2 Literature on System Call HIDS
Monitoring system calls and using them to build an HIDS is not new. Usually shell
commands, audit events, and/or system calls are used to build an anomaly-based
HIDS [92]. We monitor system calls for detection because they are almost the only
available data we can collect from VMs without accessing them or installing any
code on them. Furthermore, previous research proved that detecting anomalies by
monitoring system calls provided high efficiency and effectiveness [63], [93], and
[128]. Any activity inside VMs requires invoking system calls, which are sent to the
host and can be analysed to detect anomalies. The main problem here is bridging
the semantic gap; system calls are low-level data and extracting useful information
from them is a hard and tricky task.
Another problem in system call-based IDS is its inability to detect attacks not
reflected by system calls and attacks that do not change the behaviour of the mon-
itored VM. This problem becomes an issue if the IDS only monitors one applica-
tion or process in the VM, and the attack is performed using another application
to exploit errors of omission in the attacked application, such as race conditions,
opening files without appropriate safeguards and checks, and leaving temporary
files with critical information. These errors in the monitored application are usu-
ally exploited by another application, and thus they might not cause a change in
the behaviour of the attacked application. In our case, we monitor the whole VM
as a black box, including the malicious and victim applications. These will most
probably be reflected in system calls, unless it is a 100% network-related attack,
which should be detected using NIDS. As we stated in section 3.1.10, an HIDS is
not an alternative to the NIDS; they are complementary systems. There are types of
attacks designed specifically to avoid detection by a system calls-based IDS. These
are discussed later in the chapter, in section 4.5.
Jyothsna et al. in [92], provided a thorough survey of anomaly detection meth-
ods. They categorised them into five types: statistical-based methods, computer
immunology, user intention identification, cognition-based, and machine learning-
based methods. Statistical-based methods include the Markov process, operational,
multivariate, statistical moments, time series, and univariate methods. Finite state
machines, description scripts, and expert systems methods can be subcategorised
under cognition-based methods. Lastly, the machine learning category comprises
Bayesian networks, generic algorithms, neural networks, fuzzy logic, and outlier
detection.
System calls are sequences of observations that are made over a period of time.
Thus, they can be considered to be a time series model and can be analysed using
statistical, machine learning, and data-mining methods. Each system call might
have arguments and/or return values. Some of the used methods to build the
classifier are simple; they do not contain any probability calculations and ignore
arguments and return values, which reduce the complexity of the method and al-
low it to operate faster, i.e. sliding windows (stide) [63], RIPPER [105] and bag of
system calls [93]. Other methods consider arguments for building the classifier and
detecting anomalies [157] and [128]. The main reason for ignoring arguments and
not using probability calculations is to reduce the cost (reduce the overhead on the
system) [62].
Mutz et al., in [128], compared methods that considered arguments with other
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simple methods and proved that the previous ones are efficient and more accurate
(see table 4.1).
Table 4.1: Comparison between different methods of learning extracted from [128].
FN FP
Stide system from [63] 3 208
Bag of system calls from [93] 3 116
K-Nearest neighbours 2 179
Cluster-based estimation 12 158
Mutz et al.’s system 0 39
As we can see from the table, Mutz et al.’s system, which is an argument-based
system, [128], gave the best results; it gave 0 false negatives and 39 false positives.
The second best system is the bag of system calls (BoSC), which gave 3 false nega-
tives and 116 false positives.
Mutz et al.’s system classified system calls using Bayesian networks and scor-
ing instead of a simple threshold-based scheme. If the root node of the Bayesian
network registers a 50% or more probability of abnormality, then the system call
is classified as malicious. Regarding the overhead, the system did not affect the
performance of the host during regular usage. However, when the rate of invok-
ing system calls was increased (heavy use of the host), the performance degraded;
the CPU load was 40% when the detection system was disabled and 58% when
the system was enabled. To improve the performance, only a chosen subset of all
invoked system calls was monitored. Then, a profile was created for each system
call to register its normal arguments, in addition to a set of procedures (a function)
to decide whether or not an argument was an anomaly, using a probability calcu-
lation; arguments with low probabilities were classified as anomalies. The set of
procedures and evaluated features of the arguments were designed based on the
designer’s knowledge of known attacks. Known attacks were analysed to decide
which arguments and features to consider. Examples of the features considered
were the argument string length, string character distribution (normal frequency
of characters), structural inference (i.e. grammatical analysis of the argument) and
token finder (define a set of possible alternatives for the argument).
The proposed method increased the CPU load by 45% in the case of a heavy
load host. It also required prior knowledge and an analysis of known attacks to
select the detection features. As discussed in section 3.1.3, the cloud is a heavy-load
environment; in addition, working on the fly is a main requirement. Furthermore,
the detection system in the cloud should be fully automated, involving no human
intervention, and no prior knowledge.
Simple method:
The time-delay embedding (tide) by Forrest et al. [63] is the simplest of the meth-
ods for system call anomaly detection. A sliding window technique was used to
register system calls. Researchers tested window size of 5, 6, and 11. To explain a
sliding window, see figure 4.2; if the window size is 6, a sequence of 10 system calls
will generate 5 sequences.
Forrest et al., in [63], monitored only the root processes of two applications
(sendmail and lpr) and created a normal behaviour profile for each of them using
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Figure 4.2: Sliding window of size 6 generates 5 sequences of system calls.
sequences of system call. They ran malicious activities on the monitored system,
which generated traces for suspicious system calls; these sequences were collected
and registered using a sliding window. Then, the registered sequences were com-
pared with a database of normal system calls, and the number of mismatches was
counted. The reason for monitoring only the root processes is that these show rel-
atively consistent behaviour [63]; so it is possible to create a representative profile for
them. In addition, the root processes have full access to the host, which make them
a serious threat to it in case of exploitation.
Forrest et al.’s system was tested in an experiment. Enough data were generated
to train the classifier, with additional data (malicious and innocent) for testing it.
The experiment showed that by monitoring system calls only, malicious activities
can be detected reliably.
Forrest et al.’s research in [63] is the first research to suggest using system calls
to build normal behaviour profiles for processes to use in comparisons for anomaly
detection. They based their research on two assumptions. The first assumption is
that programs have consistent behaviours, which generate a pattern of consistent
sequences of system calls. Consistency is essential for building a steady profile
that represents the monitored process. The second assumption is that during an
attack or errors, unusual sequences of system calls will be generated. System calls
arguments were ignored for performance reasons.
The same researchers extended their research in [78] by fixing the window size
to 10 and using Hamming distance as the matching rule to generate anomaly sig-
nals; the method was called sequence time-delay embedding (stide). To test the
new system, data were collected from real environments located in the Artificial In-
telligence laboratory of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and in the Computer
Science Department of the University of New Mexico. Multiple sources of data were
used to show the effect of changing the environment on system call sequences. The
data were first analysed for false positives, and then were used to create the normal
behaviour profile.
After that, malicious traffic was generated by running malicious scripts, which
were sunsendmailcp, syslogd, a decode alias intrusion, sm565a, sm5x, and for-
warding loops error on the sendmail application. The proposed system success-
fully detected intrusions and errors and generated strong anomaly signals. Re-
searchers also found that changing the window size had almost no effect on the
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detection rate. Regarding the effect of changing the environment on system call
sequences, they found that data from two different environments had created the
same database pattern, and only the database size varied.
The experiments of Forrest et al. in [63] and [78] provide the foundation of most
system call-based anomaly detection systems. Their promising results promoted
more research in the area. The data they collected (sequences of system calls) were
used later by many other researchers to test different system call-based detection
methods.
Another study similar to that of Forrest et al., with modifications, was con-
ducted by Kosoresow et al. in [100]. Kosoresow et al. used a sliding window to build
the normal behaviour database and used deterministic finite automaton (DFA) with
its equivalent language to describe the patterns of system calls. The DFA was con-
structed using macros with sequences of system calls with different sizes; so the
length of the system call sequences was not fixed, and the macros were selected
manually.
The detection system based on a machine learning algorithm was introduced
in [106]. Data collected by Forrest et al.’s were used to test the new detection sys-
tem, which was based on a machine learning classifier. Normal and abnormal data
were used to train the classifier, which was different than most anomaly detection
systems, where only normal data are used for training, and abnormal data are only
used for testing. The classifier was based on RIPPER, which is a classification rule
learning algorithm introduced by Cohen in [43]. The output of RIPPER is a set of
if-then rules for normal traces; an example is, if the third system call is ’lstat’ and the
fourth is ’write’, then the seventh should be ’stat’. A list of normal patterns was built
using sliding windows with sizes of 7 and 11. Then, intrusion traces were scanned,
and all the traces not found in the normal list were recorded as abnormal. The de-
tection system was tested using new normal and abnormal traces, which were not
used before in the training phase. A sequence of system calls was labelled as mali-
cious if the majority of these were classified as abnormal. Furthermore, a machine
learning algorithm was used to generate a rule that predicted system calls to define
the normal correlation among system calls. For example, the algorithm predicts the
middle system call in a normal sequence of size 11. If the system detects a system
call that is different than the predicted one, it raises an alarm for an anomaly. The
confidence value was used to express the strengths of intrusion signals. Lee et al., in
[106], found that malicious sequences of system calls generated larger percentages
of abnormal system calls than the normal sequences.
Some system calls-based anomaly detection systems have response techniques,
[21] and [150]. In [21], only system calls with a high threat (privileged system calls)
were monitored. Researchers targeted buffer overflow-based attacks as an exam-
ple. However, the concept can be generalized. Their main contribution was the
detailed analysis of Linux system calls. System calls were categorised into 9 cat-
egories (see table 4.2), and 4 levels of threats were created to classify system calls
(see table 4.3).
Then, system calls were grouped according to their threat level; examples of the
groups are shown in table 4.4.
Only system calls with a high threat level were monitored. Analysing and cat-
egorising system calls may help reduce the overhead on the system performance
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Table 4.2: System calls were categorised into 9 categories by Bernaschi et al. in [21].
Group Functionality Group Functionality
I File system, devices V Communication
II Process management VI Time and timers
III Module management VII System info
IV Memory management VIII Reserved
IX Unimplemented
Table 4.3: Four levels of threats were used to classify system calls by Bernaschi et al.
in [21].
Threat
level
Description
1 Allows to get full control of the system
2 Used for a denial of service attack
3 Used for subverting the invoking process
4 It is harmless
Table 4.4: System calls grouped according to their threat level by Bernaschi et al. in
[21].
Threat System call Group System call Group System call Group
1 open I link I unlink I
1 chmod I lchown I rename I
2 creat I mknod I umount I
2 brk II kill II ioperm II
by monitoring only a small subset of system calls, rather than monitoring every
invoked system call. Tables (4.2, 4.3, and 4.4) were made by Bernaschi et al. in [21].
The same idea of categorising system calls depending on the threat level (and
monitoring only high threat ones) was tested in our research using the novel mon-
itoring system we proposed, as detailed later in section 4.3.2.
In [150], researchers developed a system called process Homeostasis (pH). The pH
system monitors the system calls invoked by every process in the system, and when
an anomaly is detected, it responds by delaying or aborting the suspected system
calls automatically. pH was tested on a Linux machine by adding an extension
to the kernel to give the ability of detecting and responding. Somayaji et al., in
[150], concluded that with the response mechanisms on, the system performance
was heavily affected.
Mutz et al., in [128], conducted a comparison between different types of system
call anomaly detection systems, the best performance was for the hidden Markov
model (HMM)-based IDS, and the second best performance was for the bag of sys-
tem calls from [93]. The bag of system calls IDS (BoSC) provided a better detection
rate than other simple methods in addition to being far less complex in comparison
with the HMM-based IDS. Kang et al., in [93], aimed to provide a detection system
that has better performance and accuracy than tide from [63]. The bag of system
calls (BoSC) method was derived from bags of words modelling, which is a popular
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representation method in speech recognition. In BoSC, the order of system calls
is ignored, and only their frequencies are considered. Researchers in [93] proved
that the frequencies of system calls were enough to build a normal behaviour pro-
file for processes and detect anomalies reliably. The system was tested using data
from MIT Lincoln Lab from [109]. For clustering the distribution of normal and ab-
normal system calls, they used two-means clustering and a one-class naive Bayes
algorithm. The proposed system provided promising results, a high detection rate
and low false positives, see table 4.5 (this table is from [93]).
Table 4.5: Testing results for bag of system calls system from [93].
Program Accuracy Detection Rate False Positive
UNM live lpr 99.28 100.00 1.29
UNM synthetic sendmail 80.3235 40.00 16.76
The main advantages of the system are as follows:
• only small size databases were needed (because only frequencies were stored
without the order),
• fast learning,
• less memory was needed, and
• fast detection, which provided the ability to work on the fly.
Kang et al., in [93], stated that by maintaining the order of system calls, the
size of the database will increase exponentially; therefore, they ignored the order
of system calls. We used a similar strategy in one of the detection methods we
proposed. The details are presented later in the chapter, section 4.3.1.
Tandon et al., in [157], also conducted a comparison between system call anomaly
detection systems. The first one was a sequence-based IDS that ignored arguments,
whereas the other one considered arguments, return values, and error status. A rule
learning algorithm called LERAD was used to specify the monitored attributes of
arguments. By considering arguments, the detection rate was better, but with a
very high cost in time. One of the reasons for the increase in the time overhead was
the complexity of the attribute learning algorithm LERAD [157]; it gave each rule a
probabilistic score, which was used to calculate the degree of abnormality for sys-
tem calls. The other reason for the increase in the time overhead was the enriched
features.
Another comparison between different methods was conducted by Warrender
et al. in [170]. Methods such as stide, t-stide (which is stide with a frequency thresh-
old), RIPPER, and HMM were compared. In an experiment, HMM gave the highest
accuracy, with the highest computational demand. Furthermore, researchers found
that a sequence size of 6 provided the best results for stide and RIPPER. Warren-
der et al. stated that sequences of system calls are ”regular enough for even simple
modelling methods to work well” and ”that weaker methods than HMMs are likely
sufficient” [170].
In the next section, we present alternative methods to perform cloud security
monitoring based on system calls, as well as a hypervisor-based HIDS to monitor
VMs as black boxes. These methods also satisfy the special requirements of cloud-
based monitoring systems.
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4.2 Alternative Detection Methods
In this chapter, we propose two novel detection systems that we designed and
tested in the lab. These monitoring systems are able to detect anomalies in VMs
hosted in a public IaaS environment without additional instrumentation or any
prior knowledge about VMs. The system can also work on the fly and deal with
a large amount of data. We believe that they fulfil the special requirements for a
cloud HIDS that were discussed in the state of the art chapter, chapter 3.
We monitored the channel between VMs and the host, which is occupied with
system calls. All the system calls passing this channel were collected and used to
create a normal behaviour profile representing the normal behaviour of the mon-
itored VM; then any deviation from the normal behaviour profile was detected as
an anomaly.
To create the normal profiles and detect anomalies using system calls only, we
tested two methods. The first method is the bag of system calls (BoSC) [93]. The lit-
erature shows that it provides high accuracy and low overhead. Another reason for
choosing BoSC is that it ignores the order of system calls and only considers their
frequencies, which requires smaller databases and allows it to be migrated with
the corresponding VM in the case of migration. Furthermore, cloud computing is
a distributed environment and maintaining the event time within such an environ-
ment is a complicated and hard to achieve task. Therefore, relying on the order
of the system calls for monitoring might not be reliable and is not recommended.
The chosen method should also be simple and have low complexity to be able to
work on the fly. In this regard, BoSC is a simple method that is not based on any
machine learning algorithms or complicated probability calculations; it only uses
frequencies.
The second method is the hidden Markov model (HMM). We used HMM to
build a classifier that works with ephemeral VMs, which are VMs that are created
and live for short periods of time (i.e. an hour or two) to perform a specific task and
then terminate. Ephemeral VMs are usually used for testing purposes or analysing
large amounts of data within a short time. These short-lived VMs have different
detection requirements, where time is the most critical resource. For this reason
and for this scenario, we used HMM, which is fast to build and has a high accuracy
rate, but a higher computational demand.
The phases needed to build the detection system are as follows:
• collecting the data,
• training the classifier using the collected data and the chosen method (BoSC or
HMM). The output of this step is a profile (database) representing the normal
behaviour profile of the monitored VM, then
• testing the detection system by generating malicious traffic and measuring the
classifier’s ability to detect it.
We built an IaaS cloud environment in the Penetration Test Laboratory of the In-
formation Security Group, Royal Holloway University of London, to collect data and test
the designed detection using BoSC and HMM. Our setup in the lab has the mini-
mum requirements for the real production of a cloud environment. The description
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of the experiment, modification of the tested methods to suit our environment, and
different phases to build the classifier are discussed next.
4.2.1 Experimental Design
In this section, we describe the setup of the laboratory-based IaaS configuration that
was used to collect the data set. We built an environment similar to the Amazon
elastic compute cloud (Amazon EC2) service, which is an IaaS cloud service and
one of Amazon’s web services (AWS). The tools used to build the experiment were
as follows:
Eucalyptus: This is a cloud management application used to build and manage
the IaaS cloud. It is an open source software under GPL. Its main purpose is to
create and manage the cloud computing IaaS components [55]. The software was
originally developed in 2007 as a university research project in the Computer Science
Department, University of California, Santa Barbara. The attempt was to build a cloud
environment similar to AWS to help researchers explore, develop and examine the
IaaS cloud; two years later, a commercial version of Eucalyptus was established.
We chose Eucalyptus as the cloud management application because it is similar to
the cloud management application used by Amazon EC2 (which is currently the
most popular IaaS provider on the market), and it is compatible with Amazon’s
AWS APIs (Application Programming Interface) which allows the use of any code
designed for Amazon AWS without modifications [55]. It is also free, open source,
and has detailed documentation for installation. Nowadays, some of the most pop-
ular cloud providers (i.e. Ubuntu and Dell) are using Eucalyptus as the main cloud
management application [55].
Ubuntu: This is a Linux operating system, which was used in our cloud as the
main operating system. Ubuntu is open source, flexible, and well documented,
which were the main reasons to support our usage of this tool. The used kernel
version was 2.6.32.
Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM): We used KVM as the hypervisor (virtu-
alisation technology), which allowed multi-tenancy in our cloud. The choice of the
hypervisor is critical and might affect the collected samples and the reliability of
the results obtained from the analysis. In today’s market many of the main players
in cloud computing are using KVM as their main virtualisation technology, such
as Ubuntu, Red Hat, and Dell UEC SE Cloud Solution. KVM is an open source
full virtualisation solution that requires the support of a virtualisation extension in
the host hardware. It can run over an unmodified operating system. KVM was
included in the Linux mainstream from kernel version 2.6.20 and upwards as a
loadable module kvm.ko [158]. One of the main features of KVM related to the pro-
cess of building a detection system is that it deals with each VM as a single process.
For instance, the host in figure 4.3 hosted three VMs, each of which was a single
process with a unique process ID (PID). The first VM had the PID 1358, the sec-
ond VM had the PID 1532, and the third had PID 1334; each of these processes had
many children (threads) working under it. This feature was essential because the
designed detection system monitored each VM as a single process.
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Figure 4.3: Each VM is represented by a single process in host machine.
4.2.2 The Setup
The minimum setup for an Eucalyptus-based cloud environment can be done by
using a single machine for all the IaaS components, which are the cluster controller
(CC), cloud controller (CLC), Walrus2, storage controller (SC), and node controller
(NC). However this deployment is not recommended by the Ubuntu Enterprise
Cloud documentations for production use, and it has a number of registered bugs
[51]. Furthermore, we found from users experience that it is not reliable. A more
advanced setup was recommended. We used a setup called single cluster setup,
which contained two machines, one for the CC, CLC, Walrus, and SC, and the other
for the NC. The machine that had the CC, CLC, Walrus, and SC was called the
front end (FE). This setup is called the single cluster setup because it includes only
one cluster, which is the minimum. However, a real live production cloud usually
has more than one cluster, and each cluster has more than one node. The single
cluster setup, which we used, is enough for a small cloud production environment;
it satisfies all the requirements to run a stable IaaS cloud service.
Single cluster setup:
A single cluster setup can be deployed in different ways. Two examples of
this setup are suggested by the Eucalyptus system administrators guide and can be
found in [56]. The first example is shown in figure 4.4 (this figure is from [56]) and it
shows the simplest configuration for a single cluster setup, where all the machines
are connected directly to the public network.
2Walrus is the cloud storage equivalent to Amazon S3 (Simple Storage Service). It offers persis-
tent storage to IaaS cloud users, i.e. it stores VM images and users’ account information; it is also
responsible for managing the consistency of the stored data [99].
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Figure 4.4: Single cluster setup where all machines are connected directly to public
network [56].
The second example is shown in figure 4.5 (this figure is from [56]); in this setup,
node controllers are isolated in a private subnet, and the FE server is the gateway.
This is the deployment we used in our research; see figure 4.6 for our setup.
Details of machines:
Our setup is shown in figure 4.6; we used three main machines (Server1, Server2,
and Client1), a router, and a switch.
Server1 is the FE server, which contained the CC, CLC, Walrus, and SC. The
used operating system in Server1 is a Linux kernel 2.6.32-28-server. It has four Intel
processors (1.86 GHz), each with vmx capability (virtualisation extension), 64 bit
width, and 1 GB of memory. It also has two Ethernet ports: eth0, which is connected
to the public network through a router, with an IP address of 192.168.10.3, and eth1,
which is connected to the private switch and has the IP address 192.169.20.1.
Server2 has the NC, which is connected to a private switch and uses Server1 as
a gateway. The used operating system in Server2 is a Linux kernel 2.6.3 -28- server.
It has four Intel processors (1.86 GHz), each with vmx capability, 64 bit width, and
1 GB of memory. It also has two Ethernet ports: eth0 and eth1. However, only eth0
is used. The IP address for Server2 is 192.168.20.2. For this server, having more
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Figure 4.5: Single cluster setup where controllers are isolated in private subnet and
FE is used as gateway [56].
Figure 4.6: The experiment setup.
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than one processor may affect the sequences of system calls. However, forcing the
VM process to use only one processor is unrealistic because in a real-world cloud,
servers have large numbers of processors to be able to host several VMs at the same
time. VMs will move from one processor to another, which might affect the order
of the collected system calls; this increases the importance of using a representation
method that ignores the order of the system calls, as BoSC does.
Client1 is the cloud management machine. It is used to create and ping VMs,
and uses secure shell (SSH) to access them.3 It is also used to create and store access
keys and for other cloud management tasks. This machine is an HP laptop with a
Linux kernel 2.6.38-11-server. However, the specifications of this machine are irrel-
evant; any machine can play this role. The only requirement is the installation of
the Euca2ools software, which is a command-line tool to interact with web services
and send an API compatible with the Amazon EC2 service [50].
Cloud IaaS components:
An Eucalyptus-based cloud IaaS has five major components: the cluster con-
troller (CC), cloud controller (CLC), Walrus, storage controller (SC), and node con-
troller (NC), [56].
The cluster controller (CC) performs the following tasks:
• connects the NC with the CLC,
• allocates new VMs to hosts (NCs) based on reports received from hosts and
other environmental parameters,
• answers CLC queries about load,
• gathers information about virtual machines and schedules their execution,
• manages virtual machines networks, and
• participates in the enforcement of the service level agreements (SLAs) as di-
rected by the CLC.
The cloud controller (CLC) performs the following tasks:
• resources management (in which cluster a new VM should be allocated),
• communicates with the CC,
• provides a GUI to the management machine, and
• manages the CC, SC, Walrus, and network via the Amazon EC2 API and web-
based interface.
Walrus performs the following tasks:
• allows consumers to store data permanently using REST and SOAP API com-
patibles with Amazon S3,
• stores VM images,
• allows consumers to access their VMs, images, and stored data, and
• manages the consistency of the stored data.
The storage controller (SC) performs the following tasks:
• allows the creation of snapshots of volumes and stores them in Walrus,
3The secure shell (SSH) is a protocol that provides encryption, authentication, and integrity pro-
tection to secure remote login over an insecure network [179].
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• allows the creation of persistent block devices that can be attached to the in-
stance file system (cannot be shared across instances), and
• provides raw unformatted block devices that can be used as any block device
such as creating a file system on top of it.
The node controller (NC) performs the following tasks:
• hosts and controls virtual machines, which include:
– checking the authenticity of users’ requests to start instances,
– fetching images from Walrus,
– creating a virtual network interface,
– executing instances, and
– terminating instances.
• manages virtual network endpoints,
• takes instructions from the CC about how to manage the host OS and hyper-
visor, and
• responds to the CC queries about availability.
Eucalyptus networking modes:
In Eucalyptus, there are four networking modes: system, static, managed-
NOVLAN, and managed. The system and static modes are the simplest and are
not recommended for production environments because they do not offer the fol-
lowing essential services, [56]:
1. security groups, which is a firewall that can filter both ingress and egress
traffic from VMs [171],
2. elastic IPs, which refers to the dynamic assignment of IP addresses to VMs,
and
3. isolation of network traffic between VMs.
Managed-NOVLAN and managed modes offer security groups and elastic IPs.
However, only the managed mode offers network traffic isolation between VMs.
Therefore, we chose the managed mode for our deployment [56] because it is the
normal choice for a public IaaS, where different VMs owned by different clients are
sharing hosts and other cloud resources.
Virtual Machines:
In each NC, a limited number of virtual machines can be run concurrently. We
can choose between a small, medium, large, and xlarge VM size. These differ in
memory size, disk space, and number of CPUs. The maximum numbers of VMs
in our deployment can be found using a command from Euca2ools, which is euca-
describe-availability-zones verbose, see figure 4.7.
With 0 VMs running in the system, the number of free is equal to the number
of max, i.e. free=4 and max=4. Before starting a new VM, we have to check the
availability, so that the capacity and power of the new VM can be decided.
We initiated three VMs with small, medium, and x-large sizes. Each VM had
two IP addresses: a public and private. The range of public IP addresses are be-
tween 192.168.10.200 and 192.168.10.2003; while the range of private IP addresses
are between 10.10.1.2 and 10.10.1.5. The public IP addresses allow consumers to
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Figure 4.7: Maximum allowed number of concurrent VMs in same host.
access their VMs from outside the cloud network, while private IP addresses are
used for the virtual subnet.
Applications in VMs:
One of the most popular uses of IaaS cloud services is for middleware applica-
tions. Therefore, in the VMs under examination, we ran an ERP application,4 which
satisfied the following criteria:
1. multi-tiers,
2. heavy weight transactions,
3. free or has a trial version, and
4. open source to be able to check the source code if needed.
Any multi-tier ERP application with heavy transactions could be chosen. Af-
ter examining the available applications in the market, we selected Tryton. It is a
three-tier application platform under the GPL-3 license (free and open source). It
is written in Python and use PostgreSQL as its database engine [162]. It requires at
least two VMs to work: one of them is the client and the other is the server. It has
the ability to generate reports for the company who initiated and owns the VM and
saves information databases.The modules chosen in Tryton were timesheet manage-
ment and inventory management. Tryton deployment has 3 parts: the Tryton client,
Tryton server, and PostgreSQL database. The Tryton client is used by users to ac-
cess the server and to add, delete, modify, search, and generate documents, and to
print reports. The PostgreSQL database is in the Tryton server and holds all of the
persistent data. The only way to use this application is through the Tryton client,
which has a graphical interface; the Tryton server cannot be accessed directly. We
created three machines: two were Tryton clients and one was a Tryton server.
VMs specifications:
VM1 - Tryton client:
• public IP: 192.168.10.201,
• private IP: 10.10.1.3,
• name: i-5CD30A7F,
4ERP stands for enterprise resource planning and it is type of management systems (application)
which aim to bring different functions within an enterprise onto a single system [129].
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• operating system: Ubuntu 10.04 LTS - Lucid Lynx (amd64),
• kernel version: 2.6.32-21,
• size: c1.small 192 ram, 2 GB disk, 1 CPU, and
• PID: 27992.
VM2 - Tryton server:
• public IP: 192.168.10.203,
• private IP: 10.10.1.5,
• name: i-410F07B0,
• operating system: Ubuntu 10.04 LTS - Lucid Lynx (amd64),
• kernel version: 2.6.32-21,
• size: m1.medium 256 ram, 5 GB disk, 1 CPU, and
• PID: 4669.
VM3 - Tryton client:
• public IP: 192.168.10.202,
• private IP: 10.10.1.4,
• name: i-3F1C080F,
• operating system: Ubuntu 10.04 LTS - Lucid Lynx (amd64),
• kernel version: 2.6.32-21,
• size: c1.xlarge 2 GB ram, 80 GB disk, 2 CPUs, and
• PID: 14029.
For each VM, there should be a KEYPAIR, with private and public keys. These
keys are used to validate a user’s identity when logging into VMs via SSH. The keys
are injected into the VM to allow only authorised users to access the VM using SSH,
which usually does not require passwords. The public key is stored in Eucalyptus,
and the private key is stored in a file such as mykey.priv and printed as standard
output. The same KEYPAIR can be used for several VMs if required.
4.2.3 Data Collection
The detection system has to be trained using sufficient quality data to be able to
build a representative normal behaviour profile for each VM and then detect any
deviation from normal. We have to have sufficient data for training and also for
testing the detection systems.
Many researchers in the area of HIDS have tested their techniques on data im-
ported from other research (they did not collect the data themselves). This was
because, as Mutz stated in [128], generating quality data is a problem in itself. In
our situation, no quality data were available from previous research. Thus, we had
three choices to obtain the required data:
1. Collect the data from an IaaS environment that is in production, such as Ama-
zon EC2.
2. Collect the data from an IaaS environment that was built in the lab, with an
attempt to make it as close as possible to an environment in production.
3. Collect data from a simulated environment.
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The first choice was not possible for legal and security reasons (mistakes or er-
rors could affect the cloud network in production and cause service disruptions,
lost data, or other security threats). The third choice would have been the easiest,
but we avoided it in an attempt to generate less artificial data. We chose to build an
IaaS environment in the lab that was close as possible to a production environment.
First, we used a configuration that is recommended for production, as discussed in
section 4.2.2. Then, we used a Eucalyptus cloud management application that is
designed to be similar to Amazon EC2 and is used in real IaaS clouds [55]. Fur-
thermore, when we used the applications inside the monitored VMs, we added
randomness factors to avoid generating spurious similarities among data sets and
to mimic realistic usage patterns, as will be explained in more detail later in section
4.2.3.
The data quality affected the accuracy of the results; any misconfiguration or
missed details could affect the reliability of the findings. For example, when col-
lecting samples we had to be conscious of the tendency of some applications and
operating systems to buffer data before sending them to the CPU, memory, and/or
I/O devices. If this critical point was missed, and data for a short time period were
collected while there was some buffering, the collected data would not have been
accurate and might not have reflected the real activities occurring in the VM. As
a consequence, any analysis with this data would have been unreliable. To over-
come this problem, we collected data for a long period of time and compared them
with data acquired within a short time period to determine whether there was any
buffering in our system. This point is mentioned just to show how all the details of
the experiment were vital.
Despite all of the considerations we took into account, we know that a real
productive environment will be different. However, this is the best we could do
at this stage until one of the IaaS cloud providers adopts the project or applies
the proposed ideas. There is also another popular problem in the area of HIDS,
classifier drafting, which is a large topic and left for future research.
Declaring the source of the data and the details of the collection are essential to
evaluate the accuracy of the findings in order to either accept or reject these. In our
case, as no suitable corpus of data was available, we built the required environment
in the laboratory to generate the data.
After setting up the experiment as described in section 4.2.2, we collected all
the system calls that were invoked by VMs being monitored. To collect the system
calls, we used the Linux strace tool; it intercepts and records all invoked system
calls by the chosen processes (which were VMs in our case). As explained in section
4.2.1, each VM in the system was represented by a process that had many threads.
The strace tools was used to monitor the main process and all the threads under
it. Each of the processes and each of the threads under them had a unique process
identifier (PID). Different PIDs were assigned to the threads and processes which
gave the monitoring system better insight into the VM activities.
Tracing tool: To collect the system calls invoked by the monitored VM, we used
the strace tool. According to Linux’s man page, strace ”intercepts and records the
system calls which are called by a process and the signals which are received by
a process. The name of each system call, its arguments and its return value are
printed on standard error or to the file specified with the -o option” [116]. We ran
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strace in the NC machine with the option -f, which monitors the targeted VMs, in
addition to monitoring any other process cloned from this main process. The option
-f is useful to maintain the sequences of system calls. This is the description of the
-f option on Linux’s man page.
”Trace child processes as they are created by currently traced processes as a re-
sult of the fork(2) system call. The new process is attached to as soon as its PID is
known (through the return value of fork(2) in the parent process). This means that
such children may run uncontrolled for a while (especially in the case of a vfork(2)),
until the parent is scheduled again to complete its (v)for (2) call. If the parent pro-
cess decides to wait(2) for a child that is currently being traced, it is suspended until
an appropriate child process either terminates or incurs a signal that would cause
it to terminate (as determined from the child’s current signal disposition)” [116].
We found that the VM processes in the experiment used the clone system call to
create new threads. It is also important to mention here that not all the system calls
are recorded by strace reliably. There is a possibility that a small fraction of system
calls will be missed, depending on the host load patterns. It is difficult to know the
exact percentage of missed calls, but we have to consider that some of those can be
lost in the analysis.
We used the option -o to save the tracing results to a file to be analysed later.
Strace with the -f and -o options generates a file for the targeted process. Each line
of the file started with the PID and then the system call that is invoked by this PID;
figure 4.8 shows some lines from our sample as an example.
Figure 4.8: Sample of data collected using strace tool.
The Tryton ERP application is business management software that consists of a
suite of integrated applications (modules) used to perform tasks such as account-
ing, invoicing, inventory management, and sales management. To generate normal
traffic, we ran the Tryton system using two modules: timesheet management and in-
ventory management. We used these modules for normal tasks such as filling in data
on forms and spreadsheets, generating reports and exporting them to LibreOffice
applications5, printing reports as PDF files, and saving data to a hard disk. Using
different combinations of these services, we designed more than 30 scenarios to
5LibreOffice is a free and open source office suite that embeds several applications such as word
processing and spreadsheet applications.
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generate sufficient traffic in the monitored VMs and then randomly moved among
these scenarios. We monitored a Tryton client VM during regular activities, subse-
quently extracting system call traces.These scenarios were automated by a scripting
mechanism (Python scripts and the Dogtail open source automation framework).
Then, the system was exercised by them. To avoid generating spurious similarities
among data sets and to mimic realistic usage patterns, the move from one scenario
to another and the intervals within scenarios were performed randomly.
We ran these scenarios while collecting system calls using strace. After collecting
a large amount of system call traces, we divided them into epochs of 1 GB.
Analysing system calls: Our experimentation revealed that only about 25% of
Linux system calls were used by our VMs. Therefore, to save space and computa-
tional time, we only considered the used system calls and covered the rarely used
ones by a new entry added to the list of used system calls called ’other’. This trick
reduced the data analysis time and also reduced the time required to build the nor-
mal behaviour profiles in the BoSC and HMM methods, as we will see in section
4.3. We used a small amount of collected data to generate the list of used system
calls, and then added the entry ’other’ to the list. Each distinct system call in the
small sample was an item in the list of used system calls variable. We also added the
item ’other’ to the list to cover new system calls that were not in the small sample
when they arrive in the future (in the training or testing phase).
KVM is dealt with by the Linux host as a character device, which is managed
using the IOCTL system call.6 Each Linux device is represented by a file and has
two numbers (major and minor) and a node name to identify it.7
From LANANA, we found that KVM is registered as a char device with major
number 10 and minor number 232 with default location /dev/kvm. /dev/kvm
has a file descriptor with number 5.8 There are more file descriptors; for instance,
kvm virtual cpu (vcpu) has the fd 11. Each file (device) also has a magic number at
the beginning of it to identify the file type. The KVM device magic number is 0xae.
IOCTL system calls are used to manage VMs, and it has the following format, see
figures 4.9 and 4.10. The untyped memory pointer is represented by dots because
it could lead to an unlimited amount of data. 9.
Figure 4.9: IOCTL system call format from Linux man page.
6IOCTL stands for input/output control and is used to manage all the devices in Linux.
7LANANA (Linux Assigned Names and Numbers Authority) is the authority that manages de-
vice names and numbers in Linux. Their website is http://www.lanana.org/.
8To check the file descriptor for any KVM device, go to any of the VM processes; for example, for
VM2 go to /proc/27992/fd and then run the command ls -l or by using lsof command.
9The structure of IOCTL in our system can be found in /Usr/src/linux-headers- 2.6.32-
28/include/asm-generic/ioctl.h.
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Figure 4.10: IOCTL system call structure in system.
There are four access modes in the IOCTL system call ( IOC DIRBITS 2bits), as
follows:
• 00 = NONE ( IO NONE = no data transfer).
• 01 = WRITE ( IO WRITE = write operation).
• 10 = READ ( IO READ = read operation).
• 11 = READ and WRITE ( IO READ‖ IO WRITE = read and write opera-
tion).
The size of the parameter structure ( IOC SIZEBITS 14 bits) is architecture de-
pendent, and it represents the size of the user data. It is useful for error detection
and backward compatibility tasks. Type ( IOC TYPEBITS 8 bits) is the magic num-
ber, which is equal to 0xae in KVM. Sequence ( IOC NRBITS 8 bits) is the KVM
command number.10
It is essential to understand the structure of the IOCTL system calls to analyse
the collected data. The following are two examples from our sample for IOCTL.
Example 1: IOCTL(11, 0xae80, 0) = 0
Example 2: IOCTL(5, 0xae03, 0x10) = 1
In example 1, the first argument is 11, which is the file descriptor for KVM
vcpu. The second argument is 0xae80. 0xae is the KVM magic number, and 80 is
the property of the KVM command representing the command KVM RUN. A list
of KVM commands and their meanings can be found in Linux in the file kvm.h.
In example 2, the first argument is 5, which is the file descriptor for /dev/kvm.
The second argument is 0xae03. 0xae is the magic number and 03 is the KVM
CHECK EXTENSION to get the size for mmap (vcpu fd).
It is clear that the IOCTL commands in the previous examples requests abso-
lutely different actions from the kernel. Therefore, we consider each IOCTL sys-
tem call with the first and second arguments as a different system call. Therefore,
”IOCTL(11, oxae80,” and ”IOCTL(5,oxae03,” are registered as two different system
calls in the list of distinct system calls.
How much data should we collect?
For testing purposes, we collected a large amount of data, more than 100 GB of
sequences of system calls generated from normal activities on the monitored VM.
However, the target is to use the minimum possible amount of data for training to
be able to build the normal behaviour profile as fast as possible to suit the dynamic
feature of the cloud. We stopped the training process when a consistent normal
behaviour profile was created. To decide if a profile is consistent enough or not,
we used a method similar to that previously reported by Warrender et al. in [170].
10Different commands can be found in this file /usr/src/linux-header-2.6.32-28/include/kvm.h.
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According to their report, ”one way of establishing a consistent measure of how
much training data to use across several programs is to set a target for the slope
of this growth curve. Once the rate of encountering new sequences drops below
some preset value, we say we have enough data with which to build our model of
normal.”
Data generated from normal behaviour:
We automated the process of generating data (the normal usage of the appli-
cation) followed by the collection of the generated data using the strace tool. We
traced two processes (Tryton client VM and Tryton server VM). However, we could
not trace the two processes concurrently because the strace tool can monitor only
one process at a time. Therefore, we monitored the client first and then the server.
Approximately 60 hours for the Tryton client and 12 hours for the Tryton server
were needed for collecting the data required for training.
List of training samples:
• 12 hours of normal usage traffic for VM3 (Tryton client). The size of the sam-
ple is about 28 GB.
• 24 hours of normal usage traffic for VM3 (Tryton client). The size of the sam-
ple is about 45 GB.
• 24 hours of normal usage traffic for VM3 (Tryton client). The size of the sam-
ple is about 37 GB.
• 12 hours of normal usage traffic for VM2 (Tryton server). The size of the
sample is 411 MB.
The difference in the sample sizes is because we intended some randomness in
the automation code to allow the program to run differently each time. Further-
more, the Tryton client processes the majority of the work and therefore generates
more traffic.
For testing purposes, we also had to collect abnormal sequences of system calls
generated from abnormal activities on the targeted VM. The target was to build a
detection system that is able to detect abnormal activities in VMs, whether these
activities are malicious, errors, or intended changes of behaviour, any change of
behaviour whether it is legitimate or malicious. Therefore, to generate the abnormal
testing traffic, the VMs’ behaviour could be changed either legitimately or by an
attack.
Generating malicious traffic
To generate anomalous system calls, an attack should be conducted against the
monitored VMs. There are several ready-to-use attacks in the wild; however, per-
forming an IaaS specific attack with the assumption that the attacker is conscious
of the cloud environment and the used technologies is more valuable. We designed
a DoS attack that targeted two of the main features of the cloud: ’migration’ and
’over-commitment’. We started by writing a very simple piece of code to stress the
CPU of the monitored VM and collect the generated sequences of system calls dur-
ing the stress test. The code was not malicious (regular CPU stress testing), but if
there was coordination between the VMs to increase the demand and trigger migra-
tion for false reasons, the effect on the cloud would be harmful. We started with a
very simple malicious scenario just to change the monitored VMs’ behaviours. The
CPU utilisation was increased by running non-malicious stress test in the VMs. A
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regular stress test was chosen because, unlike worms and viruses, it would not be
captured by a network-based IDS, would not be blocked by firewalls, and there
was no need to download any code from the Internet, because the code was in the
operating system package (which was Ubuntu based on Linux 2.6.35).
The stress test code was as follows:
stress.sh
#!binsh
cd usrsrclinuxsource2.6.35
time make
done
Before running the stress test code in the VM, the host processors registered an
idle time of approximately 96%; after running the stress test in one of the VMs, it
fell from 96% to approximately 48%. This was a result of running the stress test in
only one of the two VMs. The large drop in the host CPU idle time encouraged us
to search more in the area of host over-commitment and continue developing the
attack to become a sophisticated cloud-specific DoS attack, referred to as a Cloud-
Internal Denial of Service (CIDoS) attack; the details of the sophisticated version of
this attack are shown later in chapter 5.
4.3 Detecting Anomalies in VMs Through System Call
Analysis
We tested two methods to build the system calls hypervisor-based IDS, which were
the bag of system calls (BoSC) from [93] and hidden Markov model (HMM). The
proposed systems help IaaS providers achieve the following. First, they detect any
change in a VM’s behaviour to raise a security alert, send notifications to the corre-
spondent client, and/or trigger investigations about the reasons for the behaviour
changing. Second, they help providers to evaluate a VM’s security status by com-
bining information about each VM from the HIDS and NIDS. The evaluation of
each VM’s security status helps providers to make future decisions and take ac-
tions, i.e. to notify consumers to improve their machine’s security and/or change
the contract terms and conditions or even charge security ignorant consumers an
extra amount of money for the risk they pose to the provider’s network and infras-
tructure.
The general hypothesis for this chapter is that a normal behaviour profile can
be built for IaaS-hosted VMs by monitoring the sequences of system calls invoked
by them.
The consistency of the VMs’ behaviours
In 1996, Forrest et al. stated in the paper ”A sense of self for unix processes” [63],
that when building the first system calls anomaly detection system, they monitored
only root processes because these usually have relatively consistent behaviours.
Their research was based on two assumptions. The first assumption was that
programs have consistent behaviours, which generate a pattern of consistent se-
quences of system calls. Consistency is essential for building a steady profile that
represents the monitored process. The second assumption was that during an at-
tack or errors, unusual sequences of system calls will be generated.
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Their research inspired us to develop new cloud monitoring solutions based
on similar assumptions because of the similarity between VMs hosted in the IaaS
cloud and root processes; we assumed that VMs hosted in the IaaS cloud are also
limited in the used services and applications.
This assumption was relative to regular servers, which may aggregate multiple
services on a single instance. Regular best practices for IaaS cloud services would
argue against deploying such mixed workloads in a single VM for security and
performance reasons, as we discussed in detail at the introduction of this chapter.
This assumption leads us to assume that VMs have relatively consistent be-
haviours; and consistency is essential to be able to build a normal behaviour profile
that represents the monitored VM accurately. Furthermore, in general, servers usu-
ally tend to perform the same series of tasks repeatedly, which provides a sound
data set for training. This assumption drives us to the further assumption that in
the IaaS cloud, any change in VM behaviour should be treated as a sign of abnor-
mality. This is how the idea of the proposed monitoring solutions started.
Assumptions: We based the building of the normal behaviour profile repre-
senting cloud VMs on three assumptions:
1. VMs generate sufficient data to train the classifier in a timely manner.
2. VMs are not initially malicious and hence can provide a valid initial training
data set. In the context of our research, this assumption is acceptable; if the
monitored VM is malicious from the beginning, this means either the client
who initiated this VM is an attacker or the VM was hijacked the moment it
started. These two possibilities are not the security problems we investigate
here; they are rather related to authentication mechanisms and the process of
initiating new VMs in the cloud, and outside the scope of this research.
3. VMs are limited in the used services and applications. This assumption is
relative to regular servers that may aggregate multiple services on a single
instance. Regular best practices for IaaS cloud services would argue against
such mixed workloads being deployed in a single VM for security and per-
formance reasons, as described in section 2.7.1. This assumption leads us to
assume that VMs have relatively consistent behaviours; and consistency is
essential to be able to build a normal behaviour profile that represents the
monitored VM accurately. Furthermore, in general, servers usually tend to
perform the same series of tasks repeatedly providing a sound data set for
training. This assumption drives us to the further assumption that in the IaaS
cloud, any change in VM behaviour should be treated as a sign of abnormal-
ity.
4.3.1 Detecting Anomalies Using BoSC
4.3.1.1 Hypothesis
The hypothesis behind the first detection system (BoSC) is that a normal behaviour
profile can be built for VMs hosted in an IaaS environment using sequences of sys-
tem calls, and a strong enough anomaly signal is generated when comparing abnor-
mal sequences of system calls with the normal behaviour profiles. The normal be-
haviour profiles are built using a bag of system calls representation method, which
ignores the order of system calls and only relies on frequencies.
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4.3.1.2 Training the Classifier Using BoSC
We trained and evaluated the new hypervisor BoSC-based HIDS using the data
sets obtained from the experiment. BoSC was originally proposed by Kang et al. in
[93]; it retains only the frequency of system calls without relying on the ordering
(or adjacency) of individual events. We registered sequences of system calls using
a sliding window technique.
First, we created a list of distinct system calls using a small sample of the col-
lected data. Then, we added the item ’other’ to the list to cover rarely used system
calls. The generated list of system calls was used to structure a database containing
the normal behaviour profile of each VM. Using Python, we wrote an algorithm to
train the classifier using BoSC and create the normal behaviour profile. A series of 1
GB epochs were the input of the algorithm; the first one was used to create the table
representing the VM, and the following epochs were used to update the table until
reaching a consistent version that represented the normal behaviour profile of the
VM. The data were read from the epochs line by line, where each line represented
a system call.
To measure the consistency of the generated table and thus decide when to stop
training, we calculated the distance between the table before and after each update,
as we will see later in the section.
The frequencies of each system call in the sequence were counted, and if the
same frequencies were found in the database, the corresponding frequency field
was increased by one. If the frequencies were new, they were not found in the
database and had to be added as a new field with a frequency of one.
The length of the sequences should be determined before running the algo-
rithm. The length size 6 is usually recommended to provide the best performance
[78]. We tested length sizes of 6, 10, and 20, and then compared their results to
determine the effect of changing the length. The output of the algorithm was a sta-
ble normal behaviour database representing the monitored VM. This database was
used later for detection.
Profile stability:
If the database of normal behaviour registered a slight change for several con-
tinuous epochs, then we concluded that the classifier was sufficiently trained and
ready for use.
To calculate the change in the classifier before and after each epoch, we defined
metrics based on the difference in the frequencies of sequences.
To stop training and announce the classifier as trained, we needed to satisfy two
conditions: (1) the difference in the frequencies of sequences had to be less than a
specific threshold, and (2) this difference had to be under that threshold for at least
two sequential epochs.
S1 < T and S2 < T
• S1: The difference in frequency for the previous epoch
• S2: The difference in frequency for the current epoch
• T : Threshold value = 200 for sequence size 10 (chosen by experiment)
By applying this formula we found that only 6 epochs were needed to train the
classifier for a sequence size of 10.
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4.3.1.3 Evaluating the Classifier
After training the classifier and creating the normal behaviour profile for the moni-
tored VM, the next step was testing the efficiency of the classifier. We ran sequences
of anomaly system calls and observed whether the classifier would recognise these
as abnormal, with an acceptable cost (time and space) and efficiency and efficacy.
We wrote a simple detection algorithm for classification; it compared the data
generated for testing with the normal behaviour profile of the monitored VM and
calculated the difference in the frequencies of the sequences.
Efficacy analysis:
The system was efficient if the abnormal system calls were recognised, and the
system generated a strong enough anomaly signal. We could say that the anomaly
signal was strong enough if the difference between Q1 and Q2 was greater than the
threshold T .
T is equal to 382, and it is calculated using the following equation: (T = |B −
A|/2), where A is the average difference in frequencies for normal samples, and B
is the average difference in frequencies for malicious samples.
Q1 is the difference in frequencies between the normal behaviour database of
the VM and normal epochs.
Q2 is the difference in frequencies between the normal behaviour database of
the VM and malicious epochs.
This equation (H0 : Q1 − Q2 > 382) is true if malicious epochs register a large
difference in frequencies in comparison with normal epochs, when compared with
the VM normal behaviour profile.
The problem of deciding whether the generated anomaly signal is strong enough
or not, can be formulated in terms of hypothesis testing as follows:
1. The null hypothesis: (H0 : Q1 −Q2 > 382)
(H1 : Q1 −Q2 <= 382) (one sided hypothesis)
2. Assume (H0) is true
3. The difference in frequencies follows an approximately normal distribution,
see figure 4.11. We considered 64 samples, and then grouped them depending
on the frequency difference into 6 groups. We found that a low difference
of frequency and very large difference in frequencies were closer to zero, as
shown in the figure.
4. Level of significance (α = 0.001(99.9%) confidence level)
5. Find Z scores: (Zα = Z0.001 = −3.09)
6. Find the region of rejection RR which is a set of values less than or equal to
(α) : ((RR <= −3.09))
7. Collect samples
8. For each epoch, we extracted the difference in frequencies for sequences and
calculated some statistics, as shown in table 4.6.
(SD =
√
σ21
N1
+
σ22
N2
= 35.5)
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Figure 4.11: Difference in frequencies for sequence size of 10 follows normal distri-
bution.
Table 4.6: Statistics calculated from samples for BoSC-based classifier.
Normal Malicious
N1 = 8 N2 = 8
µ1 = 68 µ2 = 860
σ = 3 σ = 100
(∆ = 382) (the value in the null hypothesis)
(µ = µ2 − µ1 = 793) the new centre
(ME = Zα ∗ SD = Z0.001 ∗ SD = −110)
Range: 683 to 902
(Z = µ−∆SD = 12)
9. Draw a conclusion: the test statistics Z = 12 is not in the RR so we retain the
null hypothesis.
Widely accepted criteria for measuring the efficiency of an HIDS are the accu-
racy, detection rate, and false positive rate [93].
Accuracy = # of TP+# of TN# of Input Sequences
Detection Rate = # of TP# of TP+# of FN
False Positive Rate = # of FP# of TP+# of FP
TP = true-positive, FP = false-positive, FN = false-negative, and TN = true-
negative.
The results for sequence size 10 are shown in table 4.7
Complexity analysis:
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Table 4.7: Results with sequence size of 10. The anomaly signals are very strong,
which generate 100% accuracy for the BoSC-based classifier.
Sequence Length Accuracy Detection Rate False Positive Rate
10 100.0% 100.0% 0.00%
The time complexity is of the utmost importance in a cloud-based intrusion de-
tection system. A computationally efficient algorithm that can be applied in almost
real-time to train the classifier and perform the classification is required. In this sec-
tion, we calculate the computational complexity of the used algorithm, along with
the space consumption.
The used algorithm has a linear time complexity ofO(n), where n is the number
of lines in the input file. The average number of lines in one epoch is n = 11743281,
and there is a loop of n. Inside this loop, we have an array of 25 digits (number
of distinct system calls), where each digit represents the frequency of this system
call in a group of 6 consequence system calls (for sequence length 6). This array
is added to the database of normal behaviour if it does not already exist. If it al-
ready exists, its frequency in the database is increased by one. The sliding window
technique is used to receive new system calls and drop old ones.
In the worst case scenario, there are 70 instructions in each iteration of the loop.
The sequence length is x2, and the number of rows in the database is x3. The equa-
tion for the number of instructions in our algorithm, in the worst case scenario, is
n(2x2 +70)+x3. If x2 is 6 and x3 is on average 2534, then the number of instructions
using this formula is 82. For space consumption, the normal behaviour database
has 3419 rows (for sequence size 6) and two columns, one of the char type and the
second of the integer type. The database is relatively small, and only a few lines
are added to it with each new epoch. We needed 5 epochs to train the classifier.
Thus, our algorithm has a relatively low cost, which makes it suitable for real-time
environments, and the generated database is small, which allow it to be migrated
with the corresponding VM.
4.3.1.4 Discussion
Our results prove that it is possible to build a normal behaviour profile for a whole
VM via system calls monitoring using the bag of system calls representation method.
We successfully created an identity, and a sense of self, for the targeted VM. The
used mechanism also successfully detected anomalies and generated strong enough
anomaly signals. Three different sequence lengths were tested, sizes 6, 10, and 20.
Table 4.8 shows a comparison between these. Size 6 is the best if we need a very fast
detection system; while size 10 provides the best accuracy and false positive rate,
but with a slightly higher consumption of time than size 6. Size 20 is not efficient
because its accuracy and false positive rate are equal to those of size 10, but it has
higher computational time demands in comparison to sizes 6 and 10.
The training algorithm has linear complexity, which makes it fast enough to be
applied in real-time environments. The other algorithm is the detection algorithm,
which is very simple and short; the bottleneck of this algorithm is the database.
The algorithm’s speed depends on the chosen sequence length; with an increase in
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the sequence length, the consumed time increases significantly (see table 4.8). For
instance, with a sequence size of 6, the detection algorithm produces the results
almost instantly.
Table 4.8: Results with sequence lengths of 6, 10, and 20 for BoSC-based classifier.
SIZE 6 SIZE 10 SIZE 20
Accuracy 98.36% 100.0% 100.0%
Detection Rate 100.00% 100.0% 100.0%
False Positive Rate 11.11% 0.00% 0.00%
Consumed Detection Time by
Units
32 324 2492
Other interesting observations were found. First, the anomalous system calls
generated using the stress test code had bigger arguments than normal ones, which
made the 1 GB epoch of malicious data have fewer lines than that of the normal
data. Malicious data also registered more new system calls than normal data, along
with system calls under the ’other’ category that had never been seen in the train-
ing data. Second, malicious data also registered as more unfound in the database
sequences (new sequences) than normal data.
As we can see, the proposed system satisfies the special requirements for a
cloud host-based IDS shown in the previous chapter, chapter 3. Because the used
representation method is simple, it can deal with a large amount of data. The sys-
tem can monitor VMs with almost no intrusiveness and requires no prior knowl-
edge about VMs. The detection system is separate from the monitored VM. There-
fore, it has a high attack-resistance. It can work on the fly due to fast training,
monitoring, and detection. It is also small and autonomous. Therefore, it can be
migrated with the corresponding VM. Lastly, it does not require any human inter-
vention, which is essential for a large-scale cloud. However, there are other prob-
lems in dealing with ephemeral VMs, as discussed below.
4.3.2 Detecting Anomalies in Ephemeral VMs
The method proposed in section 4.3.1 (BoSC) is a frequency-based representation,
which is simple and requires no probability calculation. By using this method, the
classifier generated strong anomaly signals with high detection rates. However,
we found that about 6 GB of data were needed to train the classifier, with 1 GB
for testing. This is a relatively large amount of data, which is acceptable in long
term VMs, especially given that a high volume of flow data is one of the prominent
characteristics of cloud environments. However, for ephemeral VMs, there is a
need for a classifier that can be built faster, even if it consumes more computing
resources, if not time.
Requiring more resources to build this classifier, rather than time, is acceptable
in the cloud, where resources such as computational power are not scarce because
it is the main service offered by the cloud. Hence, with these requirements in mind,
we modified our first classifier by changing the machine learning approach and the
part of the data being analysed to reduce noise. We built a hidden Markov model
(HMM)-based classifier.
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HMM is a sophisticated representation method, which usually provides a high
detection rate and low false positives, but has a high computational demand [170].
There are many research papers about how to improve HMM for anomaly detec-
tion by reducing the power usage (such as in [81], [155] and [80]); however, in this
research, we tested the regular HMM.
4.3.2.1 Hypothesis
The hypothesis is that a normal behaviour profile can be built for ephemeral VMs
hosted in an IaaS environment using limited number of system calls sequences, and
a strong anomaly signal can be generated when comparing abnormal sequences
of system calls with the normal behaviour profiles that are built using an HMM
representation method.
There are two main requirements to be satisfied by the proposed system. First,
the required amount of data to train the classifier should be kept to the minimum
to be able to build the profile for ephemeral VMs within an acceptable time frame.
Second, the model should provide acceptable accuracy, detection, and false positive
rates. There should also be a balance between efficiency and efficacy, in addition to
satisfying the special requirements for cloud security monitoring tools discussed in
section 3.1.12.
One of the methods we used for pre-processing the collected system calls is to
categorise them based on their threat level, as in [21]. Another method is to only
monitor specific threads, rather than the whole process representing the VM.
We want to build an HMM-based classifier that generates a matrix representing
the normal behaviours of VMs and detects any change in behaviour.
4.3.2.2 Modelling VM’s Normal Behaviour Using HMM
HMM is known to provide a very powerful model to capture the structure of se-
quential data. It generates two sequences of symbols, where the first is observable,
and the second is hidden. The hidden states can be discovered only through the
observable states. The probabilities of transitioning from one hidden state to an-
other and from a hidden state to an observable state are represented using two
probability density functions. The model is denoted as λ = {A,B, pi}.
HMM symbols:
• A: the transition matrix of size N*N that stores the probabilities of transition-
ing from one state to another and is row stochastic (the sum of each row is
equal to 1).
• B: the observation matrix of size N*M that stores the probabilities of an ob-
servable event occurring given that the system is in a certain hidden state,
which is also row stochastic.
• pi: the initial state probabilities of each state being the start of the sequence. It
is of size M and is row stochastic.
• T: length of the observation sequence (the number of observations taken).
• S: S1, S2... SN is the set of hidden states with N items.
• O: O1, O2... OM is the set of observable states which is the set of used distinct
system calls with M items.
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The collected system call traces of the targeted VM are considered to be the
HMM observation sequence, and each system call is an observation symbol. Before
building and training the classifier, we need to first specify the size of the HMM.
The HMM consists of two finite sets of states, hidden states set S with N items and
an observable events setO withM items. It is a common practice in HMM anomaly
detection classifiers based on system calls to choose a size for N equal to the size
of M , which is equal to the number of distinct system calls [76]. In our case, the
number of distinct system calls is 25. The trick of using the ’other’ item in the list
of used system calls makes it possible to cover the rarely used ones and reduce the
number of states in the HMM model, which significantly reduces the computation
time.
After specifying the size, HMM becomes the stage for pre-processing data to
train and then test the classifier. We used three samples: two were normal and one
was malicious. The first normal sample was used to train the classifier, while the
second and third were used for testing purposes.
4.3.2.3 Training Steps for HMM Classifier
To train the HMM classifier, we went through the following steps:
• Step 1: we prepared normal samples for training.
• Step 2: we processed the samples by removing errors, incomplete system
calls, and IOCTL system calls, which had a missed first or second arguments.
The data were pre-processed using three different methods:
– Method one: we considered all system calls that were invoked by the
monitored VM. This method is the main method; however, we will show
the results of methods two and three in the results and discussion sec-
tions.
– Method two: we considered only IOCTL system calls and system calls
with threat level one from the list of used system calls. The threat level of
each system call was imported from [21], but later modified depending
on the research environment.
– Method three: each VM was represented in the system with one process,
but this process had many threads or children processes. In this method,
only the main threads were considered. We defined the main thread as the
thread that initiated the IOCTL system calls because in our environment
(KVM-based virtual environment), an IOCTL system call was the most
critical system call for the reason that VMs communicate with resources
in the host kernel using IOCTL.
• Step 3: we took a small part of a normal sample and used it to create the list
of used distinct system calls, and then specified the value of M , which was 25
for methods one and three and 8 for method two.
• Step 4: we transferred system calls to vectors of numbers; for instance sys-
tem call ′ioctl(11, 0xae80,′ was represented by number 10, and the system call
called ′other′ was represented by number 24. The list of numbers represented
the items of the observable states O.
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• Step 5: we converted all the system calls in the training sample to the corre-
sponding numbers and divided them into groups of k, using a sliding win-
dow, k = 6.
• Step 6: we determined the number of sequences of system calls used to train
the classifier. Since this classifier targeted ephemeral VMs, the number of
sequences used for training had to be kept to the minimum. The number of
sequences for training and testing were chosen by experiment, as shown later
in the section.
• Step 7: after determining the number of sequences to train the classifier, we
trained the classifier using the Baum-Welch algorithm, which is an expecta-
tion maximisation algorithm, to find the unknown parameters of HMM. The
inputs of the algorithm were sequences of system calls of size 6, and the out-
put was a trained classifier to be used later in the testing phase.
• Step 8: end the training process.
Testing the classifier
To test the classifier, we used 1500 traces (1000 were normal and 500 were ma-
licious) collected in the experiment discussed in section 4.2. We input these to
the classifier and then calculated the log-likelihood of each trace, and also calcu-
lated two sets of values, Set1 and Set2. Set1 was the difference between the log-
likelihood of 500 normal traces TR1 and 500 abnormal traces TR2. Set2 was the
difference between the log-likelihood of TR1 (the same normal traces used in Set1)
and another 500 normal traces TR3. To label traces as normal or malicious and gen-
erate the anomaly signal, two thresholds were designed. The first threshold T1 was
used to decide if a trace was normal (represented by 0) or a mismatch (represented
by 1). The value of this threshold was chosen by experiment.
For each entry in TR1 and TR2, we calculated the difference in log-likelihood
and compared it to T1. If the difference was less than T1, the value was set to ’1’,
and the trace was registered as a mismatch, otherwise the value was set to ’0’, and
the trace was registered as normal.
The second threshold T2 was used to decide if a chunk of traces was normal
or malicious, which determined the final decision to send an anomaly signal or
not. Each chunk of traces contained 10 traces. If a chunk of traces registered over
4 mismatches, it was considered to be a malicious trace, and an alert was raised.
However, we found that about 50% of malicious chunks registered 10 out of 10
mismatches, which meant all the traces in the chunk were malicious. If the chunk
had 4 or less mismatches, it was considered to be a normal chunk. However, about
60% of the normal chunks had 8, 9, or 10 out of 10 normal traces in them. Dividing
traces into chunks helped to make the classifier works on the fly using a small
amount of data for detecting anomalies. When the classifier started processing a
chunk and it registered 5 mismatches, there was no need to continue processing
the rest of the chunk because 5 was enough to label it as malicious. In this case the
classifier could ignore the rest of the chunk and move to the next one. The choice
of T2 and the number of traces in each chunk were defined by experiment.
The amount of data used to train the classifier was relatively small. We used
about 780,000 system calls to train the classifier, which was about 19 MB of raw data
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containing system calls, along with their arguments and return values. For testing
1500 samples were used each of them is of size 150 KB. Each sample contains 100
chunks of size 1.5 KB (10 traces ≈ 600 system calls). In 50% of the samples, the
classifier was able to decide if a chunk was malicious or not by checking only the
first 75 bytes of the chunk; in half of the samples (50 chucks, 75 KB) we can decide
by checking only ≈ 38 KB.
4.3.2.4 Evaluating the Classifier
After training the classifier using the HMM method, the output of the training algo-
rithm was the normal behaviour profile representing the monitored VM. The next
step in this process was testing the efficacy of the classifier.
Efficacy analysis:
The problem of deciding whether or not the designed HMM-based detection
system generates strong enough anomaly signals could be formulated in terms of
hypothesis testing as follows:
Q1 is the number of anomaly signals in malicious samples in comparison with
normal sample, and Q2 is the number of anomaly signals in normal samples in
comparison with another normal sample.
1. The null hypothesis: H0 : Q1 −Q2 > 5
H1 : Q1 −Q2 <= 5 (one sided hypothesis)
2. Assume H0 is true
3. The difference in anomaly signals is based on the difference in the log-
likelihood and follows approximately normal distribution, see figure 4.12.
We considered 9710 samples and then grouped these depending on the dif-
ference of log-likelihood into 13 groups. We found that a low difference of
log-likelihood and very large difference of log-likelihood were closer to zero,
as shown in the figure.
4. Level of significance α = 0.001 (99.9% confidence level)
5. Find Z scores11: Zα = Z0.001 = −3.09
6. Find the region of rejection RR which is a set of values less than or equal to
α : (RR <= −3.09)
7. Collect samples
8. Extract the difference in anomaly signals for sequences for each chunk and
calculate statistics, as shown in table 4.9. N is the sample size, and µ is the
average.
SD =
√
σ21
N1
+
σ22
N2
= 0.320
∆ = 5 (the value in the null hypothesis)
11Z Score is a statistical measurement represent the relationship of a score to the mean in a group
of scores.
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Figure 4.12: Difference in log-likelihood between normal and abnormal samples
follows normal distribution.
Table 4.9: Statistics collected from samples.
Normal Malicious
N1 = 8 N2 = 8
µ1 = 0.625 µ2 = 9.625
µ = µ2 − µ1 = 9 the new centre
ME = Zα ∗ SD = Z0.001 ∗ SD = −0.99014
Range: 8.06 to 9.99
Z = µ−∆SD = 12.48303
9. Draw a conclusion: the test statistics Z = 12.48303 is not in the RR so we retain
the null hypothesis.
The accuracy, detection, and false positive rates criteria are generally used to
measure the efficiency of a detection system. The results of testing 1500 samples
with a chunk size of 10 and sequence length of 6, where each sample contained
1000 sequence and 8 iterations, are shown in table 4.10.
Table 4.10: Results of testing 1500 samples with chunk size of 10 and sequence
length of 6, where each sample contained 1000 sequences and 8 iterations.
Accuracy Detection Rate False Positive Rate
97% 100% 5.66%
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Complexity analysis:
Two main factors that affect the complexity of algorithms are time and memory.
For the Baum-Welch algorithm, the time complexity scales linearly per iteration
with the sequence length and quadratically with the number of HMM states (num-
ber of distinct system calls in the list) [97]. The memory complexity also scales
linearly with the sequence size and number of states [97].
The time complexity is O(N2k), and the memory complexity is O(Nk) [96].
Therefore, to reduce the required computational complexity, we reduced the value
of N to an acceptable level. Although Linux has about 326 different system calls,
we only considered 25 of them, which reduced the time complexity considerably.
Results:
We found that method one provided the best results, with a high accuracy and
detection rate and an acceptable false positive rate in comparison with the other
two methods. Method two, when only IOCTL system calls were monitored, pro-
vided a detection rate of ≈ 83%. For method three, when only the main threads
were monitored, 3 main threads were found; the first one provided a very low
anomaly signal, while the other two failed to distinguish between normal and ma-
licious samples.
Furthermore, we compared the detection rate of the system when using differ-
ent sizes of training samples (195,000 system calls, 390,000 system calls, and 780,000
system calls); we applied this only to method one because methods two and three
had failed. The result of the comparison is shown in table 4.11.
Table 4.11: Different sizes of training samples for HMM classifier.
# of System Calls 195000 390000 780000
Detection Rate ≈ 93% ≈ 96% ≈ 97%
After obtaining these primitive results, we decided to use the 780,000 system
calls for training and afterward applied the chunk approach to generate the results
shown earlier in the section.
4.3.2.5 Discussion
Method one detected all of the malicious samples but also labelled some normal
chunks as malicious with a false positive (FP) rate of 5.66%. The FP rate could be
lowered by reducing the threshold T1. For this, the average difference could be
divided by 4 instead of 2 (as used here). This will decrease the FP rate but will
increase the false negative one. Therefore, in addition to other factors, the choice of
this threshold may depend on how critical this VM is. Providers should design this
threshold based on the nature of their clients, their industry, and the geographical
area.
We argue that method two failed because IOCTL system calls were not the
main system calls to distinguish the malicious attack we used (stress test attack).
Other attacks might be detected by monitoring mainly IOCTL system calls; how-
ever, deciding which system call to monitor is a complicated task and going deeper
in this track might convert the anomaly detection system into a misuse detection
system (signature-based).
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The reason for the failure of method three might be that we monitored the
wrong threads. Threads in general are not stable because they are created and
terminated continuously; therefore, the approach of monitoring specific threads
under the main process of the VM should be flexible and may change with time.
More research can be done in this area to find a better definition of ’main threads’
rather than ’the thread that initiates IOCTL system calls’, which is the definition
used in this research. We argue that by monitoring the right threads, the training
and detection time will be less, and the accuracy will improve.
This proposed system satisfies the special requirements for a cloud host-based
IDS, in addition to providing the ability to detect anomalies in ephemeral VMs.
The system processes the collected data (system calls) in a way that reduces the
complexity of HMM while being able to detect anomalies reliably in ephemeral
VMs.
4.4 Similar Systems
In the literature, there are number of systems close to what we proposed here. The
closest and strongest candidate was designed by Azmandian et al. in [14]. We dis-
cussed their IDS, which is called VMM-IDS, briefly in the state of the art chapter,
section 3.3. In the VMM-IDS, the hypervisor was modified in order to be able to
extract and collect low-level architectural events from VMs while running. The
monitored events include the execution of privileged instructions, memory access,
and I/O use. The hypervisor logs all events and the related information in order
to reconstruct the actions of VMs (bridge the semantic gap). The logged events
and information include for example Read/Write events with the control register
number, its value, and if it was read or write, which helped to understand the VM
operating system state. Another example involved page faults with the register
number, its value, and whether it was read or write, which helped to understand
how VMs’ applications use memory.
Azmandian et al. divided the extracted features from collected events into two
groups: (1) features that are generated from the sum of events; and (2) features that
are generated from the relationship between events. Their system was tested in a
virtualisation-based environment (but not a cloud computing one). As explained
in section 3.1.3, high volume of data is one of the main characteristic of the cloud.
Registering all events and then analysing them using machine learning algorithms
might prevent the IDS from working on the fly and make it more of a log analyser
rather than a detection system. We believe that the detection system of Azmandian
et al. needs to be tested in the cloud context.
Zou et al. published two interesting papers closely related to our topic. In their
first paper, [174], they proposed a VM monitoring system for virtualised platforms
called VMDriver. It has two components. The first is in the hypervisor, which
is responsible for intercepting and collecting events (system calls, registers, and
memory pages) and then sending them to the second component. The second com-
ponent exists in a separate VM, called the management VM (MVM), which is re-
sponsible for analysing the collected low-level binary data and reconstructing the
semantic information based on prior knowledge of the monitored VM’s operating
system. This method of bridging the semantic gap is called ”OS-dependent se-
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mantic reconstruction” [174]. Each monitored VM has a corresponding monitoring
driver in the MVM. What is interesting is that they can encapsulate the needed in-
formation about the monitored VM’s OS with its monitoring driver, and the driver
can be loaded dynamically when the VM arrives. We think that this idea suits
cloud environments, because the monitoring drive can be migrated with the VM.
In their second paper, [191], in 2013, they added more features to their old system
to be able to work in the cloud. The problems the researchers tried to solve were
security monitoring and trust within the cloud. They proposed trusted monitoring
for cloud-based platforms. They used trusted computing to maintain the integrity
of the monitoring systems. They also suggested placing the MVM under the man-
agement of a trusted third party to solve the problem of trust in cloud computing.
We believe that the systems proposed by Zou et al. have a great potential to work
efficiently in the cloud and help solve the problem of security monitoring in it.
However, they require prior knowledge. Our idea of monitoring VMs through sys-
tem calls using only low-overhead and simple methods can be integrated with the
system of Zou et al. systems. This might improve the trust and security monitoring
dilemmas in the cloud.
4.5 Attacks Against System Call IDS
Sekar et al., in [147], stated that anomaly detection systems that are based on sys-
tem call monitoring (without considering arguments) will struggle to detect the
following attacks:
• Attacks that rely on system call arguments, i.e. ”attacks involving les ac-
cessed via symbolic links” [147]. To cover this type of attack, many research
papers have suggested considering system call arguments in the used detec-
tion method [157] and [128].
• Attacks that do not cause any change in the behaviour of the targeted VM.
Usually these attacks are related to the network, and the proposed systems
are HIDSs, which are not a substitute for the NIDS.
• Attacks that are designed specifically to work in a host monitored by a sys-
tem call-based anomaly HIDS. An example of this type of attack is the mimicry
attack [169]. In a mimicry attack, the attacker designs its attack to achieve ma-
licious purposes using sequences of system calls that look normal (mimick-
ing the sequence of system calls of normal behaviour) [128], [108], and [169].
Therefore, in our context, the attackers have to analyse the normal sequences
of system calls of the VM and design their attack accordingly.
Almost all anomaly detection systems (without arguments) that use sequence
of system calls are threatened by this type of attack, including the BoSC-based
detection systems that we used in this research. A BoSC-based detection sys-
tem is even easier to mimic because it ignores the sequence of system calls
and only relies on frequencies. However, our systems are less threatened by
a mimicry attack because we monitor the whole VM with all of its applica-
tions and services, rather than a single application or process. In contrast,
most other system call-based HIDSs monitor only one application or process
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within the host, giving the attacker the chance to analyse the behaviour of the
monitored application and also giving him/her the chance to inject a code
to mimic the normal sequences of system calls. In our context, the attacker
might be detected while injecting the exploit code or while analysing the nor-
mal sequences of system calls. Our systems are still threatened by a mimicry
attack, but the exploit code is harder to design, and the process of injecting
system calls might cause the invocation of new system calls, which might be
detected by the detection system.
4.6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we proposed two anomaly detection systems that work by mon-
itoring all of the system calls invoked by the VMs hosted in a public IaaS cloud.
The monitoring systems work efficiently and successfully detect changes in the be-
haviours of VMs without the need to access VMs or collect data from inside them;
they rely exclusively on the system calls invoked by VMs to detect any behaviour
change. System calls were collected and used to create a normal behaviour profile
representing the VM, and any change in behaviour was detected as an anomaly.
The main assumption for our detection systems was that VMs have relatively con-
sistent behaviours because they are limited in their used services and applications.
This assumption was relative to regular servers, which may aggregate multiple
services on a single instance. Regular best practices for IaaS cloud services would
argue against deploying such mixed workloads in a single VM for security and per-
formance reasons. The new systems satisfy the IaaS public cloud special require-
ments for detection systems; they can work efficiently without accessing VMs, and
they require no prior knowledge about VMs. They cannot be disabled by VM users
because they are installed in the cloud host rather in the VMs themselves. They
can work almost instantly (fast training, monitoring, and detection). They generate
small normal behaviour profiles, which can be migrated with the correspondent
VMs in the case of migration. They need no human intervention to work, but are
fully automated, with no need to update rules or insert any detection signatures.
The first detection system was built based on the BoSC representation method,
and for a sequence size of 10, it achieved 100% accuracy and 0 false positives; it
generated very strong anomaly signals.
The other detection system was designed to monitor ephemeral VMs, which
are VMs that live for short periods of time to perform specific tasks and then termi-
nate. The model of ephemeral VMs is very popular in the public IaaS cloud. The
detection system was built using the hidden Markov model representation method.
The system worked efficiently, providing an accuracy of 97% and a false positive
rate 5.66%. We tested three methods: monitoring all the system calls, monitoring
only system calls with a high threat level, and monitoring only threads (processes)
that initiated IOCTL system calls. The first method one provided good results,
whereas the second and third methods failed to distinguish normal and abnormal
behaviours and provided a weak anomaly signal or no signal at all, respectively.
We processed data to reduce the time and space needed for monitoring and
detection. Only the used system calls were considered (not all the Linux system
calls); by considering only the used system calls and creating the ’other’ item to
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cover those rarely used, we reduced the amount of processed data to the minimum.
This step also significantly reduced the HMM states and the database needed by the
BoSC.
Further research is needed to cover the following topics:
• Testing improved versions of HMM to detect anomalies in ephemeral VMs.
• Considering system call arguments in the classifier.
• Investigating the problem of classifier drafting, especially for ephemeral VM
anomaly detection systems.
• We assumed that the VMs are not malicious from the beginning. However,
if they are, the anomaly detection system will fail. This area needs more re-
search; the problem is related to authentication mechanisms and the process
of initiating new VMs.
• Investigating the threat of a mimicry attack, while monitoring the whole VM
by a system call HIDS, rather than just one application or process.
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Chapter 5
Attacks in IaaS Cloud
Sharing resources, co-residency, pay-for-use, over-commitment, and migration are
essential features for a public IaaS model to operate efficiently and effectively. In
contrast, they introduce new security concerns and needs to the cloud. Recently,
many studies have been conducted to discover the vulnerabilities and investigate
possible techniques to misuse these features and attack the cloud or its consumers,
such as in [139], [183], and [164]. Public IaaS cloud computing is a service, and
disturbing this service is the first main threat facing the cloud.
In this part of the research, we introduce a cloud-specific denial of service fam-
ily of attacks that is based on misusing the ’migration’ and ’over-commitment’ fea-
tures of the cloud. These attacks also employ co-residency, co-residency checks,
and covert channels to disturb the service. We call this new class of attacks CIDoS,
which stands for Cloud-Internal Denial of Service.
In the CIDoS class of attacks, a group of malicious VMs coordinate their re-
source consumption to stress some of the cloud resources, aiming to trigger a mi-
gration order for fake reasons. Attackers increase their consumption of resources
by building on the already existing consumption (riding the workload wave) to
reach thresholds (time and strength) that trigger a migration order. The scale of
this attack has the potential of causing a complete paralysis of the cloud. If attack-
ers successfully force the cloud to enter a continuous state of migration, the whole
service will have difficulty functioning.
VMs migration
By studying the IaaS cloud, we found that VM migration is a main feature in the
cloud that allows load balancing, rapid elasticity [125], and cost reductions by max-
imising the utilisation of hosts or evacuating rarely utilised hosts to save power.
VM migration is essential; however, at the same time, it has a high cost. If it is an
online migration, it requires many synchronisation steps to transfer VMs without
disturbing their work, which consumes the network and host resources. If it is an
offline migration, it requires turning off VMs before migration, which disturbs the
service and might affect the users. Furthermore, migration should be done without
the consumers’ awareness, and without requiring that they adapt to or track the
change in location [15].
The process of moving a VM from host to host is very expensive because it
consumes bandwidth, computational power, and affects security by increasing the
attack surface. In migration, the whole VM is transmitted through the network,
which gives the attacker the chance to attack the VM passively by eavesdropping
for sensitive data or information. If the attacker succeeds in taking a snapshot of the
VM in the transmission channel, this will give him or her the chance to attack the
VM offline without raising suspicion or leaving any trace. All parts of the VM have
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to be migrated, including the running memory, which increases the danger of data
loss and requires tools to maintain the integrity and confidentiality of the transmit-
ted data. Furthermore, authentication and authorisation mechanisms should be in
place, and the security of the source and destination servers should be considered.
Finally, there should also be monitoring and alerting mechanisms for VMs during
migration to detect any stealing, tampering, or dropping of the data. Migration de-
cision mechanisms might also be a target for attackers, initiating migration orders
for false reasons or cancelling a valid order, as we did in the CIDoS attack.
Cloud host over-commitment
Cloud hosts tend to oversubscribe or over-commit based on the assumption
that not all of the co-resident VMs will use their resources to the maximum at the
same time [182]. By over-committing cloud servers host more than they can afford,
which reduces the cost without affecting the service. The aim is to provide adequate
services with the minimum resources (i.e. turn on the minimum number of hosts to
save power, which is the most money consuming factor in the cloud, about a third
of the costs of the datacentre [11]).
Over-commitment could also be a source of threats to the cloud, as stated in [20],
”the host is oversubscribed; that is, if all the VMs request their maximum allowed
CPU performance, the total CPU demand will exceed the capacity of the CPU.”
This is what we call misusing over-commitment, and it is most harmful when there
is a rapid coordination between groups of malicious VMs.
Migration and over-commitment are essential to efficiently manage a cloud’s re-
sources. Because migration is known to be expensive, if we could trigger migration
orders for false reasons, we might affect the availability of the service, especially if
a large number of migration orders are triggered.
Cloud attacks
In the literature, we found that most of the published cloud attacks follow the
same generic theme: they require co-residency, co-residency checks, and the use of
covert channels for communication or stealing data or resources. We used the same
theme to develop our new cloud DoS attack.
A CIDoS attack requires the following steps. First, it requires that numerous
malicious VMs (over a specific threshold) coexist in the same physical host. Sec-
ond, the attack class relies on the use of covert channels for communicating and
coordinating the attack among attack members. Covert channels are communica-
tion channels that are not designed to carry information, and are typically beyond
the authorisation of access control media. In covert channels, flaws in the isolation
between resources are exploited to enable communication [173]. The severity of the
covert channel is measured by the channel capacity. Ensuring the elimination of all
covert channels is extremely difficult if there are shared resources.
Third, the attack class operates a novel protocol through the covert channel to
coordinate and trigger the attack. When attackers are ready to attack, by the end
of a successful protocol operation, each of the participating VMs increases its utili-
sation following the expected workload pattern of the host and building over it in
an attempt to break the host’s ability to cope with the increased stress (a technique
similar to jamming signals). The attack is hard to detect because attackers maintain
steady behaviours close to their usual workloads. The attack deceives the cloud by
stressing some of the host resources, showing that the host is very busy for a pe-
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riod of time that is long enough to trigger migration and short enough to not raise
suspicion.
In this chapter, we introduce the idea of the CIDoS attack, describe the novel
protocol used to coordinate the attack among malicious VMs, and investigate dif-
ferent mitigation strategies that involve prevention, detection, and response. The
description in the chapter is for the theoretical version of the attack only.
The designed protocol is based on a group key agreement protocol (GKA) to es-
tablish a session key, packet delay variation (PDV) to synchronise the attack time,
pulse-code modulation (PCM) to digitise the workload patterns, and leader elec-
tion protocol to choose a leader for the attack.
For mitigation strategies, we base our detection mechanisms on correlation
measurements and distance calculations among the attackers’ workload patterns.
We use the simple one dimensional discrete cosine transform (DCT) and Euclidean
distance to measure the correlation.
After that, the attack is improved by designing a stealthy randomised prob-
ing strategy to learn the parameters and thresholds used in the process of making
migration decisions in the cloud (reverse engineering the migration algorithms).
In a CIDoS attack (without the improvement), it is assumed that the workload
thresholds that need to be broken to trigger migration are known to the attack-
ers, whereas, in reality, they are hidden and discovering them requires the design
of a new attack, which is the CIDoS attack improvement. We discuss the ideas, con-
cepts, and design of the improvement theoretically in the last part of this chapter,
which will be verified in future work.
We perform sequential runs of the attack to extract and reveal the parameters
and thresholds of migration algorithms. The attack is based on CIDoS, together
with a statistical analysis. We also design a formal model for the migration deci-
sion process, and then create a dynamic algorithm to extract the required hidden
parameters. The mechanisms to extract these thresholds are adapted to the dy-
namic changes in cloud management algorithms. Revealing the parameters is a
security breach in itself. Furthermore, they can be used in a CIDoS attack to al-
low the malicious VMs to accurately generate the needed workload to cause the
required effect (trigger migration). It is vital that the generated workload is not
more than required to reduce the possibility of detection and to make the attack
last longer (attackers will try to keep the host on the edge). They can also use their
understanding of the applied migration policies and algorithms to avoid being mi-
grated.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The literature dealing with the
CIDoS class of attacks is discussed in section 5.1. Section 5.2 shows the threat
model, while the details of the attack and the proposed protocol are presented in
section 5.3. The mitigation of the attack is discussed in section 5.4. Section 5.5 dis-
cusses the improvement of the attack, and section 5.6 presents the conclusion and
future work.
5.1 CIDoS Attack Literature
The first step of the attack is attaining co-residency. Many techniques have been
proposed in the literature to achieve co-residency and/or verify co-residency in
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the cloud. Table 5.1 lists the results of a survey of techniques found in literature
used for co-residency and co-residency checks.
Table 5.1: Survey of different techniques for co-residency and co-residency checks.
Technique Co-residency Co-residency
check
Using cloud Tomography [139] X
Brute force [139] and [164] X
Using covert channel as a ground truth
[139]
X
Abusing new instance placement locality
[139]
X
Through cross-VM attacks [184] X X
Using network probes [139] X
Active traffic analysis [19] X
TTL scan [75] X
Interrupt-overloading side-channel [75] X X
5.1.1 Co-residency and Co-residency Checks
In a cloud network, there are regions and availability zones;1 each region resides in a
geographical area, and it has multiple isolated locations (availability zones). Avail-
ability zones are offered for consumers to plan their VMs locations in a way that
increases availability (by distributing them in different availability zones to escape
full failure if one of the locations has fallen). The first step to increase the likelihood
of co-residency is for an attacker (who is a cloud consumer) to initiate all of their
new VMs in one region and one availability zone [139].
Ristenpart et al., in [139], aimed to map the cloud internal infrastructure (cloud
cartography) to find the location of a targeted VM (a victim) and then initiate co-
resident VMs to attack the victim using a cross-VM attack. The research covered
two parts. First came the advantageous placement, which involves initiating VMs in a
way that maximises the likelihood of co-residency. The second is a cross-VM attack
to steal cryptographic keys using side channels, which we have already discussed
in chapter 3. Researchers tested their techniques on Amazon EC2, and they were
proven to be successful.
To achieve co-residency, Ristenpart et al. proposed and tested two methods. The
first one involves performing a network probe using nmap, hping, and wget. To
retrieve the external name of a VM and translate public IP addresses into internal
addresses, they used DNS resolution queries. Then, a list of internal IP addresses
was collected. They hypothesised that each availability zone has dedicated inter-
nal IP address ranges. More than 400 VMs were initiated. Observations generated
using network probing were collected and analysed. Amazon EC2 interactions
were studied to map the cloud network and understand the used placement algo-
rithm. For instance, by studying the observations, researchers found that Amazon
1These are the names used by Amazon EC2, which is the leader of the field.
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EC2 distributes VMs belonging to the same client to different physical hosts. They
also found that the maximum number of co-resident VMs of size small in one host
is eight. Furthermore, they found that Amazon EC2 has ’strong placement locality’
when a VM has been terminated just before the second has been launched, and the
second will often be placed in the first VM’s ex-host. Amazon EC2 also has ’parallel
placement locality’; when two VMs belonging to different clients are launched at the
same time, they will often reside in the same host. Information like this is valuable
to attackers, and makes it easier to achieve co-residency.
A brute force technique for co-residency was suggested in [139]. Brute force
works by launching a large number of VMs and terminating the ones that are not
co-resident. Researchers proved that this simple strategy registers reasonable suc-
cess rates [139].
After achieving co-residency, Ristenpart et al. performed a co-residency check
using different methods. The first method is matching VMs’ Dom0 IP addresses
by checking the first hop out from the VM or the last hop to the VM using a TCP
SYN traceroute. The second method is using round-trip times to calculate the time
it takes for a signal to arrive and its acknowledgment to return. After checking
the co-residency, they verify it using a covert channel based on hard disk usage. If
two VMs successfully communicate a message with acceptable false positive rates
through the covert channel, they are co-resident. Thus, the covert channel is used
to prove co-residency as a ground truth.
When a VM in the Ristenpart et al.’s model, [139], wants to send a ’1’ through
the covert channel, it writes in a fixed location in the hard disk, and the receiver
VM calculates the time needed to read from the same location (calculate the delay).
If the reading time is higher than a threshold, the other VM is trying to send a ’1’;
a delay occurs because the location is busy. To send a ’0’, the sender does noth-
ing. Consequently, the receiver will read from the fixed location faster, below the
threshold (no delay), and will decode it as ’0’.
The problem when using network probes to attain co-residency is that popular
providers are aware of the threat they might pose. Thus, they are blocked, and most
of them are not applicable nowadays [19] and [75]. Other more advance network-
based co-residency check techniques were proposed in [19] and [75].
Researchers in [19] employed a network covert timing channel to perform a
co-residency check. The attacker has to have a management machine outside the
cloud premises. It initiates a large number of VMs hosted in the cloud and check
for co-residency using a network covert channel and statistical analysis. The at-
tacker’s target is creating a malicious VM that shares the same host with the victim
VM (which is known to the attacker beforehand). The victim VM has to have an
Internet-facing service, and the attacker will initiate a web session with it.
The attacker creates a large number of VMs to increase the possibility of co-
residency. Each of these, in turn, will perform some network activities (inject onto
the network interface a stream of UDP packets) to congest the hardware respon-
sible for the outbound interface and multiplexed with the victim traffic, causing a
delay in its flow. The attacker will try to generate a recognisable pattern of delay and
no delay network flow, which represents the watermark signature of co-residency.
When the management machine detects a watermark signature, co-residency is
achieved by the VM in turn. The management machine uses statistical measure-
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ment to decode signals. They use a Poisson distribution and Kolmogorov-Smirnov
distribution test [19]. Researchers conducted an experiment to test the scheme and
successfully proved co-residency in less than 10 s.
In [75], Herzberg et al. designed a cloud attack consisting of three steps. The first
retrieved the internal IP address of the victim VM using its external publicly known
one. They used an interrupt-overloading side-channel to discover the internal IP
address. This is a technique based on the fact that operating systems give higher
priority to inbound packets than outbound ones. In the interrupt-overloading side-
channel, the attacker overloads the host hardware with I/O device interrupts; these
interrupts occur due to a burst of packets (UDP datagrams). The attacker uses two
machines: the first one is called the client and is used to establish a connection with
the victim via its public IP. Then, the second machine, which is a VM hosted in
the same cloud and is called the prober, sends bursts to different addresses in the
clock range. The client inspects its connection with the victim looking for timing
patterns that might be generated if the prober burst the right internal IP address,
causing delays in the sent packets. If a pattern is found, this is the correspondent
internal IP address. There should be a synchronisation between the client and prober
to agree on the timing, burst size, and frequency. This technique has been tested
on Amazon EC2 using a burst of 1000 packets and three probers. The success rate
for discovering the internal IP address was above 60%. Discovering the internal IP
address is just the first step of this attack; the main goal is checking for co-residency
with the victim VM, and then attacking it using side channel attacks or inter-VM
attacks.
Discovering the internal IP address is irrelevant to our attack because we need
to prove co-residency among our malicious VMs, not between a victim and the
attacker. The second step of Herzberg et al.’s attack is counting the number of hops
between the victim VM and the malicious VM. A time to live (TTL) scan is used to
count the hops between the two VMs. The attacker knows the victim VM’s internal
IP address, from the previous step. They then create a series of TCP SYN packets
and send them to the victim. The first TCP SYN packet in the series has TTL = 1,
and the field increases by one with each sent packet. The TTL value decreases by
one with each hop, and once it reaches 0 on the way to the destination, the packet
is discarded and an ICMP error is returned to the sender.2 When the packet arrives
at the destination, a SYN/ACK will be sent to the attacker, and the TTL field value
in the successfully arrived packet is the number of hops in between the two VMs.
If the value of the successful TTL is 0, this might indicate co-residency; however,
as stated in [75] ”this depends on whether the hypervisor reports itself as a hop
on the path from the instances on a physical host.” The proposed hop counting
technique has been tested on different providers and proved successful in Amazon
and Rackspace Cloud [75].
To prove co-residency, Herzberg et al. suggested using an interrupt-overloading
side-channel after having TTL = 0. In this model, the attacker has three machines:
the client, prober, and probed (a possible co-resident VM that requires the co-residency
2In Amazon EC2, ICMP messages are blocked to prevent the network from being scanned. How-
ever, locking the ICMP messages has only a slight effect on the attack, because upon failure (not reach-
ing the destination) nothing will return to the sender (no failure acknowledgment), which means the
packet has been discarded along the way [75].
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check). First, the client will establish a connection with the victim VM. Then, the
prober will use the interrupt-overloading side-channel (described above) to send a
burst to the probed VM, which will overload the host NIC and introduce delay in
the victim machine’s outbound traffic if they are co-resident. The client will inspect
its communication with the victim looking for timing patterns, and if they exist,
that is a co-residency signal in addition to TTL = 0.
5.1.2 Covert Channels in Cloud
In covert channels, shared resources are used indirectly to leak information to unau-
thorised VMs or to communicate data among VMs in an unauthorised manner,
which violates the security policy. The covert channel’s capacity is used to measure
its severity, the number of bits they can carry per second, in addition to the error
rate.
There are two types of covert channels, storage based and timing based. In
storage covert channels, the sender writes in a shared storage location, and the
receiver reads from it, either directly or indirectly. In timing covert channels, the
sender uses the resources in a way that creates a timing pattern that can be observed
and decoded by the receiver, such as inter-packet delays or disk access delay [33].
In [139], Ristenpart et al. designed and tested three different covert channels
in the Amazon EC2 cloud. The first one is a memory bus covert channel, and by
experiment it was able to transmit 0.006 bps.3 There are no design and implemen-
tation details about the memory bus covert channel in [139]; however, Wu et al. in
[173] studied and tested this type of covert channel in the cloud, and we show their
findings later in the section.
The second tested covert channel in [139] is a hard disk based covert channel,
and by experiment it was able to transmit 0.0005 bps in the Amazon EC2 cloud
environment. The idea behind this covert channel is simple; to transmit ’1’ read
from the shared hard disk to keep it busy, and to send ’0’ do nothing. Meanwhile,
the receiver will try to read from the same shared hard disk, and if there is latency,
the disk is busy, and the sender is trying to send ’1’ otherwise it is ’0’.
The third covert channel in [139] is an L2 cache-based covert channel, and by
experiment it was able to transmit 0.2 bps in the Amazon EC2 environment. The
L2 cache line is divided into two sets: even and odd. The sender evicts the even set
to send ’1’ and the odd set to send ’0’. The receiver measures the access time of each
set; the delay in reading the even set decodes as ’1’, and the delay in reading the odd
set decodes as ’0’.
5.1.2.1 L2 Cache Covert Channels
In this type of covert channel, the two co-resident VMs communicate by construct-
ing an agreed pattern of contention on the shared L2 cache (if it is shared), and the
sent message is encoded by the receiver VM using the contention patterns. The
main problem of using this type of covert channel in the cloud is that most cloud
hosts have multiple CPUs and core migration (changing the CPU assigned to a VM)
30.006 bps is less than the minimum acceptable government rate for covert channels, which is 0.1
bps [135].
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happens regularly [176]. Another problem is the interfering from other VMs shar-
ing the same resource (L2 cache) as the sender and the receiver. In [176], researchers
found by experiment that in Amazon EC2, about 50% of the time, a VM remains in
the same core for no more than 10 ms, and 25% of the time for no more than 100
ms, which caused a large number of invalid reads.
To overcome the previous problems, Ristenpart et al., in [139], suggested that
the receiver take the average of multiple samples to decide if it is a ’1’ or ’0’. Fur-
thermore, when the core has changed (core migration), the receiver will revert to
the prime stage. Another solution was suggested by Xu et al. in [176] to deal with
the core migration problem, which is repeated sampling (resend the bit multiple
times). However, the receiver might read the same bit a number of times and con-
sider each bit to be new data. There is ’no guarantee’ [176], especially because there
is no form of acknowledgment. This covert channel provided a transmission rate
of 3.2 bps with an error rate of 9.28% when it was tested in Amazon EC2 [176].
The same problems facing L2 cache covert channels in the cloud were recog-
nised in [173]. Furthermore, they found that some processor cores do not share any
caches, even if VMs are running in the same processor [173].4 Moreover, in virtu-
alised environments at context switches (changing the user of the resources), the
L2 cache is completely flushed [173]. As a solution to all of these problems facing
cache-based covert channels in the cloud, and as an alternative, Wu et al. in [173]
suggested memory bus covert channels.
5.1.2.2 Memory Bus Covert Channels
In [173], researchers designed and implemented a protocol for cross-VM covert
channels based on the memory bus, and it was dedicated to cloud environments.
The covert channels they created were very wide; they successfully communicated
at 700 bps in the lab and 100 bps in the Amazon EC2 cloud with error rates of
0.09% and 0.75%, respectively. Researchers designed a protocol to establish the
covert channels and communicate through them. Their protocol also adopts a new
scheduling technique (instead of strict round robin) that works instantaneously
with VMs in parallel, which accelerates the communication.
The newly designed covert channels rely on the memory bus to communicate
instead of a shared cache, which has many problems functioning in the cloud, as
explained in section 3.4.
The main disadvantage of Wu et al.’s covert channel is that it has a very high
noise rate. Therefore, error correction techniques (i.e. Reed Solomon) are required.
In addition, to increase the reliability of the channel, the confirmation of the recep-
tion techniques can also be added. The sender should continuously observe the
memory access latencies while the receiver is in execution (by performing exotic
atomic memory operations). If there are no latency, the sender will assume that the
data has not arrived and a resending is required.
5.1.3 Workload Prediction in Virtualised Environments
In a CIDos, the attack leader needs to predict the workload of the host to plan the
attack pattern and distribute it among attackers. To monitor the workload of the
4Such as an Intel Core2 Quad processor [173].
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host in virtualised environments, many measurements can be combined to estimate
the current workload and then predict the future workload using algorithms from
the machine learning field. Some of these techniques are based on covert channels
such as in [139], and others are based on a network such as in [19]. These are only
two examples to show the realism of assuming the ability to monitor and predict
the host workload.
Bates et al., in [19], successfully monitored the workload of a VM and extracted
accurate traffic information from it using a malicious co-resident VM by injecting a
watermark signature into the network traffic of the victim. The details of this attack
were previously shown in section 3.4.
The researchers in [139] suggested using the host CPU caches to measure the
workload by taking load samples to measure the number of CPU cycles and corre-
lating them with the use of the cache (latency in reading from the cache). If there is
latency in reading from the cache, that indicates activities in co-resident VMs. They
proved that measuring the workload through shared caches is effective by testing
it on an Amazon EC2 machine.
5.2 Threat Model
For service providers, disturbing the service is a main concern. Affecting the avail-
ability might cause a reputation loss and/or SLA breach, which in turn might affect
the revenue of the provider.
A public IaaS cloud is threatened by traditional DoS attacks. However, these
kinds of attacks are known threats that have already been studied and understood.
We instead focus on designing a new class of denial of service attacks aiming specif-
ically to disturb the service of a large-scale public IaaS cloud.
Cloud DoS attacks can target either the implementation of the cloud or its architec-
ture. When targeting the implementation, the provider will patch or fix the bug that
causes the vulnerability, and the threat is gone. On the other hand, architecture-
based threats are harder to eliminate without changing or improving the base of
the cloud. Therefore, we focus on cloud architecture-based attacks that target the
availability of a large-scale public IaaS cloud.
In the threat model, we consider three parties: the first party are the attackers
(we play this role). The second party are composed of defenders, which are security
systems and cloud administrators. The third party are other attackers who might
interfere with our attack for their benefit. The victims of this attack are benign cloud
consumers and/or the cloud service provider.
The attackers in our model could include the following:
• other cloud providers (dishonest competitors) who want to affect the revenue
and reputation of their competitors,
• a competitor to one of the cloud consumers,
• a disgruntled ex-employee, or
• hackers who want to prove that they can intrude in the cloud.
The defenders are the security systems in the cloud, cloud administrators, clients
who will try to protect their virtual servers, and possible third parties.
In the attack we have the following:
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• an attack leader that is selected using a leader election protocol,
• m number of malicious VMs,
• co-resident benign VMs,
• a cloud host where malicious VMs live together with other innocent VMs,
• hosts management machines where host management algorithms are run,
and
• a protocol to coordinate the attack.
We make the following assumptions:
• We assume that the migration feature is enabled in the cloud service (some
cloud providers disable migration support for security and performance rea-
sons; however, migration is a main feature of the cloud that is essential for
load balancing and to allow rapid elasticity [125]).
• Virtual machines (virtual servers) that have a relatively steady workload pat-
tern. Mixing services in one VM is against best practice, especially since the
cost model in the cloud is pay-for-use.
• We can predict the host workload pattern based on the workload history (at
least for the next short interval of time), as we discussed in section 5.1.3.
• Noise in the communication channel for attackers is dealt with, i.e. by using
an encoding scheme to correct errors over the covert channel.
• The leader knows the capacity of the communication channel. This can be
done by testing the covert channel, although this aspect is outside the scope
of this research.
• The attack is targeting generic resources in the host; however, it can work by
targeting any type and number of resources in the host.
The attacker needs to do the following:
1. Increase the probability of co-residency.
2. Determine if its VMs are co-resident on the same ’physical’ machine or not.
3. Establish covert channels to coordinate and communicate the attack.
4. Trigger the attack.
Many methods can be used to spread the CIDoS attack,5 such as the following:
• uploading an infected operating system image in a public repository,
• using the same techniques as worms and viruses to spread the attack,
• spreading the attack through a cross-VM attack,
• exploiting weak authentication methods, and/or
• targeting vulnerable services in VMs.
5Spreading the attack is outside the scope of this paper, and these are only examples.
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5.3 Robust Coordination of Cloud-Internal Denial of
Service Attacks
5.3.1 Attack Coordination Protocol
A protocol was designed to coordinate the CIDoS class of attacks. The require-
ments, design, analysis, and evaluation of the protocol are discussed in this section.
5.3.1.1 Protocol Requirements
The main goal of the protocol is coordinating the attack from the arrival of the
first malicious VM to the moment of attacking. To perform this coordination, a
secure communication channel should be established among participants using a
shared session key agreed upon by all participants. The protocol should allow
only legitimate members of the attack to participate (preventing interference from
adversaries).
The time should be synchronised just before triggering the attack (the final step
of the protocol) to be able to attack almost simultaneously in order to make an
effect. The attackers should not raise suspicion to avoid detection; therefore, the
amount of the covert channel used should be reduced to the minimum effective
rate. The freshness of the messages should be guaranteed to defend against a replay
attack.6 After the last check of still alive participants before attacking, the attack
should be started as quickly as possible to avoid losing attack members over time
(by migration) and to avoid changing the expected workload pattern.
The attack should be triggered only if there are sufficient resources to cause
harm (to avoid faulty tries which might result in the detection and blocking of the
attackers). The protocol should be robust to suit the dynamic nature of VMs. So it
has to tolerate failures. The complexity of the protocol should be the minimum to
suit the covert channel’s limitations.
The identities of the participants should be hidden to avoid blocking them even
after completing the attack. To hide the participants’ identities, the messages ex-
changed among them should not contain any form of ID, including values that
might help reveal the true identity of an attacker such as IP addresses or any val-
ues derived from it. Furthermore, the participating VMs should maintain a semi-
random behaviour (workload pattern) to avoid raise suspicion.
The protocol should also resist substitution and de-synchronisation attacks.7 It
has to be portable and independent of the environment’s technical details. More-
over, it should provide a form of authentication to prevent faulty VMs or adver-
saries from forging or modifying the messages.
These are the general properties and requirements. Additional properties and
requirements for the group key agreement protocol, which is part of our protocol, are
discussed in the following section.
6A replay attack is an attack in which an adversary inserts modified or old massages into a com-
munication channel [82].
7A substitution attack is when an attacker, in the course of transmission, masquerades as the
sender or the receiver of a message by reusing legitimate messages [38]. While a de-synchronisation
attack is when an attacker tampers with the authentication capability of a valid node while commu-
nicating with another valid node by forging messages to destroy the synchronization [107].
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5.3.1.2 TJKT Attack Coordination Protocol
Our protocol requires agreement on both the set of participants and the attack ini-
tiation itself. This can be accomplished efficiently by agreeing on a shared secret in
a group whose membership is not pre-determined and which may change at any
time. This can occur for various reasons, including faults in participants such as
potential attackers being migrated from the target host to another. A number of
such protocols exist. Because membership in the group is dynamic, and no trusted
party can be assumed, no simple and efficient group key distribution (GKD) protocol
can be used. Instead, a group key agreement (GKA) protocol provides the necessary
properties. A large number of protocols have been proposed, with some notable
contributions by Burmester and Desmedt [30], the GDH and TGDH protocols by
Steiner et al. and Kim et al. [154] and [98] for the case of passive adversaries and
variants able to tolerate active adversaries [94].
As noted, of particular interest for attack coordination is the need to tolerate
faults; this has been the subject of extensive investigation. While the protocol by
Kim et al. [98] exhibits some fault tolerance, more recent work has sought to im-
prove the communication and computational complexity [86], [186], and [72] un-
der different assumptions, with Cachin and Strobl describing a constant-round ro-
bust GKA [34] with communication complexity O(n2). Our proposed protocol is
based on the protocol by Jarecki et al. [86], which provides constant-round com-
plexity and simultaneously achieves the communication and computational com-
plexity O(n+T ) for T errors to be tolerated. Although a large number of protocols
have been proposed that offer logarithmic communication complexity such as the
seminal work by Burmester and Desmedt [31] and subsequent enhancements to
robustness [186] and [72], most such protocols rely on point-to-point and hierarchi-
cal communication topologies to achieve the O(log n) communication complexity
(see Hatano et al. [72] for a detailed analysis of the communication complexity of
several important protocols).
Unlike in the case of standard GKA protocols, however, we do not require a
fixed set of participants to participate in the protocol, but only a group of a certain
magnitude. Provided that the elements of this attack set can remain synchronised,
we also permit dynamic changes in the group membership during the attack.
We assume that all the participants share the same g value; in addition to the
assumption of Jarecki et al.: ”Let G be a cyclic group of prime order q, and let g be
its generator. We assume the DDH and Square-DDH problems are hard in G” [86].
For example, G could be a subgroup of order q in the group of modular residues
Zp
∗ s.t. p− 1 divides q, | p |= 1024 and | q |= 160, or it can be a group of points on
an elliptic curve with order q for | q |= 160.
The algorithm 5.1 on the following page is the protocol used to coordinate the
attack among participants. It achieves group key agreement, time synchronisation,
and leader election.
Each VM randomly picks an r value ∈ Zq and then calculates and broadcasts
z = gr. The z values will play the identifier role for each participant.
After that, a list called ActiveList1 is created containing all of the broadcasted z
values. The number of items in this list is n, which represents the alive participants
at this point in time. If there are enough participants to attack with (n >= T1), we
continue with the protocol, otherwise we terminate. Then, each VM calculates its
106
5. ATTACKS IN IAAS CLOUD
Algorithm 5.1: CIDoS attack coordination protocol.
1: Each VMi, i = 1, ..., n, calculates T1.
2: Each VMi, i = 1, ..., n, selects ri ∈ Zq , then computes and broadcasts zi = gri .
3: Each VMi, i = 1, ..., n, collects zi values and creates ActiveList1 = z1, ..., zn.
4: if n >= T1 then
5: Each VMi, i = 1, ..., n, broadcasts X[k,i,i′] = (zi/zk)ri for T nearest neighbours to the right and T
nearest neighbours to the left. k ∈ ActiveList1.
6: Each VMi, i = 1, ..., n, collects X values and creates ActiveList2 = 1, ...,m and sorts them ascending.
The leader L is z1 (the smallest value in the list).
7: if m >= T1 then
8: Each VMi, i = 1, ...,m, computes sk
sk = (zi−1)m.ri .Xim−1.Xi+1m−2 ... Xi−2 where
Xi = X[i−1,i,i′] and X[i,i′,k] = X[k,i,i′]−1.
The key will be sk = gr1r2+r2r3+r3r4+...+rmr1
9: else
10: Terminate.
11: end if
12: else
13: Terminate.
14: end if
X value, and the X values of the T neighbours to the left and T neighbours to the
right. The T value here is the number of failure VMs the protocol can tolerate, and
it depends on how much risk of failing the attacker is willing to accept.
Next, another active list called ActiveList2 is created with m ordered items (i.e.
order z ascending values). The m value represents the number of still alive partic-
ipants, and if (m >= T1), continue with the protocol, otherwise terminate. All the
participants have the same ActiveList2 with the same order; therefore, the leader
can be agreed upon as the VM with the smallest value in the list. If, for any reason,
the leader stops responding within a specific time frame, the second smallest value
in the list will take over the leadership, and then the third smallest depending on
the number of lost participants the attack can tolerate.
The final stage of the key agreement protocol is calculating the key with the for-
mula shown in the algorithm, and as Jarecki et al. stated ”the cycle through the alive
nodes can be constructed either from a true Hamiltonian cycle or from a Hamilto-
nian path taken twice” [86].
The leader has the following responsibilities:
• The leader has to predict the workload pattern of the victim host, where this
prediction is for a short period of time, i.e. a few milliseconds, and then cre-
ates the value WT P , which contains the digital representation of the target
workload pattern. To convert the analogue workload to digital, pulse-code
modulation (PCM) (or any other compressed encoding scheme) can be used.
WT
P = {attack d, bp sample, interval s, freq}.
Where attack d = attack duration, bp sample = bits per sample rate, interval s
= sampling interval, freq = frequency.
We decided to ignore weak amplitude signals, which require more work to
break the threshold and only concentrate on medium to strong signals. For
example, if VMs (in a particular moment) consume only 15% of the CPU util-
isation and the required threshold is on 80%, the attackers have to produce
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65% of workload to break the threshold, which might be expensive, espe-
cially if they have limited resources to attack with. Therefore, we ignored
those weak amplitude signals. A threshold can be used to specify if an am-
plitude is strong enough to be considered or not. This is also important to
give the participants enough scheduling credits to contribute to the attack at
the right time (not making too much work and so not consuming all of their
scheduling credits).8
• The leader has to calculate the following thresholds:
– Ts is the severity-threshold, which is a safe threshold representing the
value just over the maximum the host can tolerate.
– T1 is a safe threshold representing the number of co-resident VMs needed
to start the attack. A higher factor of overload is better for the attacker
in case some unexpected failure arises such as a failure to communicate
part of the protocol or a force for migration for some of the attack mem-
bers just before starting the attack. The value of T1 can be calculated by
performing tests to measure the capabilities of the host and then adding
a constant number derived from the test results to make the threshold
safe.
– T2 is another threshold, similar to T1 but with a larger value, which helps
to decide if the number of co-resident VMs is much higher than needed
or not. If m >= T2, this means we have a relatively large number of
participants, so go to scenario 1 of the CIDoS attack. If m < T2, it means
that we have just enough participants and we have to design the attack
neatly, which is scenario 2. The scenarios are shown in section 5.3.1.3.
5.3.1.3 Attack Synchronisation
After agreeing on a session key, electing a leader, determining the number of alive
participants (m value), and a list of all z values Activelist2 = {1, ...,m}, the next
steps are synchronising the time, preparing, and distributing the attack pattern
among participants.
Time synchronisation is important to ensure that all participants react at the
right time; especially because timekeeping is still an issue in virtual environments.
To synchronise the time, the one-way delay metric packet delay variation (PDV) is
used 9[48]. Before broadcasting the attack pattern message, the leader should di-
vide it into packets, add an error correction mechanism (i.e. Reed Solomon), and
8Scheduling credits is a term used in virtualisation environments to describe the amount of CPU
time given by the hypervisor to each VM before switching the context.
9The sender broadcasts a packet, i.e. every 20 ms (or attaches the sending time to each packet).
Then, when the receiver reads the packet, he or she will calculate the delay time (or early arrival)
of each packet to estimate the overall delay. Thus, the attack time can be synchronised depending
on the calculated value. We chose PDV to synchronise the time for two reasons. First, we avoided
any synchronisation method that relies on communication through the network to avoid detection
by network-based security systems. Second, in PDV, only a small amount of data (if any) has to be
attached to each packet, which reduces the amount of broadcasted data. The sender needs to attach
either the sending time or nothing if there is a previous agreement between participants about the
time period[48].
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attach a heartbeat to it. Thus, the number of heartbeats will be equal to the num-
ber of packets used to distribute the attack pattern. If the number of packets is very
small, not enough to synchronise the time, the leader can send extra heartbeats. The
receivers read these heartbeats and use statistics to compute the variation of the ab-
solute (PDV) values to evaluate the delay in the covert channel. The time to attack
is calculated by each participant from the last heartbeat, taking into consideration
the packet delay variation.
To prepare and distribute the attack pattern among participants, two scenarios
are suggested.
Scenario 1 - attack pattern random sampling
In this scenario, the number of participating malicious VMs is relatively high
(m >= T2). For that reason, there is no scarcity of co-resident malicious VMs;
therefore, there is no need for a neat distribution of the workload among attackers.
Attackers will benefit from an abundance to make it a more robust attack. Each par-
ticipant decides locally where he/she wants to create a peak resource consumption.
This decision can be made knowingly based on the workload history of each par-
ticipant. Each participant should contribute to a pattern that is close to its previous
workload to not raise suspicion; however, the peaks (time and frequency) each par-
ticipant makes should be around the centre of each interval to build over the peak
of the existing workload, plus the workloads of the other malicious participants.
The leader in this scenario has to broadcast the following message:
{zl,WT P , Ts, attacking time}sk,
zl is the z value of the leader, WT P is the predicted workload pattern of the
victim, and attacking time is the time units the receiver should wait before start
attacking.
Scenario 2 - spread-spectrum attack distribution
In this scenario, the leader distributes the attack pattern among participants
using spread spectrum techniques10. A neat distribution is required because just
enough VMs exist (T1 =< m < T2). All the participants should be involved in
building over the base predicted signal with overlapping and by following differ-
ent patterns to avoid detection. The leader will start by predicting the workload
pattern of the victim host (short period prediction), followed by informing each
participant of how much work he/she should do and when. The leader can use
a direct sequence spread spectrum modulation technique [153], dividing up the
attack signals into pseudo-random sequences that are distributed among partici-
pants. The leader will also distribute the required amplitude from each participant,
in addition to the sampling interval.
The highlighted area in figure 5.1 represents the difference between the pre-
dicted workload and the required attack pattern (to break the severity-threshold
10Spread spectrum distribution techniques are usually used in radio systems to help protect sig-
nals from jamming, interference, and interception; these also help reduce spectral congestion by im-
proving the efficiency of the spectrum utilisation. When using spread spectrum techniques, a signal
is spread over a wider bandwidth [2]. The signal is diffused over a wider bandwidth by injecting the
corresponding spread-spectrum code or modulation code (a higher frequency signal in terms of the
radio frequency field) [2]. We chose the spread spectrum technique because it provides some form of
privacy and security; without knowing the corresponding spread-spectrum code (modulation code),
the receiver (or the eavesdropper) cannot read the signals, which will look like random noise in the
communication channel. In addition, any inference will be rejected by the demodulation mechanism.
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Ts). The attacker should use the expected workload and build over it. The high-
lighted area should be distributed among participants using the spread spectrum.
It will be divided into units and distributed randomly between them. The random
distribution is essential to avoid having correlation between the malicious VMs
workload patterns and thus avoid detection.
Figure 5.1: Building the attack on only one interval as an example - this figure is
illustrative.
The leader will broadcast all of the units except the ones addressed to itself. The
broadcast message has the following format:
{zl, attack sig, ampl sig, interval s, attacking time}sk,
zl is the leader’s z value, attack sig is the attack signals into pseudo-random
sequences for each participant, ampl sig is the desired amplitude for each partici-
pant, interval s is the sampling interval, and attacking time is the attacking time
from the last heartbeat.
Figure 5.2 illustrates the spread spectrum generation process.
The degree of details and size of intervals are calculated depending on the
covert channel capacity. If the channel is wide, the leader can send very detailed at-
tack patterns. While if the channel is very tight, the leader can choose to convert the
attack to a brute force one by sending only an attack-now signal without any details.
Furthermore, to design a more accurate threshold, we use environment parameters
revealed by reverse engineer cloud migration algorithms, which are discussed in
detail in section 5.5. The VM life expectancy can also be calculated and used to de-
sign accurate thresholds. If VMs are known to have long life expectancy (without
migration) we can choose less safe thresholds.
After terminating the protocol because of an inadequate number of participants,
each participant can save a buffer (or maintain a rough counter) of the number of
co-resident VMs; if the counter is too low (too much lower than T1), newcomer VMs
should not be allowed to run the protocol. This is important to avoid restarting the
protocol with each new arrival, even if the attack formation is just at its beginning
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Figure 5.2: Spread spectrum generation process for scenario 2 - this figure is illus-
trative.
(only one or two VMs co-exist).
Before broadcasting, messages should be compressed for two reasons: first to
minimise the use of the covert channel, which is one of the requirements, and sec-
ond, to make the stream of data look random by adding an extra encoding layer.
Thus, in total, there will be three layers of encoding: spread spectrum decomposi-
tion, a compressed encoding scheme (differential PCM), and encryption.
5.3.1.4 Evaluation
The protocol can tolerate up to T failures. The value of T can be calculated depend-
ing on the average life expectancy of the VMs. The computational complexity for
the group key agreement protocol is O(n+ T ).
In the protocol, three messages need to be broadcast: the z values (message 1),
X values (message 2), and heartbeats + attack patterns (message 3). Messages one
and two are part of the group key agreement protocol, while message three needs
more examination to find the overall time resolution needed for the attack. The
size of message three relies heavily on the used covert channel, because the leader
decides the amount of detail depending on the channel capacity. However, there is
a need to approximate this value, and we will do this in an example (the example
is for scenario 2 because it is the most demanding one).
For instance, using the following values: m = 8 (number of participants),
bp sample = 4 (number of bits needed to represent each sample), num levels =
24 = 16 (number of levels for the amplitude), interval s,= 5 (sampling interval)
represented using 4 bits, attack d = 20 (the attack duration) represented using 4
bits, the channel capacity is 100 bps, and the packet size is 32 bits (16 used for data
and the rest for error correction and preamble).
The size of message three is approximately 56 bits, which can be broadcast in
less than 2 s (after encryption, compression, and adding the error correction tech-
nique), and the complexity here is linear.
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5.3.2 Discussion
The complexity of the protocol can be reduced more by first studying the workload
nature of the host to find the most effective prediction algorithm to compress the
workload patterns. Then, reducing the T value if it is known to the attacker that
the VMs in this host have a relatively high life expectancy, i.e. they can choose less
safe thresholds.
The thresholds in the attack should be designed carefully to avoid starting an
unformed attack, which increases the possibility of detection and might lead to
investigation, blocking the attackers’ VMs, and/or adding the names of the corre-
spondent clients to a black list. Furthermore, the random distribution of the attack
signals reduces the correlation between participants’ workload patterns for the at-
tack, which is important to fool intrusion detection systems.
Figure 5.3 shows the workloads of the host and attackers during the attack.
Figure 5.3: Scenario 1, attack pattern random sampling (for only 3 virtual machines)
- this figure is illustrative.
5.4 Mitigation of CIDoS Attacks
This section discusses the detection mechanisms for different CIDoS attack scenar-
ios. The suggested mechanisms are based on correlation measurements and the
calculated distances between the attackers’ workload patterns. The aim is to detect
the CIDoS attack as early as possible, before the attack has been completely formed.
The detection process is based on monitoring the workload pattern of each VM,
dealing with the workloads patterns as signals. We monitor a group of signals and
calculate the correlation between them. For simplicity, only the CPU utilisation is
monitored; however, the same idea can be generalised, and other resources such
as memory utilisation, network bandwidth, and I/O can be considered. To calcu-
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late the correlation, we use the simple one dimensional discrete cosine transform
(DCT) and Euclidean distance. We also discuss variant prevention and response
techniques.
5.4.1 Mitigation Literature
The first obvious solution to prevent the CIDoS class of attacks and other cloud
attacks is blocking all the covert channels. In general, it is essential to block covert
channels when discovered. However, there will exist under the ground fact of
sharing resources and the insufficiency of isolation in the available hypervisors, as
stated by Bates et al. in [19]: ”we conclude that closing the employed covert channel
is difficult without costly dedicated hardware or reduced network performance.”
It is hard to guarantee that all of the covert channels are blocked.
In [112], researchers developed a solution for the threat of covert channels in
cloud computing. A new secure VM was created to mimic the vulnerable VM. The
secure VM receives a copy of all of the traffic destined to the vulnerable VM and
measures the difference between the outbound traffic of the two VMs. However,
we believe that this solution is hard to deploy in a large-scale public cloud service,
where there is a large number of portable VMs. In an experiment, Anyi et al. system,
in [112], increased the inter-packet delay by approximately 0.05 ms. They also in-
creased the CPU usage by about 35%, which is unacceptable in tense environments
such as the public cloud.
Enhancing the isolation between co-resident VMs will definitely improve the
security of the cloud and make attackers’ tasks harder, and there has been some
research in this area such as in [136]. However, there is still insufficient isolation
[19].
The second possible solution is preventing VMs belonging to the same client
(which is a possible attacker) from being co-resident. The vast majority of available
cloud attacks are based on achieving co-residency between attackers or between
the attacker and the victim. As mentioned earlier, in section 3.1.10, some cloud
providers offer the choice of co-residency to their consumers to reduce the com-
munication time between their VMs. This is especially essential in time critical
businesses, i.e. financial business. Furthermore, co-residency could reduce the net-
work congestion caused by VM communications. However, the provider will be
aware of consumers with the co-residency choice on; they pay extra money for the
co-residency service. Therefore, a provider can allow only them to be co-resident
while distributing other VMs among hosts. This solution is possible if the VMs
are initiated by the same account; however, if attackers use more than one account,
finding the true identity of the client is a complicated task.
Furthermore, if the attack is spread using inter-VM attack, distributing the VMs
belonging to the same account to different hosts will spread the attack more rather
than quarantine it.
Zhang et al., in [185], suggested preventing cloud attacks by avoiding co-
residency with attackers using a ’moving target defence’. They also used Shamir’s
secret sharing approach to protect secrets, i.e. encryption keys. In Shamir’s se-
cret, the key is split into k pieces and spread among k VMs. The attacker cannot
retrieve the key without having all of the k pieces. Researchers also encourage mi-
grating VMs with sensitive data regularly to prevent co-residency. One of the main
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contributions of Zhang et al. was the development of migration strategy based on
methods from game theories; the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism was used. For
simplicity, they assumed that the migration process is secure and has a fixed con-
stant cost.
Large-scale public cloud computing is a very intense environment that hosts a
large number of VMs simultaneously. If the VMs migrate regularly and last only
a short period of time in each host, the cloud resources will be saturated, i.e. the
bandwidth, because migration has a high cost. On the other hand, if these VMs
last for a long period of time in one host, there might be enough time for the co-
residency to be accomplished and the attack to be formed. To improve security,
Zhang et al. suggested that VMs have to last the right period of time in each host
and this right period of time varies depending on the attack. Deciding the mi-
gration time based on available attacks mechanisms requires prior knowledge of
these mechanisms (a technique similar to the one used in signature-based HIDS).
Another point is that the assumption of secure migration is unrealistic. Migration
increases the cost, attack surface, and the potential threat thus should be used with
caution.
Researchers in [75] recommended numerous defence mechanisms against a va-
riety of cloud attacks such as blocking internal communication between hosts and
using a separate network adapter for each VM. These solutions might be effective
in other cloud attacks but not for the CIDoS class of attacks because the communi-
cation among VMs is through an unauthorised medium (a covert channel), which
is hard to block. Using separate network adapters will prevent the attack if the
used covert channel is based on network timing, but if it is a memory bus covert
channel (which suits the cloud most), having separate network adapters will not
make any difference.
In [70] numerous incident handling practices for cloud computing attacks were
discussed, i.e. cut the network connection to the compromise VM, use honeywall
to observe suspicious traffic, and add more resources to mitigate DoS attacks. Fur-
thermore, preventing cloud cartography and preventing attackers from mapping
the cloud can also stop a number of cloud attacks, as suggested in [139]. However,
little research has been conducted in this area, and we believe that it needs more
investigation by cloud security researchers.
In this research, we developed detection methods designed specifically for the
CIDoS class of attacks. To detect the attack, we monitored the workload patterns of
the attackers. We dealt with VM workload patterns as signals and processed them
as signals. Many methods have been used to compare signals. For instance, in
[127], different methods to calculate the distance between signals were tested. Any
of them can perform the task, and we chose the Euclidean distance with thresholds
method because of its simplicity and efficiency. Thresholds are used to reduce the
amount of processed data and therefore the cost. We also adopt other techniques
from the signal processing field to detect the most advanced scenario for the at-
tack (scenario 1). The chosen technique should be able to transfer the time domain
to the frequency to calculate the correlation between signals. Many methods can
be used to accomplish this task, such as the discrete cosine transform (DCT) and
wavelet transform. We used the DCT, and only a one dimensional DCT function
was needed [103].
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5.4.2 Mitigation Strategies
5.4.2.1 Prevention
To prevent a CIDoS attack, cloud providers can disable both the over-commitment
and migration features, and allocate requested resources to each VM from the be-
ginning, even if they are not being used. This solution is valid in an uncrowded
cloud. However, the main idea of cloud computing is sharing to reduce cost by
increasing the utilisation of servers to the maximum. Thus, over-commitment and
migration are essential features to accomplish these goals. They are also corre-
lated to each other; you cannot have over-commitment without migration because
if one of the tenants in an over-committed host has requested more resources (the
elasticity feature), the provider might need to migrate this tenant to another less
pressured physical host.
The second solution is preventing co-residency using a placement algorithm
that distributes the VMs belonging to the same client to different hosts.11 This
option is hard to maintain over time because VMs consistently move from host
to host for different reasons, such as to save energy, reduce the stress of an over-
utilised host, conduct maintenance, or after the VM has been restarted.
Some providers place all the VMs that belong to a client in the same host to re-
duce the cost of communication between them. Moreover, some consumers require
co-residency, especially in businesses where millisecond delays in communication
make a difference. Offering a co-residency option to consumers increases the pos-
sibility of a CIDoS attack because it performs the co-residency and co-residency
check steps on behalf of the attackers.
The last suggested prevention solution is creating a black list to block suspicious
accounts and use more reliable ways to identify the true identities of these accounts
using techniques similar to the ones used in online payment security.
5.4.2.2 Detection
The applied detection methods have the following goals:
• detect the attack as early as possible before it is completely formed,
• distinguish between legitimate and malicious changes in workload,
• generate a sufficiently strong anomaly signal, and
• maintain a low detection cost in terms of time and complexity to be able to
work on the fly.
The main novel mechanism developed in this research, to detect the attack as
early as possible, is based on workload signals correlation. Different parameters
can be used to measure the workload. The parameter we choose here is CPU util-
isation (for simplicity). However, combining other parameters might improve the
detection. In reality, the choice of parameters depends heavily on the attack mech-
anism. If the attacker stresses the CPU, then obviously monitoring the CPU util-
isation will detect the attack, but with different circumstances, other parameters
should also be considered.
11This strategy is used by Amazon EC2.
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Although there is a leader in this attack, finding the leader is not essential. Any
participating VM can be considered as the leader, because the correlation will be
among all of the participants.
Data collection:
We collect the workload signals of co-resident VMs; these VMs might be a col-
lection of normal and malicious VMs. In a large-scale public cloud, it is highly
probable that, first, each of these VMs belongs to a different client and second,
there is no communication between them internally. For these reasons, each VM is
expected to generate a unique workload pattern that is uncorrelated to the work-
loads of other VMs. However, in environments where co-residency is a choice of
the client, a correlation between the signals of related VMs might exist. This cor-
relation depends on the type of VMs and the services they provide. However, we
assume here that the cloud provider will be aware of this correlation (i.e. from the
contract) and the nature of these VMs is also known to the provider.
After collecting workload signals, the next step is processing them to reduce
noise and increase accuracy. We only considered data that might indicate the attack
to improve the performance and reduce the cost. We only considered strong work-
load signals (high amplitude). Signals below a specific threshold were ignored and
replaced by zeroes. This threshold is a fixed arbitrary threshold that can be chosen
by experiment.
To verify the validity of the suggested detection techniques, we created syn-
thetic workload signals based on our understanding of the attack and the following
assumptions:
• the workload pattern of each VM differs randomly from other VMs unless
abnormal, and
• each VM has a stable workload pattern that is not random, because in the real-
world, servers usually have stable workload patterns (they perform the same
series of tasks repeatedly) and this is the main idea behind regular anomaly-
based HIDS.
We used a random factor to build each VM workload pattern based on the data
for scenarios 1 and 2. We also used another two random factors to choose where
to make the peaks (around the centre) and the strength (amplitude) of these peaks.
These random factors were only applied to the scenario 1 data.
Only short samples were created because the attack is designed to be fast and
target only the next short interval of time to avoid VMs migration and a host work-
load pattern change.
We have two noise sources to deal with; the first is faulty malicious VMs (out-
side the leader controlled suspicious VMs), which might cause a false negative
alarm. Faulty malicious VMs are not a problem because if the number of partici-
pating VMs is high (scenario 1), the attack can still be formed and detected without
the faulty VMs. If the number of faulty VMs is high too, in this case the attack will
fail (as accurate timing is essential for this attack to succeed); therefore, this also not
a problem.
The second noise source is innocent VMs that have weird behaviours. In real-
ity, these VMs should be detected and diagnosed using a regular host-based IDS;
furthermore, they are not harming our results because it is highly unlikely that
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their random behaviours will match the leader’s plan and generate a false positive
alarm.
We used a sliding window to accelerate the detection and accuracy, as in [151].
The required number of VMs to build the attack is m. In the real-world, the m
value is based on the physical host server specifications. The stronger the server,
the more VMs are required to perform the attack. For our experiment, we chose m
= 6.
Detecting scenario 1 - pattern random sampling:
This scenario is hard to detect because a large number of VMs are participating
in the attack (far more than required). Therefore, they can avoid changing the be-
haviour suddenly, which might be detected by regular behaviour monitoring tools,
i.e. HIDS. Each participating VM can change its workload gradually to reach the
targeted workload pattern, while maintaining a harmony with its old workload
pattern. In this scenario, VMs also can afford a degree of randomness by deciding
where and how much their peaks are, but they should be around the centre of the
peaks in the distributed plan. Since all the VMs are following the same plan, they
change their workload patterns to be close to each other. Therefore, we assume that
there will be a correlation between their workload patterns, and that this correla-
tion will increase over time until the attack has been completely formed, and the
sum of the workloads break the severity-threshold Ts. The detection mechanism is
based on this correlation.
For the early detection of the attack, a signal processing technique is used to
map the time domain to the frequency domain and then calculate the correlations
(data transformation for statistical analysis). Any suitable Fourier transform tech-
nique can be used; we use the one-dimensional discrete cosine transform (DCT)
because it is simple to apply and has low complexity (N2) multiplications [23].
DCT calculates the sum of the cosine function for sequential data points with dif-
ferent frequencies; in comparison to the sine function, the use of the cosine func-
tion is more efficient for performing the required tasks because fewer data points
are needed to represent the signal [114]. We applied the DCT, and then used hy-
pothesis testing based on a threshold to decide whether or not VMs were acting
suspiciously. High correlation coefficients between VM workloads that increase
over time are a strong sign of a CIDoS attack.
In our experiment, we compared the correlation coefficients between the signals
of six malicious VMs with two innocent normally behaved ones. Thus, we had
eight samples in total, S = 8, S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, and S6 (the malicious signals) and S7
and S8 (the innocent signals).
The number of points extracted from each signal was n. In our experiment,
we chose n = 300 (the n value is chosen based on the length of the signal and the
acceleration of the frequencies in a way that allows us to cache the characteristics
of this signal).
We ignored all the relatively weak amplitudes (under a specific threshold) be-
cause they have no meaning in our attack. We only considered the strong ampli-
tudes and it was not important exactly how strong they were because the strength
of each VM was decided locally and was random. Therefore, we represented the
amplitudes over a specific threshold as 1s and below the threshold as 0s. The choice
of the threshold was made based on the required balance between false positive and
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false negative errors. We called this threshold ts1.
We created a relatively short signal for each VM following the previous assump-
tions and then represented it using n points. The threshold ts1 was used to decide
which amplitude should we considered, and it was equal to 50% of the maximum
available strength in our experiment. Then, we applied the DCT to each sample to
linearly transform the signals into the frequency domain. The DCT expressed each
signal in terms of a sum of cosine functions with different frequencies. The function
of the one-dimensional DCT coefficients is:
wk =
n−1∑
t=0
stcos
[
pi
n
(t+
1
2
)
]
, k = 0, ..., n− 1 [103]
ck =
{
1√
2
k = 0
1 k > 0
, k = 0, ..., n− 1 [103]
DCT coefficients =
√
2
n ∗ ck ∗ wk [103]
A set of coefficients were calculated from each sample, and then the sum of
these coefficients was calculated and used to represent its sample. It was also used
to measure the correlation between VM workloads; high correlation indicated the
suspicion of a CIDoS attack. The generated abnormality signal had to be strong
enough, and we used hypothesis testing to determine whether or not the signal
was strong enough. If the difference between the sum of coefficients of a sample
and the sum of coefficients of another sample was less than a specific threshold,
and it decreased over time, an alarm was raised for a CIDoS attack to detect the
attack as early as possible.
In our experiment, the final sums of the coefficients for S were as follows: S1 =
8.04, S2 = 7.74, S3 = 8.07, S4 = 8.42, S5 = 7.05, S6 = 8.62, S7 = 12.08, and S8 = 10.94.
Hypothesis testing:
The problem of deciding whether the generated anomaly signal was strong
enough or not can be formulated in terms of hypothesis testing as follows:
1. The null hypothesis: H0 : Q1 −Q2 > 1
H1 : Q1 −Q2 <= 1 (one sided hypothesis)
Q1 is difference in coefficients for normal samples and Q2 is difference in
coefficients for malicious samples.
2. Assume H0 is true
3. Difference in coefficients for VMs workloads follows approximately normal
distribution.
4. Level of significance α = 0.001 (99.9% confidence level)
5. Find Z scores: Zα = Z0.001 = −3.09
6. Find the region of rejection RR which is a set of values less than or equal to
α : (RR <= −3.09)
7. Collect samples
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Table 5.2: Statistics calculated from the samples.
Normal Malicious
N1 = 2 N2 = 6
µ1 = 3.477384 µ2 = 0.455994
8. Extract difference in coefficients for signals and calculate some statistics shown
in table 5.2.
SD =
√
σ21
N1
+
σ22
N2
= 0.590617176
∆ = 1 (the value in the null hypothesis)
µ = µ2 − µ1 = −3.02139 the new centre
ME = Zα ∗ SD = Z0.001 ∗ SD = −1.825007075
Range: -4.846397075 to -1.196382925
Z = µ−∆SD = −6.808792837
9. Draw a conclusion: the test statistics Z = -6.808792837 is not in the RR so we
retain the null hypothesis.
In the previous testing, we only covered measuring the coefficients at a partic-
ular point of time. However, we can use a technique similar to a sliding window
and continuously or periodically measure the coefficients. Then, if the differences
decrease over time, this is another sign of abnormality and a strong indicator that
these VMs are following a plan and not behaving innocently. We cover the idea
of detecting a correlation that increases over time in the detection method used for
scenario 2.
Detecting scenario 2 - spread spectrum attack distribution:
In this scenario, malicious VMs adjust their workload to reach the required
amount of workload at the same moment to stress the resource and trigger migra-
tion. To avoid detection, VMs try to approach each other gradually by persistently
adjusting their workload signals to match the detailed plan that is designed and
distributed by the leader. To detect the attack, we calculated the Euclidean distance
between the normalised signals of all the VMs and the leader [127]. We found that
the calculated distances varied enough to distinguish between normal and mali-
cious VMs. The distances between malicious signals were low (in comparison with
normal signals), and they decreased over time. Other techniques can be used to
measure signal correlation, but the chosen technique should have low complexity
and be able to perform on the fly.
If the distance rate between the leader’s workload signal and those of the other
VMs decreases over time for a number of VMs simultaneously, an alert should be
raised. Two thresholds are needed, TD2 and TD3. TD2 is the threshold to decide
if the distance between the leader and other VMs is worrying or not; if the dis-
tance is below TD2, a suspicious case should be registered and monitoring should
continue. TD3 is the threshold to decide the maximum acceptable number of sus-
picious cases. If the number of cases is over TD3, this means there is a relatively
large number of VMs that are trying to adjust their behaviour to match each other.
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Therefore, there is a suspicion of an attack, and an alert should be raised. We wrote
an algorithm to apply the previous steps and detect the attack, see algorithm 5.2.
ts1 is the threshold used to decide which amplitude we are considering (we
ignored weak amplitudes).
Algorithm 5.2: Early Detection Algorithm for CIDoS Attack, Scenario 2.
Require: A set S of m signals and each signal contain n items, S = {{x00, x01, , x0n}, {x10, x11, , x1n}, , {xn0,
xm1, , xmn}} and thresholds ts1, TD2, and TD3
1: for each xij , 0 ≤ i ≤m do
2: for each 0 ≤ j ≤ n do
3: if xij < ts1 then
4: xij = 0
5: end if
6: end for
7: Calculate µ and σ of xi
8: Normalise xi to x̂i
9: end for
10: Chose one of the VMs to be considered as the leader x̂k
11: for each x̂ij where 0 ≤ i ≤m do
12: for each x̂ij where 0 ≤ j ≤ n do
13: x̂ij = x̂ij - x̂kj
14: Distance D = D + ‖x̂ij‖
15: end for
16: if D < TD2 then
17: Count C = C + 1
18: end if
19: D = 0
20: end for
21: if C > TD3 then
22: Alert
23: end if
The values of TD2 and TD3 can be specified depending on the environment
parameters such as the capacity of the host and VM size.
Brute Force scenario:
A sudden simultaneous increase in the consumption of VMs could indicate an
attack, but it may also be a simple normal peak in activities. It is therefore of great
importance to know the cause of the increase, which could be obtained from differ-
ent sources such as the VM owners (the clients) and/or information obtained from
the VMs’ old behaviour (history). Monitoring the VMs’ behaviour before and after
the increase helps to distinguish between normal and malicious sudden increase
in consumption. Typically in the CIDoS class of attacks, malicious VMs maintain a
very low consumption rate to provide space for newcomers and thus achieve co-
residency. Their consumption does not increase until there is a sufficient number
of malicious VMs to trigger the attack. The sudden increase in consumption can be
detected using a simple statistical analysis.
Results and discussion for detection strategies:
In both scenarios, the detection is based on the same idea, which is measur-
ing the correlation between signals. If the correlation is higher than normal and
it keeps increasing over time, this is a strong indication of a CIDoS attack. In our
experiment, we found that the distances between malicious signals are low in com-
parison with the distance between normal ones. Some normal VMs might coinci-
dentally have high correlation with malicious VMs in some points. However, the
correlation between malicious VMs has to decrease over time because they are coor-
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dinating to match the distributed pattern, and normal VMs will not follow the same
pattern. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the coincident correlation between nor-
mal and malicious VMs will last for the whole test and cause a false alarm.
Ignoring weak amplitudes by representing them using zeroes and strong am-
plitudes using ones makes it possible to reduce the detection time and complexity
of operations. In addition, the Euclidean distance and one-dimensional DCT are
very simple and straightforward methods. Applying simple methods is essential
to run the detection on the fly and detect the attack in time before it is completely
formed.
5.4.2.3 Response
In the case of a widely spread CIDoS attack, if the provider network is seriously
infected, one of the suggested responses is temporarily disabling migration. Dis-
abling migration stops the consumption of resources and gives cloud administra-
tors the chance to deal with the attack without a serious service disruption. It is
also important to alert other hosts and/or the central distributed intrusion detec-
tion system (DDIS) to be aware of the attack, and monitor and block (if needed)
suspected VMs.
We can also respond to the attack by targeting the timing. Some of the sus-
picions VMs can be suspended for milliseconds, which is enough to disturb the
timing of the attack. However, providers have to make sure that this action does
not violate the service level agreement, SLA, with the clients or affect the integrity
of their data.
Another possible response action is distributing suspected VMs to different
hosts, which forces a restart of the attack. The problem with this solution is that
if the attack is spread through inter-VM infection, it will be distributed rather than
quarantined, and this will increase the damage. Another useful technique is isolat-
ing one of the suspected VMs and monitoring its behaviour. If the behaviour has
changed after isolation, or the VM has been terminated, that is another suspicious
sign and the defender in this case might block all the VMs with correlated work-
load patterns. It is also important to block any discovered communication channels
used by the attackers, i.e. covert channels.
5.5 Dynamic Parameter Reconnaissance for CIDoS Class of
Attacks
In CIDoS, m co-resident VMs increase their workloads to reach thresholds (time
and strength) and trigger migration. These thresholds were assumed to be known
to the attackers, while in reality they are hidden and discovering them requires
designing a new attack, which is described in this section.
We designed a series of attacks to reveal some of the cloud parameters that are
used by migration algorithms. We also designed a formal model for the migration
decision process and then created a dynamic algorithm to extract the required pa-
rameters. The mechanisms to extract these thresholds were adapted to dynamic
changes in cloud algorithms. Revealing parameters is hence a security threat in
itself, and they can be used by malicious VMs to accurately generate the needed
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workload to continuously trigger migration, resulting in thrashing. It is vital that
the generated workload is no more than required to avoid detection and make the
attack live longer. Furthermore, attackers may also use the revealed parameters to
avoid being migrated.
The attack proposed in this section is a stealthy randomising testing strategy
to learn the thresholds that are used in the process of making migration decisions
(reverse engineer migration algorithms). We performed a series of attacks (called
tests) to reveal these thresholds; these tests were based on CIDoS, together with a
statistical analysis. The attack proposed in this section is still theoretical, and we
will verify it in future work.
For simplicity, we assume that cloud hosts are homogeneous (having the same
specifications). However, if this is not the case, the attack still works but instead of
discovering the host specifications only once for the whole cloud, attackers should
perform this task once per host.
5.5.1 Migration Algorithms Literature
The success of the CIDoS class of attacks is based on the understanding of the al-
gorithms used to manage the migration process in the cloud. One of the main
challenges we faced was the fact that the migration policies and algorithms used
by today’s cloud providers are not publicly revealed. However, many research
studies discuss these policies and algorithms.
VM migration is the process of transferring a whole VM from one host to an-
other [16] for various reasons, which are as follows:
• to save energy and thus reduce cost by evacuating low utilised hosts and then
turning them off or putting them in sleep mode [32],
• for fault tolerance when dealing with faulty or malicious VMs or for mainte-
nance reasons, and
• to reduce the load in an over-utilised host to avoid SLA violations [32].
To allow migration, cloud providers have to deal with many challenges in se-
curity and performance. These challenges include the following:
• minimising the migration time to avoid consuming the network, which might
cause a lack of response and thus an SLA violation, as discussed in [20]. Fur-
thermore, in [168], researchers found that because of live migration (which is
considered to be the default feature in today’s virtualisation community, as
stated in [16]), application performance was degraded by 10% (the percent
varies depending on the application nature) [168], and
• protecting the VM being migrated from data loss or security breaches.
Thus, VMs migration has a high cost and should be used with caution.
Migration mechanisms:
Node management machines are responsible for managing migration, includ-
ing the issuing of migration orders based on a number of parameters and policies
such as utilisation and/or power-consumption policies [20], [32], and [144]. Status
reports have to be collected from each host periodically to show its general status
and the status of its tenants [20]. The data from these reports are the inputs for
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a collection of migration algorithms. There are many different policies and algo-
rithms used in the cloud; we will discuss some of the most popular ones. However,
this is not an inclusive list.
These algorithms include the following:
• migration decision algorithms:
– overload detection algorithm [16], [32], and [20].
– power saving algorithm [144].
• VM selection algorithm [16] and [175].
• VM placement algorithm [20] and [54].
In [32], researchers focused on reducing the cost and carbon footprint by reduc-
ing the energy consumption. They designed an architectural framework and prin-
cipals to accomplish this task. Furthermore, policies and algorithms were proposed
for resources allocation that aimed at reducing the energy consumption while con-
sidering the SLA. For VM selection, the following policies were suggested: 1- mi-
grate the minimum number of VMs, 2- migrate the least used VMs and 3- choose
the VM to be migrated randomly (using a uniformly distributed random variable).
A best fit decreasing algorithm with modification was used to allocate VMs with
upper and lower utilisation thresholds.
In [144], Sammy et al. concentrated on reducing the power consumption by
declaring very low-utilised servers to be retirement servers, which means they should
be turned off soon to save power. Therefore, retirement servers should not accept any
new tenants but should wait for the current tenants to shut-down or be migrated
if they exceed a threshold called the retirement threshold. The algorithm used to
accomplish this task was dynamic round-robin.
Beloglazov et al., in [20], proposed algorithms based on dynamic measurements
generated by statistically analysing historical data. Four methods were proposed to
detect overloaded hosts: the median absolute deviation (which specifies the value
of upper utilisation based on the CPU utilisation deviation strength), interquartile
range, local regression, and robust local regression. For VM selection, three po-
lices were suggested: migrating VMs with the minimum migration time calculated
based on the memory usage and NT bandwidth, random selection based on a uni-
formly distributed discrete random variable, and migrating VMs with the highest
CPU utilisation correlation with other VMs calculated using multiple correlation
coefficients.
For the detection of under-loaded hosts (power saving algorithms), Beloglazov
et al. suggested finding the host with the minimum utilisation and evacuating it
without over-utilising any other host in the cloud.
For the VM placement problem, researchers suggested sorting VMs based on
their CPU utilisations and then allocating them to hosts that provide the minimum
cost in terms of power consumption. They used the best fit decreasing algorithm
with a modification.
Another study, [16], also used dynamic utilisation thresholds to detect over-
loaded hosts. The dynamic thresholds were calculated based on the workload
history (statistical analysis). Bala et al. measured the statistical dispersion using
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the median absolute deviation. For VM selection, the multipath correlation coeffi-
cient was used to describe the relationship between measurements. These measure-
ments were grouped in different levels, where each level affected the subsequent
ones. The machine with the minimum expected workload and that had the least
influence on others was migrated (VMs with zero inter-correlation factors could be
migrated). This policy reduced the migration time and the number of migrations
needed.
Researchers in [46] proposed prediction algorithms for short term prediction to
detect an overload before it occurs to avoid an SLA violation. They also proposed
long term prediction to be used in managing resources in the cloud. For short term
prediction multivariate linear regression based on the CPU utilisation was used.
Overload detection algorithm:
The upper utilisation threshold can be set to decide whether or not the host is
overloaded. However, as stated in [20], ”fixed utilization thresholds are not effi-
cient for IaaS environments with mixed workloads that exhibit nonstationary re-
source usage patterns;” they suggested dynamic thresholds. Prediction algorithms
are also needed to create these dynamic thresholds and predict an overload before
it occurs [16]. Different techniques are used for prediction, such as statistical anal-
ysis or machines learning algorithms [20].
Power saving algorithms:
Power saving algorithms are responsible for detecting hosts with low utilisa-
tion. Fixed and dynamic thresholds can also be used here, as in [144] and [16].
VM selection algorithm:
Many policies are used for VM selection algorithms, such as migrating the min-
imum number of VMs [32], migrating the least active VMs [32], migrating VMs
randomly [20] and [32], or migrating the VM with the highest correlation (max-
imum correlation policy) [20] and [149].12 Discovering the policy used can help
reveal the required parameters and improve the CIDoS attack, as shown in section
5.5.
Placement algorithm:
The new location can be chosen based on different factors; the most popular
ones are the power consumption factor (to reduce it) [32] and utilisation factor (i.e.
the minimum utilised host). Many algorithms were suggested in [20], [32], [175],
and [54].
5.5.2 Estimating Cloud Migration Parameters
Attackers aim to extract some of the main parameters used by migration algorithms
and use them to build more efficient, harder to detect, and more robust DoS attacks.
Because of the power saving policy, the number of running hosts is dynamic and,
as a consequence, the used thresholds should be dynamic, and the process of ex-
tracting parameters has to be dynamic too. Furthermore, we need to discover these
parameters as fast as possible because of the dynamicity of the environment. We
need to do the following:
12The Maximum Correlation policy based on the assumption that the higher the correlation be-
tween the resource usage by applications running on an over-utilised host related to higher probabil-
ity of the host overloading [149].
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1. extract the required parameters,
2. measure the reliability of the extracted parameters and reduce the probability
of accidental errors,
3. consider the noise,
4. consider not changing the host behaviour heavily to avoid affecting the pre-
diction algorithms, and
5. measure the success of the attack.
We dealt with this problem as a regular statistical experiment.
Extracting the required parameters:
This task is accomplished by reverse engineer the algorithms that are responsi-
ble for making the migration decision. We start by designing a formal model of the
migration decision process.
Migration decision process:
We consider two migration policies, over-loaded host detection to prevent SLA
violations and under-loaded host detection to save energy.
The host management node collects status reports periodically from all the
hosts under its control. Data from these status reports and other data from the
environment are the inputs of the algorithms. Then, an algorithm runs to decide
whether the host under examination is currently over-loaded or predicted to be
over-loaded. The output of this algorithm is zero (if the host is not over-loaded) or
one (if the host is over-loaded and migration is needed).13 If the output is one, the
management node will run the VM selection algorithm to decide the best candidate
VMs for migration, and then VM placement algorithm to choose the best candidate
destination hosts for the VMs under migration. Lastly, VMs will be migrated either
online or offline.
The inputs of the over-loaded host detection algorithm are as follows:
• the general overall status of all the hosts in the same availability zone as the
host under examination,
• the specifications of the host under examination,
• the history of, current, and predicted CPU utilisations,
• the history of, current, and predicted memory utilisations,
• the history of, current, and predicted network traffic rates to and from the
host,
• possible errors,
• time, and
• hidden unknown variables.
We target large-scale public cloud providers. Therefore, the effects of a change
in the general overall status of hosts are not usually dramatic. Thus, it can be
considered to be constant and represented by a constant value in the migration
algorithms.14 We assumed that the hosts are homogeneous (same specifications).
Therefore, the effect of the host specifications can also be considered to be a constant
13The final migration decision has to be binary. However, the process for reaching this decision is
based on dynamic parameters and thresholds.
14The effect on the migration decision when the number, i.e. 10.000 hosts on or 10.003 hosts on, is
too low.
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and added to the constant value. The error is reduced by replicating the test many
times and then using hypothesis testing to decide whether to accept the revealed
parameters or not. For simplicity, we did not consider the memory utilisation and
NT traffic rate; we only considered the CPU utilisation.
There are many methods for CPU utilisation prediction, most of which are
based on the history of the host. A multivariate linear regression model (MLR)
can be used to perform the prediction, as in [46]. The CPU utilisation history is par-
titioned into intervals and analysed to measure ”how closely prediction matches
observed utilisation across the utilisation spectrum” [46].
The algorithm 5.3 is used for over-loaded host detection. The algorithm nota-
tions are as follows:
• xhistory, xcurrent, and xpredicted are the history, current, and prediction of CPU
utilisation consequently,
• xtime is the time,
• α is the constant value,
• upperU is the dynamic upper utilisation threshold:
f (α+β1xcurrent+β2xhistory+β3xtime),
• mig is a Boolean variable which is set to 1 if a migration required, and
• if the current CPU utilisation or the predicted CPU utilisation is over the
threshold upperU, migration is required. If xcurrent or xpredicted ≥ upperU
then mig =1.
Algorithm 5.3: Over-loaded Host Detection.
1: Input: α, xtime, xhistory , xcurrent, xpredicted Output: mig
2: mig = 0
3: upperU = UpperThreshold(α, xtime, xhistory , xcurrent)
4: if xcurrent or xpredicted ≥ upperU then
5: mig = 1
6: end if
7: Return mig
Algorithm 5.4 on the next page is for under-loaded host detection. The algo-
rithm notations are:
• xhistory and xcurrent are the history and current of CPU utilisation consequently,
• xtime is the time,
• α is the constant value,
• VMsNumbers is the number of tenants in the host under examination,
• lowerU is the dynamic lower utilisation threshold:
f (α+β1xcurrent+β2xhistory+β3xtime),
• mig is a Boolean variable which is set to 1 if the host is under-loaded and
all VMs in that host can be migrated without causing over-utilisation to any
other host, and
• if the current CPU utilisation is lower than the threshold lowerU, the host is
under-utilised and need to be evacuated (if possible) then turn it off to save
energy.
Cloud migration parameter estimation:
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Algorithm 5.4: Under-loaded Host Detection.
1: Input: α, xtime, xhistory , xcurrent, VMsNumbers Output: mig
2: mig = 0
3: lowerU = lowerThreshold(α, xtime, xhistory , xcurrent)
4: if xcurrent < lowerU then
5: if hostsAvailability(VMsNumbers) then
6: mig = 1
7: end if
8: end if
9: Return mig
We developed an algorithm to extract the parameters from the migration model,
see algorithm 5.5.
Algorithm 5.5: Dynamic attack permitting cloud migration hidden parameter
estimation.
1: Input: chunksList, Bprofilenormal Output: xcurrent, xtime
2: for chunk in chunksList do
3: wait()
4: CIDoS.run(chunk.xcurrent, chunk.xtime)
5: Bprofilecurrent = updateProfile ()
6: SuspicionValue = compare (Bprofilecurrent, Bprofilenormal)
7: if SuspicionValue > simThreshold then
8: successCounter = 0
9: for i = 0→ replicationNum do
10: xcurrent1 = increment xcurrent
11: wait()
12: Bprofilenormal = updateProfile()
13: CIDoS.run(chunk.xcurrent1, chunk.xtime)
14: Bprofilecurrent = updateProfile()
15: SuspicionValue = compare (Bprofilecurrent, Bprofilenormal)
16: if SuspicionValue < simThreshold then
17: successCounter = successCounter + 1
18: end if
19: end for
20: if successCounter ≥ successThreshold then
21: Return xcurrent, xtime
22: end if
23: end if
24: end for
First, the attack leader specifies the range of the test (the minimum and maxi-
mum CPU utilisation and time) that might cause migration (this is the test range).
Then, the leader designs a series of all possible test phases, portions them into
chunks, and gathers them into a list called chunksList. Each item in the list is
called chunk, and it has two variables, xcurrent and xtime. The inputs of the algo-
rithm are chunksList and Bprofilenormal, which is the profile of the host’s normal
behaviour before the attack. The algorithm then tests the chunks in the list one by
one until it finds the parameters that cause migration. CIDoS.run is a function with
two arguments (CPU utilisation and time) to run a phase of the CIDoS attack (the
whole attack that has been described in section 5.3). This function is responsible
for coordinating the resource consumption of malicious VMs to stress the host and
cause migration. It attacks using the time and strength passed to it in the variables
chunk.xcurrent and chunk.xtime.
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To be able to measure the success of the attack (do the tested parameters cause
migration or not?), we create normal behaviour profiles for the host workload pat-
tern before and after the test. To create a new behaviour profile (for after the attack),
we use the function updateProfile and calculate the distance between the old normal
behaviour profile and the new one using the function compare(profile1, profile2). The
function updateProfile is a regular anomaly-based IDS used to detect anomalies in
the workload pattern of the host, i.e. HMM-based IDS (more details are shown later
in the section). The behaviour profile is updated using fresh data (newly collected
data from the current workload). The result of the comparison between profiles is
contained in the variable SuspicionValue. If SuspicionValue is greater than the thresh-
old simThreshold, the host behaviour has changed (probably because of migration),
so initially accept the tested parameters and replicate the test replicationNum num-
ber of times to increase the reliability and reduce the effect of accidental errors.
successCounter is the number of successful replications. If it is greater than or equal
to the threshold successThreshold, then accept the tested parameters as reliable and
exit the algorithm. The function wait() is used to create a gap in time between test
phases to avoid affecting the prediction algorithms.
If a VM has been migrated in the middle of one of the tests for another non-
malicious reason, this will not affect the reliability of the test, it will be discovered
in the replications. As stated, replications are used to increase the reliability and de-
crease the effect of accidental errors. The attacker needs m malicious VMs to attack
with, where the value of m can be calculated based on the host specifications. With
a stronger host (high specifications), more malicious VMs are needed to attack.
The time complexity of the algorithm depends on how many tests are needed,
the size of the gap between tests, and how many replicates should we make to
have acceptable reliability. A smaller test range means fewer tests are needed. Fur-
thermore, if we distribute the tests between different hosts, we can perform them
in parallel, and the gap in time will be less, or there will be no need for a gap.
However, the communication between attackers through the network increases the
possibility of being caught by a NIDS.
How to check migration:
The leader checks for migration (measures the success of the attack) by building
a normal behaviour profile for the host workload and re-examines the workload af-
ter each phase of the test. If there is a deviation in the workload (anomaly detected
in terms of the HIDS), it is highly probable that a migration has occurred. If there is
no deviation (no anomaly detected), the current test phase has failed, and another
phase should be performed using different xcurrent or xtime values.
How to build normal profiles:
We assumed in the threat model that the attack leader can monitor the host
workload [19] and [139], and can create a normal behaviour profile for the host
(host-based anomaly detection system). The host-based anomaly detection system
detects any change in the host’s behaviour.15 We first have to build a detection sys-
tem; different algorithms can be used to build the system, some of which are based
on machine learning techniques such as the hidden Markov model and others are
based on statistical learning techniques such as regression [41]. These algorithms
15The degree of sensitivity of the anomaly detection system (detection rate) depends on the thresh-
old values (how much change in behaviour is accepted).
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are used to model the workload of the host (create the normal behaviour profile
of the host workload). To obtain the required data for building the model, the at-
tack leader can gather observations from the host, for example by calculating the
host’s response time or using a side channel to collect data. Then, the host’s normal
behaviour profile can be used to detect any deviations from the normal workload
pattern.
The attack leader calculates the SuspicionValue by comparing the registered nor-
mal profile to the current profile. To compare the two profiles, we calculate the
distance between them using techniques such as the Kullback Leibler distance met-
ric. If that value of SuspicionValue is high, an alert for an anomaly should be raised
(possible migration). To decide whether or not SuspicionValue is high, the leader
has to specify another threshold, simThreshold. This threshold is calculated based
on the available resources for the attack and the degree of assurance needed by the
attackers.
If there is an anomaly (the host workload pattern has changed significantly),
which might be an indication of a migration; and this is how we check for migra-
tion. We also have to consider the noise; a migration might occur for another nor-
mal reason (not because of an attack). Furthermore, the workload might change for
another reason, rather than migration, which might affect the reliability of the test
and the revealed parameters. To increase the reliability we use Experiment Replica-
tion (in statistical terms), which reduces the effect of the noises generated by errors.
Interactive hypothesis testing by the attacker:
We replicate the experiment numerous times to obtain statistically significant
results. The attack leader has to do the following:
• specify the number of replications needed, replicationNum,
• specify the acceptable level of reliability, successThreshold,
• count the number of successful replications, successCounter, and then
• run an interactive statistical hypothesis testing algorithm to decide whether
or not to accept and distribute the tested values of xcurrent and xtime as reli-
able.
The attack leader can form the hypothesis testing in many different ways, for
example:
1. The null hypothesis H0: SuspicionValue = 0
H1: SuspicionValue 6= 0 (one sided hypothesis)
The SuspicionValue variable is equal to zero if there is no change in the host
behaviour (no migration) and is equal to one if there is a change in the host
behaviour (possible migration).
2. Assume H0 is true.
3. The null hypothesis distribution is computed by the number of permutations,
which is equal to replicationNum (it should be replicationNum+1, but because
successCounter ≥ 1, there will be at least one successful experiment).
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4. Specify the significant level α.
The values of the signification level is calculated based on the costs of com-
mitting a type I error (accepting and distributing inaccurate xcurrent and xtime)
and a type II error (rejecting an accurate xcurrent and xtime). The attack leader
can calculate the cost depending on different factors such as the available re-
sources.
5. The leader calculates the successThreshold based on α.
6. Compute the t-test statistic.
7. Then a decision rule is formed based on the threshold to decide whether to
reject H0 (accept the tested values as reliable thus distribute them and use
them for attacking) or to not reject H0 (not accept the tested values and go to
the next test phase).
8. Collect samples by running the experiment replicationNum a number of times
(experiment replications) and count the number of successes and number of
failures.
9. Draw a conclusion whether to reject or not reject the null hypothesis, H0.
Although the test is replicated numerous times to obtain statistically significant
results, there is still a possibility for type I and II errors. A type I error is rejecting a
true null hypothesis. However, after the rejection, the leader will try higher xcurrent
and xtime values, which will trigger the attack using slightly higher than required
values. In a type II error, which is accepting a false null hypothesis, the attacker
might attack using insufficient time and strength (CPU utilisation). This might
cause the attack to fail and cloud increase the possibility of being caught by security
defences in the cloud. Therefore, when selecting the successThreshold value, the
leader should consider the available security defences and balance the two errors.
Attacking the cloud using the revealed parameters:
After accepting the values of xcurrent and xtime, the attack leader in the host can
form a CIDoS attack based on these values. The value of Ts (the severity-threshold
to be broken by the attackers) is xcurrent, and the duration of the attack is xtime.
As described in section 5.3, in scenario 1 of the CIDoS attack, the leader broadcasts
the value of Ts, whereas in scenario 2, the leader distributes the units that each
malicious VM has to cover, and these units are calculated by the leader depending
on the value of Ts.
Without accurately knowing the migration parameters, attackers have to in-
crease the workload to put the host in an over-utilised state. By using relatively ac-
curate parameters, attackers can trigger migration without over-utilising the host
by making the cloud management algorithms predict that the host will be in an
over-utilised state, which causes it to migrate some of the VMs to avoid future SLA
violations. Thus, the current workload will not break the thresholds, but the pre-
dicted workload will. This will make the attack harder to detect, and attackers will
need less resources for the attack. Moreover, the parameters can be broadcast to all
the CIDoS VMs, even in other hosts. This will significantly increase the damage,
130
5. ATTACKS IN IAAS CLOUD
especially because migration policies are usually the same in all the availability
zones, and we assumed that all the hosts were homogeneous.
In addition, by having a predicted workload that is not over the threshold but
is very close to it (because the used parameters are relatively accurate), the cloud
might migrate only one VM from the host (rather than a large number of VMs, which
would be the case if the workload was far over the threshold). Migrating one VM
increases the lifetime of the attack because the participating VMs can increase their
workloads to cover the loss of one VM and continue with the attack. This is espe-
cially valid in scenario 1, where large number of malicious VMs are available. The
attackers can keep covering the loss gradually until there are not enough malicious
VMs to attack with or there are no other non-malicious VMs in the host. The leader
can determine that there are no other non-malicious VMs in the host if, for a series
of migrations, only malicious VMs are being migrated. The leader can also deter-
mine this if the only existing host workload is the collection of the workloads of
the malicious VMs. If the leader finds that this host is only occupied by malicious
VMs, he/she can either reduce the workload to the minimum to allow new arrivals
or terminate most of the malicious VMs to activate the policy of save energy by mi-
grating all the VMs in that host and then turning it off, which causes greater damage
than regular migration. This will consume the cloud resources and cause the cloud
management machine to make decisions based on false reasons. Moreover, caus-
ing a migration of only one VM will also make the attack harder to detect because
migrating a large number of VMs at the same time might raise suspicion and lead
to further investigations.
5.5.3 Analysis and Discussion
Finding the values of xcurrent and xtime, or any other hidden parameters, that are
used by cloud management algorithms is a security threat by itself, especially con-
sidering that it is highly probable that these parameters are used everywhere in the
cloud and are part of its underlying structure, which is relatively consistent. By
using accurate parameters, the attack will live longer and become harder to detect.
For simplicity, we only considered CPU utilisation. However, by adding memory
utilisation and network traffic, the attack will be stronger and even harder to detect.
A change in the VM workload during the attack might be detected by a sensi-
tive anomaly-based HIDS; however, a sensitive HIDS generates a large number of
false negative errors, which increases the noise and decreases the value of alerts.
The attack can be detected reliably by being aware of its technique and calculat-
ing the correlation between the workload patterns of VMs, which requires complex
calculations and communication, and thus has a high cost.
If there is coordination among hosts (rather than a single host) to form the
CIDoS attacks, cloud management machines will make a series of false resource
consuming decisions, which might saturate the network. The cloud management
machine might also start turning on more hosts to cope with the fake increase in
demand or turning off hosts.
Moreover, if the attacker discovers the VM selection algorithm, he/she can
avoid being migrated by, for instance, intensely using the memory, which will in-
crease the cost of migrating the attacker VM and thus prevent being selected by
the VM selection algorithm for migration. This is just an example; how to escape
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migration depends on the selection algorithm used. However, the number of used
algorithms is relatively small, which eases the attacker’s task of discovering them.
By avoiding migration, the attack will live longer because the group of malicious
VMs that form the attack will stay together for a longer period of time and con-
stantly attack the same host.
5.6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we proposed a class of denial of service attacks, called Cloud-
Internal DoS attacks, which are architecture-based. This class of attacks is designed
to work specifically in large-scale public IaaS cloud environments. It misuses the
’migration’ and ’over-commitment’ features of the cloud. The attack is actualised
by a novel protocol based on group key agreement (JKT protocol [86]) to establish a
session key, PDV (to synchronise time), PCM (to digitised workload patterns), and
leader election protocol (to choose the leader of the attack). The attack pattern is
calculated and distributed using spread spectrum techniques. This attack, as with
many cloud attacks, require co-residency and covert channels for communication.
The protocol has a very low complexity O(n + T ) for the key agreement protocol
and needs to send a very small stream of data (less than 100 bits in our example).
In the design of the protocol, we considered defending against different forms
of man-in-the-middle attacks, i.e. replay attacks. Therefore, the protocol provides
authentication and allows only members of the attack to participate in an active
manner. The protocol is also portable and independent of the technical details of
the environment.
Then, we suggested and tested methods for detecting different scenarios for the
CIDoS class of attacks. We used the one-dimensional DCT and Euclidean distance
to measure the correlation between the workload patterns of participating mali-
cious VMs. The suggested methods successfully detected the attack and generated
strong anomaly signals. We developed an algorithm to measure the correlation be-
tween workload patterns and check whether the correlation is increasing over time,
which is a strong sign of the attack.
After that, we extended the CIDoS attack by performing a series of attacks to
discover the migration thresholds and parameters. We proposed a technique to re-
verse engineer the cloud migration algorithms, overload the detection algorithm
and save energy algorithm, and reveal hidden parameters and thresholds. Then,
these parameters were used to improve the CIDoS attack, making it more harmful
and harder to detect. We also designed a formal model for the migration deci-
sion process. Then, an algorithm was developed to extract the parameters from the
model. We used anomaly-based HIDS to measure the success of the attack. The reli-
ability of the extracted values was calculated using interactive statistical hypothesis
testing. These values can be used to attack the host and can also be distributed to
other malicious VMs in different hosts.
In future work, the attack can be scaled by coordination between hosts in the
cloud, not just within one host. There is also a need to investigate the mitigation
of the improved version of the attack. Furthermore, the next natural step for the
improved version of the attack is moving it from the theoretical to the practical and
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testing it in the lab. The area of avoiding migration, i.e. by intensifying the use of
memory, is also interesting and needs further investigation.
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Chapter 6
Summary, Conclusion, and Future
Work
Nicholas Carr, in his popular book ”The Big Switch”, [37], made a very interest-
ing comparison between computing power and electrical power in the early 20th
century. Electricity started with in-house electrical generators, in companies and
factories, and then moved to mass production for a power grid, which anyone can
tap into. Electricity moved from being a product (generators, etc.) to a service. Or-
ganisations moved from being buyers to consumers, where they pay for what they
use. Sharing has reduced cost. In addition, there is no longer a need for a team of
electrical engineers to maintain the service and run the generators. The same thing
is happening with computing power today; it is moving toward being a service, as
a pay-for-use model, with smaller and less expert IT teams and a lower cost due to
sharing, the selection of low-cost locations, and decreases in the cost of electricity,
network bandwidth, operations, and hardware. There will be less money wasted
and carbon emissions by increasing the utilisation of physical servers and other
computing power to the maximum 24 hours a day and 7 days a week. This is even
better than a fully equipped office rented by three organisations, where the day
is distributed among them with eight hours each, without affecting each other’s
data or possessions. They share the service and the cost. The main concern in this
model is security. What if the other organisation steals my data, or destroy them,
even accidentally? It is exactly the same with cloud computing.
A large-scale public IaaS cloud is the model most suitable to play this role,
and security is the main concern. To help cloud services reach their destinations,
we have to improve all aspects of security and provide security assurance to con-
sumers.
6.1 The Problem
One of the main problems facing the large-scale public IaaS cloud is monitoring
the areas where they have no control. This is the area inside consumers’ VMs.
Providers have the responsibility to secure these VMs, the cloud infrastructure,
and prevent any attack originating from their network, because it may impose li-
ability on them. For providers to fulfil their security responsibilities, they have to
have some form of control on these VMs activities. The isolation between VMs is
maintained by the hypervisor, but there is insufficient isolation, and many attacks
successfully break the isolation (i.e. VM escape, covert channels, and inter-VM
attacks). Much research has been conducted to improve the isolation; however,
the ground truth of sharing resources makes 100% isolation almost impossible.
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Providers can install monitoring tools inside the hosted VMs, which will give them
a clear vision and evaluation of the VMs’ security status; this is not recommended
for the following reasons:
1. It might increase the providers’ liability in relation to a VM’s illegal activities
or content (i.e. if there is defamation or infringement of copyright contents in
the consumers’ VMs and any other illegal activities).
2. It will affect the privacy of consumers.
3. It will slow the monitoring process because in a large-scale cloud there will be
hundreds of thousands of VMs (this is expected to be millions in the future),
and collecting detailed data from inside the VMs will generate an extremely
large amount of data to analyse and react to in real-time.
4. Cloud consumers are themselves organisations who are applying security
standards and regulations and sharing their data with users, who might be
restricted by regulations.
5. The cost model in the cloud is pay-for-use and generating extra activities in-
side VMs produced by the monitoring tools will increase the cost and cause
confusion in cost measurement because consumers will not accurately pay
only for what they used.
For these reasons, having no instrumentation within VMs, in addition to lim-
iting the level of intrusiveness introduced by providers, is highly recommended.
These are two main requirements for cloud security monitoring tools. In addition,
other requirements include automatically collecting and analysing data, and then
extracting information and reporting (when needed) without human intervention,
because manual interaction with data in such tense mixed environments as the
large-scale public cloud is not feasible. Second, the monitoring tool has to work
on the fly, instantly monitoring, detecting, and reporting. Third, the used moni-
toring tools have to cope with high volumes of data without falling over. A high
volume of data is a main characteristic of a large-scale public cloud, [148], [166]
and [71], due to the large number of VMs, which target to increase the utilisation
to the maximum. In addition, the VM’s lifecycle such as cloning, migration, and
snapshots for backups generates a large amount of data. Moreover, all the data and
commands to and from VMs travel long distances through the Internet; all graphi-
cal outputs, mouse clicks, and even keyboard keystrokes come from long distances,
which generate a greater data flow. A large amount of data requires tools that are
simple to avoid posing a great overhead. They must be distributed (to avoid cen-
tral monitoring), autonomous to be able to migrate with the corresponding VM,
and automated.
When designing a monitoring tool to work in the large-scale public cloud, we
have to assume that this tool will work in a hostile environment [138]. Almost
any organisation or individual, and possibly an attacker, who has a payment card
(i.e. credit card) can be a consumer. Furthermore, the process of renting the ser-
vice is automatic, without any human intervention from the provider side because
on-demand self-service is one of the essential characteristics of cloud computing, ac-
cording to NIST [122].
The monitoring tools also have to be tamper resistant so a malicious consumer
or an attacker cannot disable the monitoring tool or neutralise it. Furthermore, the
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monitoring tools must have enough generality to monitor a wide variety of VMs
[191]. Lastly, the tools have to be designed in a way that allows sharing security
information with consumers or third parties when needed [70].
In the cloud architecture and supporting technologies, new threats and vulner-
abilities have been created. Multi-tenancy is a great source of threat, especially in
a public cloud where the service is shared by different organisations and individu-
als. In addition, isolation insufficiency emphasizes the threat imposed by sharing
resources.
Another threat is that all administrative and critical commands and data in VMs
are coming from abroad, travelling long distances through the Internet. Therefore,
strong confidentiality mechanisms are required. Encryption can maintain the confi-
dentiality of data during transformation. However, there is no guarantee that data
are not being misused by cloud administrators, by, for example, revealing some
sensitive information using searching and indexing on encrypted data.
A cloud also suffers from other security problems such as VMs patch manage-
ment, the problem of infected images, the problem of trust, and the problem of lack
of interoperability and vendor lock-in, which were discussed briefly in the thesis.
There are more security challenges in the cloud introduced by some of the usage
paradigms such as ephemeral VMs. The use of ephemeral VMs are very popular in
the cloud; these are VMs that live for very short periods of time (i.e. an hour or two)
to perform a specific task and then terminate. This type of VM poses special secu-
rity requirements for monitoring tools. For example, the setup of the monitoring
tool has to be very quick and use only a small amount of data.
Three essential features of the large-scale public IaaS cloud make it more vul-
nerable to a denial of service attack (DoS), which are its openness, public multi-
tenancy, and on-demand elasticity. The large-scale public cloud service is offered
to the public through the Internet; therefore, malicious consumers can easily gain
access to the cloud to perform DoS attacks. Cloud consumes (that are a service
providers themselves in some models) are coming through long distances. Thus,
any block of the service to them or their consumers on the way to the cloud is
considered a DoS and might affect the reliability of the service.
Public multi-tenancy allows different clients to share the same physical host,
and in some cases, as proved in the literature, malicious clients penetrate and steal
data or resources from their innocent neighbours such as in a resource freeing at-
tack (RFA) [164]. On-demand elasticity can be misused to perform economic-loss
attacks, where innocent consumers are forced to pay more for fake reasons, i.e. the
economic denial of sustainability attack (EDoS), which is discussed in [77], [152],
and [167]. The goal of these attacks is financial gain, not disturbing the service.
The victim of this attack will either pay extra money for the service he/she has not
used or, if the victim has inactivated the automatic elasticity (to fix the cost), the
attack will turn into a regular DoS.
Previous threats and challenges emphasised the importance of monitoring VMs
to detect any malicious activities that threaten the infrastructure, other VMs, or the
outside world. Monitoring is also important to detect DoS and evaluate the cloud’s
overall security status. It is also essential to discover and improve weak security
controls and acknowledge malicious or security ignorant VMs in order to notify
them, isolate them, and/or terminate their contracts if there is enough legal support
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for termination.
Security monitoring is usually performed using intrusion detection systems
(IDS), network-based IDS (NIDS) and host-based IDS (HIDS). A NIDS and HIDS
are complimentary systems; a NIDS monitors the traffic, while an HIDS monitors
the activities inside hosts. There are many problems facing a NIDS in the cloud,
including the problem of monitoring and analysing encrypted traffic; and almost
all data in the cloud network are encrypted. There is also a common NIDS problem
when implemented in switched environments [102]. Switched environments will
not allow NIDS sensors to inspect all the traffic because switches work based on
connections, and the sensor will only receive packets addressed to it (unlike a hub
that echoes every packet). There is a problem with coping with a large amount of
data without being saturated, dropping packets, or failover [102]. Intrusions inside
hosts that are not related to the network are outside the NIDS view. Therefore, a VM
can be hijacked and start attacking the host without passing the NIDS’ sensors. The
communication between co-resident VMs is also outside of the NIDS view; there-
fore, inter-VM attacks and VM-escape attacks will not be discovered by a NIDS.
Monitoring hosts and VMs are tasks of an HIDS, which monitors all of the commu-
nication between VMs and the activities inside VMs. Cloud NIDS restrictions and
challenges emphasise the importance of using an HIDS in the cloud.
Because of the need for automation and minimum human intervention princi-
ples in the cloud, a signature-based HIDS is less suitable for monitoring hosts than
an anomaly-based HIDS. In addition, an anomaly-based HIDS is more capable of
detecting unknown attacks than a signature-based one. There are different types of
HIDS that work in the cloud:
1. one that monitors the host,
2. one that is installed inside a VM (by the client), and used to monitor the VM
from inside, and
3. one that is installed one the host (by the provider), and used to monitor VMs
from outside.
The first is a regular HIDS to monitor the host activities; however, it is usually
designed not to monitor a host with dynamic VMs (VMs that are continuously
created, suspended, and migrated). The second HIDS is also a regular HIDS under
the control of the client; therefore, the provider cannot use it as a source of data
and monitoring. If the provider is allowed to access it, that will be against the
requirements of monitoring tools in the large-scale public cloud, as stated before.
The third HIDS is also called a hypervisor-based HIDS and is a good candidate
to perform the required security monitoring because it is able to monitor hosted
VMs without accessing them. Furthermore, it is tamper resistant because of being
outside the monitored VMs.The main problem facing a hypervisor-based HIDS is
bridging the semantic gap, extracting useful security information from the low-level
data that is collected by monitoring VMs from outside only. The raw data must be
reconstructed to understand what is really happening inside VMs.
All of these security requirements, challenges, and threats were discussed in
detail throughout the thesis.
After showing the security problem and need in a large-scale public IaaS cloud,
we proposed our solutions.
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6.2 Proposed Solutions
For a hypervisor-based HIDS to work efficiently in the cloud, it has to conform to
the following requirements. First, it has to cope with a large volume of data. Sec-
ond, it has to work on the fly. It also has to avoid a single point of failure [95]. The
monitoring must not disturb the cloud service nor impose a large overhead. The
monitoring system has to be tamper resistant, so clients and attackers cannot dis-
able it. It has to be able to monitor all the VMs of different types and specifications.
The level of intrusiveness has to be the minimum without requiring any instrumen-
tation within VMs. The dynamicity of VMs must be considered i.e. it has to be able
to migrate with the corresponding VM. It should not require any prior knowledge
about VMs. It has to be flexible and not centralised. Furthermore, the detection
system should not require any human intervention to work effectively. The seman-
tic gap has to be considered. All these requirements are in addition to the regular
HIDS requirements, which are an acceptable overhead, a low false positive rate and
an acceptable detection rate.
By following these requirements, and supported with our understating of the
nature of a large-scale public IaaS cloud, we developed two hypervisor-based de-
tection systems in chapter 4.
The main assumption behind the proposed detection systems is that VMs are
limited in the used services and applications. This assumption is relative to regu-
lar servers that may aggregate multiple services on a single instance; regular best
practices for IaaS cloud services would argue against such mixed workloads being
deployed in a single VM for security and performance reasons. This assumption
leads us to assume that VMs have relatively consistent behaviour; and consistency
is essential to be able to build a normal behaviour profile that represents the moni-
tored VM accurately. Moreover, in general, servers usually tend to repeatedly per-
form the same series of tasks, which provides a sound data set for training. This
assumption drives us to a further assumption, in the IaaS cloud, any change in VM
behaviour should be treated as a sign of abnormality.
By monitoring the whole VM as a single process, we were able to extract use-
ful security information and detect anomalies. If the behaviour of the VM is not
consistent or there are a mixture of applications and services on it, it will be hard
to extract any useful security information, which will affect the efficiency of the
detection system.
We proposed the idea of monitoring the whole VM as single process in an IaaS
cloud environment. We successfully set a test environment, collected data, and
built a normal behaviour profile for the VM using two representation methods to
build two detection systems. One to monitor regular cloud VMs; while the other is
to monitor ephemeral VMs.
The representation method used in the first detection system was a bag of sys-
tem calls, which is very basic and less demanding representation method. The de-
tection system we designed successfully classified normal and abnormal sequences
of system calls and generated a strong anomaly signal. We found that a sequence
length of 10 provided the best detection efficiency and a reasonable cost, while 6
was the best if the detection time was critical.
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6.2.1 BoSC Hypervisor-based HIDS
The first proposed solution was a hypervisor-based HIDS built using bag of sys-
tem calls (BoSC) method from [93]. We choose BoSC because it has been proven
in the literature to provide a high accuracy and detection rate with low false pos-
itives and low computational demand. In BoSC, the order of the system calls is
ignored, and only the frequencies are considered. By ignoring the order of the sys-
tem calls, the classifier is built rapidly and can react on the fly. Furthermore, the
generated database (normal behaviour profile) has a very small size, which allows
it to migrate without imposing a high overhead.
We tested the new detection system in an experiment. We built an IaaS cloud
network in the lab with an acceptable setup for production environments. The
setup was built using Eucalyptus as the cloud management software, KVM as the
hypervisor, Ubuntu as the operating system, and the Tryton application as the ser-
vice provided by VMs. The Dogtail tool and Python were used to write the code
for automating the use of Tryton with a randomness factor, and the Strace tool was
used to collect system calls generated by the Tryton client VM and Tryton server
VM.
We collected about 60 h of normal data; however, we used the minimum pos-
sible to train the classifier. Then, for testing purposes, we ran malicious activities
inside the monitored VMs (activities to change the monitored VMs’ normal be-
haviour). We ran a stress test code and collected system calls to use them for testing
the classifier. We trained the classifier using normal data and tested it using normal
samples not involved in the training, along with malicious samples. To reduce the
overhead, increase the speed of training and detection, and reduce the size of the
generated database (the normal behaviour profile), we considered the used system
calls only, rather than all of the Linux system calls. We also covered the rarely used
system calls with a new item added to the list of used system calls called ’other’.
This trick significantly reduced the size of the databases without affecting the de-
tection accuracy.
To register system calls, we used the sliding window from [63]. We tested sizes
of 6, 10, and 20, and then compared their results to determine the effect of changing
the length. The classifier with a sequence length of 10 provided the best results,
with 100% accuracy, no false positives, and with an acceptable overhead (see table
6.1 for a comparison between different lengths results). A size of 6 was the best if we
needed a very fast detection system; while a size of 10 provided the best accuracy
and false positive rate, but with a slightly higher consumption of time than the
size of 6. A size of 20 was not efficient because its accuracy and false positive rate
were equal to those for a size of 10, but with a much higher computational time in
comparison with sizes of 6 and 10.
We tested whether the generated anomaly signal was strong enough using hy-
pothesis testing. The results proved that it was possible to build a normal be-
haviour profile for a whole VM via system call monitoring using the bag of system
calls representation method. We successfully created an identity, and a sense of self,
for the targeted VM. The used mechanism also successfully detected anomalies and
generated strong enough anomaly signals.
The training algorithm has linear complexity, which makes it fast enough to be
applied in real-time environments. The other algorithm is the detection algorithm,
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Table 6.1: BoSC-based classifier results for sequence lengths of 6, 10, and 20.
SIZE 6 SIZE 10 SIZE 20
Accuracy 98.36% 100.0% 100.0%
Detection Rate 100.00% 100.0% 100.0%
False Positive Rate 11.11% 0.00% 0.00%
Consumed Detection Time by
Units
32 324 2492
which is very simple and short, but the bottleneck is the database. The algorithm’s
speed is dependent on the chosen sequence length; with an increase in sequence
length, the consumed time increases significantly.
The used representation method is simple. Thus, it can deal with a large amount
of data. The system can monitor VMs with almost no intrusiveness and requires
no prior knowledge about the VMs. The detection system is separate from the
monitored VM. Therefore, it has high attack resistance. It can work on the fly due
to fast training, monitoring, and detection. It is also small and autonomous; thus, it
can be migrated with the corresponding VM. Lastly, it does not require any human
intervention, which is essential to be able to work in a large-scale cloud.
6.2.2 HMM Hypervisor-based HIDS for Ephemeral VMs
To monitor ephemeral VMs, we built another hypervisor-based detection system
using the hidden Markov model (HMM) method. We reduced the number of HMM
states, which are equal to the number of distinct system calls, to the minimum by
only considering the used system calls and used the ’other’ trick as in the previous
classifier. By reducing the states, the computational demand and overhead were
significantly reduced. We also tested this detection system in an experiment using
the same setup as the previous classifier. We divided the data into chunks, with
each chunk having 10 traces; if a chuck registered 4 mismatches, it was consid-
ered malicious. This trick reduced the detection time because in the experiment we
found that about 50% of the malicious chunks registered 10 out of 10 mismatches,
which meant the chuck was classified as malicious before the end of the analysis
(this could be in the middle of the analysis), and when 4 mismatches were detected,
the classifier stopped the analysis, raised and alert, and moved to the next chunk.
In the experiment, the size of a chunk was equal to 150 byte, and in 50% of the sam-
ples, the classifier was able to decide if a chunk was malicious or not by checking
only the first 75 byte of the chunk. Dividing traces into chunks helped to make the
classifier work on the fly using a small amount of data for detecting anomalies.
In the HMM hypervisor-based HIDS, we tested three methods. First, we mon-
itored the whole VM as a single process; this process had threads or children that
were also monitored with the process. In the second method, we monitored only
system calls with a high threat (IOCTL system calls and system calls with a high
threat level). We imported the list of high threat level system calls from [21] with
modifications. In the third method, we monitored the main threads only, which
were defined as the threads that invoke IOCTL system calls. We chose the IOCTL
system call because in a KVM virtual environment, an IOCTL system call is the
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most critical system call for the reason that VMs communicate with resources in
the host kernel using IOCTL.
Methods two and three failed to recognise malicious events, while method one
provided a 97% accuracy, 100% detection rate, and 5.66% false positive rate (see
6.2). It needed only about 19 MB of data to train the classifier and less than 150 KB
of data for detection, which are very small amounts of data. This made building the
classifier and detecting anomalies very fast, which suited the nature of ephemeral
VMs.
Table 6.2: Results of testing 1500 samples with chunk size of 10 and sequence length
of 6, where each sample contained 1000 sequence and 8 iterations.
Accuracy Detection Rate False Positive Rate
97% 100% 5.66%
We proved by hypothesis testing that the proposed classifier generated a strong
enough anomaly signal.
As we can see, the proposed system satisfies the special requirements for a
cloud host-based IDS, in addition to the ability to detect anomalies in ephemeral
VMs. The system processes the collected data (system calls) in way that reduces
the complexity of the HMM while still being able to reliably detect anomalies in
ephemeral VMs. It requires no prior knowledge about the VM from inside, dealing
with VMs as black boxes, which is a requirement in a public IaaS cloud, where VMs
are under the full control of the clients.
6.3 Cloud-Internal Denial of Service Class of Attacks
In this research, we also developed an architecture-based DoS attack targeting large-
scale public IaaS cloud environments, which is shown in chapter 5. This attack
takes advantage of the cloud host tendency to commit to more than it can deliver,
’over-commitment’. Over-commitment is essential to increase the utilisation to the
maximum possible, because it is assumed that VMs will not use all of the resources
dedicated to them to the maximum 24/7. If there is coordination between some
of the host tenants (attack members), and they increase their workload following a
plan to make the host detect the occurrence of over-utilisation, a migration order
will be initiated to reduce the stress in the host. Migration is targeted because it
is a very expensive process; it consumes bandwidth, processing time, and mem-
ory, causing a series of management algorithms to be run and increasing the attack
service and risk of security incidents during migration.
We designed a protocol to coordinate the attack among members. This protocol
is based on group key agreement (JKT protocol [86]) to establish a session key, PDV
(to synchronise time), PCM (to digitised workload patterns), and a leader election
protocol (to choose the leader of the attack).
Attack members in the CIDoS attack increase their workload following the
attack pattern distributed by the attack leader. The leader calculates the host-
expected workload and estimates the amount of workload needed to break a
severity-threshold and trigger migration. The estimated workload is then dis-
tributed among attack members. The attack pattern is distributed using spread
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spectrum techniques. The attack, as in many cloud attacks, requires co-residency
and covert channel for communication. The protocol has a very low complexity
O(n + T ) for the key agreement protocol and requires the transmission of a very
small stream of data (less than 100 bits in our example).
In the design of the protocol, we considered defending against different forms
of man-in-the-middle attacks, i.e. replay attacks. Therefore, the protocol provides
authentication and allows only members of the attack to participate in an active
manner. The protocol is also portable and independent of the environment’s tech-
nical details
To discover the severity-threshold that has to be broken, we designed another
attack (which is still theoretical). This new attack is an improvement on the CI-
DoS class of attacks. We tried to reveal some of the cloud parameters that are used
in migration algorithms so we could use them to calculate the severity-threshold.
We wanted the host to predict that it will be over-utilised without actually over-
utilising the host. There are prediction algorithms running in the cloud to predict
over-utilisation before it occurs to prevent a possible SLA breach. We focused on
overload detection algorithm and energy saving algorithm. We also designed a for-
mal model for the migration decision process. Then, an algorithm was developed
to extract the parameters from the model. The required parameters are revealed by
running numerous episodes of the CIDoS attack using parameters within a range
specified by the attack leader. After each run of the protocol, a migration check
has to be performed (to measure the success of the attack). We used an anomaly-
based HIDS to measure the success of the attack. The reliability of the extracted
values was calculated using interactive statistical hypothesis testing. These values
can be used to attack the host and can also be distributed to other malicious VMs
in different hosts.
By using accurate parameters in a CIDoS attack, the attack will live longer and
become harder to detect because the number of VMs migrated in the same time is
small. It is sufficient to make the cloud management algorithms predict that the
current over-utilisation threshold will be broken without actually breaking it. For
simplicity, we only considered the CPU utilisation. However, by adding memory
utilisation and network traffic, the attack will be stronger and even harder to detect.
Revealing migration parameters is a security threat in itself, and the revealed
parameters can be used in different attacks. The harm is significant because it is
highly probable that these values are used everywhere in the cloud and changing
them require changing the management algorithms of the entire large-scale public
IaaS cloud, which requires a large amount of configuration and testing before they
can be applied.
Furthermore, if this attack is coordinated between hosts (rather than being con-
fined to a single host), the cloud management node will make a series of false
resource-consuming decisions, which might saturate the network; the cloud man-
agement might also start turning on more hosts to cope with the fake expansion.
Moreover, if the attacker discovers the VM selection algorithm, he/she can avoid
being migrated by, for instance by intensely using the memory, which will make the
cost of migrating them high; this is just an example, many techniques can be used
to escape migration. The method to escape migration depends on the used VM
selection algorithm. However, the number of used algorithms is relatively small,
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which makes it easier for the attacker to discover them. By avoiding migration, the
attack will live longer because the group of malicious VMs that form the attack will
stay together for long time and constantly attack the same host.
In chapter 5, we also discussed some mitigation strategies for the CIDoS attack
(without the improvement). The detection methods were based on a correlation
calculation. We used the one-dimensional DCT and Euclidean distance to measure
the correlation between the workload patterns of participating malicious VMs. The
suggested methods successfully detected the attack and generated strong anomaly
signals. We developed an algorithm to measure the correlation between workload
patterns and check whether the correlation was increasing over time, which is a
strong sign of an attack.
To verify the validity of the suggested detection techniques, we created syn-
thetic workload signals based on our understanding of the CIDoS attack and the
following assumptions: first, the workload pattern of each VM differs randomly
from other VMs unless it is abnormal, and each VM has a stable workload pat-
tern which is not random, because in the real-world, servers usually have stable
workload patterns; they perform the same series of tasks repeatedly.
In our experiment, we found that the distances between malicious signals were
low in comparison with the distances between normal ones. Some normal VMs
might coincidentally have high correlation with malicious VMs in some points.
However, the correlation between malicious VMs has to decrease over time because
they are coordinating to match, and normal VMs will not follow the same pattern.
Therefore, having a coincident correlation between normal and malicious VMs will
not last for the whole test and will not cause a false alarm.
The suggested detection methods successfully detected the attack and gener-
ated strong enough anomaly signals. We proved that the generated anomaly signal
was strong enough using hypothesis testing, where we retained the null hypothe-
sis.
When representing the detection system, we ignored weak amplitudes by repre-
senting them as zeroes, while considering only strong amplitudes by representing
them as ones. This trick reduced the detection time and complexity of the op-
erations. In addition, the Euclidean distance and one-dimensional DCT are very
simple and straightforward techniques. Applying simple techniques is essential
to run the detection on the fly and to be able to detect an attack in time before
it is completely formed. Its contribution is the ability to detect the attack using
suitable detection mechanisms. We also discussed some prevention and response
techniques for the CIDoS attack.
6.4 Future Work
This research has raised many questions in need of further investigation. First and
foremost, the improved version of the CIDoS attack has to be moved from the the-
oretical to practical stage and tested in the lab, which we have already started to
do. We are using CloudSim to test the improved version of the CIDoS class of at-
tacks. CloudSim is a framework for simulating an IaaS cloud environment. It runs
the most popular migration algorithms, which we are attempting to reverse engi-
neer to extract the required migration parameters. The work on the attack testing
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will involve simulations. This will be my next project in coordination with other
researchers as a team at King Abdul Aziz University in Saudi Arabia.
The simulations will check the performance of the proposed algorithm to dis-
cover some of the cloud migration hidden parameters. We will investigate the fol-
lowing questions:
• Can we detect which migration algorithms are in use?
• Can we measure the sensitivity of the algorithms to estimate the trigger point?
• Can we say something about the decision characteristics themselves?
Some examples of the resource management algorithms from CloudSim that we
will consider are shown in figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: A list of cloud resource management algorithms from CloudSim.
Most of these algorithms are based on a study conducted in 2012 by Beloglazov
and Buyya at the University of Melbourne, Australia [20].
We need to manually study the used algorithms and find the trigger thresholds.
Then, as a proof of principle we will try to detect any of the used algorithms. We
can only apply the attack in a simulated environment. We studied the possibility of
applying it in Amazon EC2. However, legal restrictions prohibit any security test
in the Amazon network.
Another interesting and critical area of research is a method to prevent a VM
from being migrated by misusing the VM selection algorithms discussed in section
5.5.1; in this research, we suggested that the VM could avoid migration by increas-
ing the cost of migration through intensifying the use of memory. However, this is
just an example. Other ways to avoid migration, in addition to the suggested one,
could be studied and tested in the future.
In the area of cloud hypervisor-based HIDS, the following areas require fur-
ther investigation and testing. First, considering system call arguments in the
hypervisor-based detection and measuring the accuracy, overhead, and detection
rate. In our research, we ignored arguments to reduce the complexity of training
and running the IDS. However, the effect of considering the arguments on the accu-
racy and the exposed overhead has not been studied, but is a good topic for future
work.
The effect of a mimicry attack on a hypervisor-based HIDS in a cloud envi-
ronment that was introduced in [169] and discussed in section 4.5 requires further
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investigation and testing in cloud environments. The problem of classifier drafting,
especially for ephemeral VM anomaly detection systems, requires more attention.
Another interesting problem is how to determine whether or not a newly initiated
VM is a short-lived one. Although this is not a security problem, many security
solutions may rely on it.
The area of preventing cloud cartography and preventing attackers from map-
ping the cloud (section 5.1.1 and [139]) are important and require more research
because they would prevent many cloud attacks that rely on mapping the cloud.
We assumed that VMs are not malicious when they first start running. How-
ever, if they are, the anomaly detection systems will fail. This area needs more
research; this problem is related to authentication mechanisms and the process of
initiating new VMs. Finally, we believe that the usage pattern of the cloud should
be more regulated, and providers should encourage their consumers to maintain a
consistent behaviour, because with anomaly detection systems, a more consistent
VM is more secure.
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